Showing posts with label Ontario law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ontario law. Show all posts

Thursday, July 14, 2016

LawFact of the Day: Civil Litigation

Here is your daily LawFact from Wise Law for Thursday July 14, 2016. Today we are talking about Civil Litigation.

A video posted by Wise Law Office (@wiselaw) on


In many Ontario civil cases, a full trial is no longer required for a court to rule.

Courts may now decide lawsuits on summary judgment motions that streamline and shorten the process.
- Garry J. Wise, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Wednesday, July 13, 2016

LawFact of the Day: Family Law

Here is your daily LawFact from Wise Law for Wednesday July 13, 2016. Today we are talking about Family Law.

A video posted by Wise Law Office (@wiselaw) on


Many couples live separate and apart “under one roof” following martial separation, and do not immediately physically separate by changing residency.

Legal advice should be obtained as to whether a separation has occurred that would be recognized under Ontario law.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Thursday, April 14, 2016

LawFact of the Day: Civil Litigation

Here is your daily LawFact from Wise Law for Thursday April 14, 2016. Today we are talking about Civil Litigation.

A video posted by @wiselaw on

In many Ontario Civil Cases, a full trial is no longer required for a court to rule.

Courts may now decide lawsuits on summary judgment motions that streamline and shorten the process.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Tuesday, April 12, 2016

LawFact of the Day: Employment Law

Here is you daily LawFact from Wise Law for Tuesday April 12, 2016. Today we are talking about Employment Law.

A video posted by @wiselaw on

Ontario employees are prohibited from discrimination and harassment against any employee.

Employers may not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, colour, citizenship, creed, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, record of offences, martial status or family status.
- Garry J. Wise, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Sunday, September 11, 2011

Ontario Court of Appeal: McNamee v McNamee, 2011 ONCA

McNamee v McNamee - an interesting analysis of "gifts" that may be excluded from calculation of net family property under s. 4(2) of the Family Law Act.

Facts

Clayton McNamee, appellant, and Connie McNamee, respondent, were married for 18.5 years with their marriage conducted as an equal partnership by all accounts. The parties separated on August 5, 2007.

Mr. McNamee Sr. owned a concrete trucking company. In 1988, he invited his two sons, Clayton and Trevor to join his company to establish a constructional division and sales divsion respectively. The company became very successful, with annual sales of more than 5 million. Mr. McNamee Sr. controlled the business side and made the major financial decisions.

In 2003, acting on the advice of his lawyers, Mr. McNamee Sr. implemented a corporate freeze in order to protect his business from creditors and limit his taxes upon death. This was achieved by folding the business into a holding company, "Holdco"and freezing the value of the business at 2 million. He subsequently transferred his only two common shares in his concrete company to Holdco in exchange for 20,000 voting shares valued at 2 million. Moreover, he subscribed for 1000 common shares for an amount of $1 and transferred 500 shares to each of his sons.

The key issue is whether this transfer of shares to his son Clayton McNamee constituted a gift.

Mr. McNamee Sr. was determined not to let anyone get a hold of the shares he transferred to his sons without his approval. He also took actions to guard against any of the shares becoming part of any joint property in the event that his sons experienced a breakdown in marriage. For instance, as part of the estate freeze, Mr. McNamee Sr. retained complete control by ensuring that his preference shares were voting shares.

Declaration of Gift

There were two conditions that Mr. McNamee attached to the declaration:

1.) In the event of a marital breakdown, neither the shares nor any increase in the shares would form part of donee's NFP in the event of a divorce

2.) The donee was to be in sole control of the shares without any interference from his spouse

The actual Declaration of Gift was as follows:

DECLARATION OF GIFT

I, John McNamee, of the Village of Jasper, in the Province of Ontario, am the owner of 1000 Common Shares in the capital of [Holdco] (the “Property”)

I desire to gift the property to my sons, Trevor McNamee and Clay McNamee, (the “Donees”) in equal proportion.

To carry out my intended purpose, I hereby deliver to each of the Donees a share certificate representing 500 Common Shares in the capital of [Holdco] registered in the name of the Donee.

I acknowledge that it is my intent to vest absolute ownership and title in the Property in the Donee from the date of this declaration.

I hereby direct that the whole of the Property gifted to each Donee, the income arising therefrom, any appreciation in the value thereof, and any property acquired in substitution therefor shall not fall into any community of property which may exist between the Donnee and his spouse, and shall not form part of the net family property of the Donee for any purpose or purposes under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 and any amendment thereto or any successor legislation thereto, and is given to the Donee on the condition that it shall remain his separate property, free from the control of his spouse. This direction shall apply not only to the Family Law Act, but also to the laws of any other jurisdiction dealing with the distribution of property in the event of death or marriage breakdown.


