However, although Justice Brown rightly notes that
The public interest favouring disclosure [of the bloggers’ names] clearly does not outweigh the legitimate interests in freedom of expression and the right to privacy of the persons sought to be identified......what is somewhat troubling is that then she further qualifies her decision by pointing out that in addition to the interest of freedom of expression, Ms. Morris also didn't do all the legwork:
It is not the role of the court to parse the impugned articles and blogs before it to attempt to determine, by divination or divine inspiration, which statements it should assess in determining whether a prima facie case has been established.While sarcasm aimed at a litigant whose pleadings are incomplete or insufficient is always welcome in this writer's eyes, one cannot help but feel that by including it the justice has in some way qualified her decision on a procedural level - allowing the question to be raised that, had Ms. Morris filed a more complete brief clearly identifying the comments she felt were slanderous, would the judge then have been more receptive to her motion. This offers an additional ground of appeal on the decision and one that allows others to call into question the free speech bonafides of Justice Brown's decision.
After all, if we are to look to existing precedent regarding anonymous online communication and how it is privileged as free expression, the United States can provide us with numerous (non-binding) precedents. Most notable in this instance is Anonymous Online Speakers v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Nevada Reno, a Ninth Circuit Court ruling from 2010 that stated unequivocally that an author's decision to remain anonymous when publishing online was protected by the First Amendment.