Proceeding to the estate freeze, the appellant along with his brother and father signed a unanimous shareholders agreement. The appellant stated that his father had told him the transferred shares were a gift.

Trial Judge's Findings

The trial judge held that the shares were not transferred by way of gift and Mrs. McNamee was entitled to half their value.

Main Issue Subject to Appeal

1.) Whether Mr. McNamee's 500 common shares in his father's (Mr. McNamee Sr.) company had been received by way of a gift and thus excluded from the appellant's Net Family Property ("NFP"). If the shares were deemed to be gifted then they would not form part of the appellant's NFP.

Application of Law & Analysis of Issue on Appeal:

Shares transferred by way of Gift:
Section 4(2) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, excludes gifts received during the marriage from a spouse’s net family property:

4(2) The value of the following property that a spouse owns on the valuation date does not form part of the spouse’s net family property:

1. Property, other than a matrimonial home, that was acquired by gift or inheritance from a third person after the date of the marriage.

The onus of proving exclusion under s. 4(2) is on the person claiming it: s. 4(3).
Elements of a Gift:
In order to constitute a valid legal gift, there must be:
1.) An intention to make a gift on the part of the donor, without expectation of consideration
2.) An acceptance of the gift by the donee
3.) A sufficient act to transfer the property to complete the transaction
The trial judge concluded that the transfer of shares to the appellant was not a gift based on four circumstances:
1.) The transfer was not a gratuitous transfer but a transfer for consideration
2.) Mr. McNamee Sr. did not intend to gift the shares
3.) Mr. McNamee Sr. did not divest himself of power or control over the shares; and
4.) The appellant did not accept the gift

Consideration Factor:

Consideration is the value that flows from a promissee to a promisor as a result of a bargain. The Court of Appeal stated that the appellant did not bargain for the shares he received. Also, the Court determined that the shares were not transferred by Mr. McNamee Sr. to his sons to ensure their continued involvement with the company. Rather, they were transferred in order that the estate freeze could be implemented.

Intention of Donor/Transferor:

The trial judge held that Mr. McNamee Sr. only intended to transfer the shares to his sons in order the complete the the estate freeze and not for the purposes of gifting. In particular the trial judge asserted:

Clearly on the evidence the intention of John in authorizing and directing the estate freeze was not for the purpose of making a gift to his boys. It was to creditor proof his business and thus better protect the future of his business.

The transfer of the shares was but one step that was necessary for the primary objective to be accomplished.

So long as the main objective was achieved with the requirements he demanded John was less concerned about how the shares were transferred to his sons. This is evident from his testimony when asked why he didn’t sell the shares to the boys. He answered that it was because they didn’t have any money.

The Court stated that the fact that the Mr. McNamee Sr. transferred shares to the appellant in conjunction with the estate freeze did not disregard the main purpose of the transfer of shares, which was the intention to transfer by way of gift. Moreover, the Court held that since the father did not sell his shares to the appellant, this reinforced the notion that a valid gift was made.

Delivery:

There is no issue concerning the delivery of the shares.

Acceptance of Shares and Divesting Power of Control:

The Court held it was of no consequence that the appellant was unaware about the Declaration of Gift until after the divorce . The appellant was aware that his father had previously indicated to him that the transfer of shares was intended to be a gift and that he paid no consideration for the shares.

The respondent contended that the appellant must understand the nature of the transaction and willingly accept title to the property is that transferred (see Ziff, supra, at p. 157). The trial judge held:

These authorities indicate that the question of whether or not the husband in the case at bar is found to have accepted his father’s gift would require that he know of the transfer of shares, at the time it was made. Indeed, at the very minimum, he would be required, under the rule in Wilson v. Hicks which is still good law in Ontario, to have understood the nature of the transaction and to have willingly accepted title to the shares. This understanding presumes an element of knowledge that he was the donee to the transfer of the shares at the time the transfer was made and of the terms and conditions attached to the shares.

Professor Ziff qualifies this concept:
Acceptance of a gift involves an understanding of the transaction and a desire to assume title. This is a requirement that is treated with little rigour: in the ordinary case, acceptance is presumed to exist.

The Court asserted that there was no evidence to suggest the respondent's inference that if the appellant had been aware of the Declaration of Gift at the time it was created he would not have accepted the transfer of shares from his father.

The Court declared that the trial judge erred in ordering half the value of the shares be included in the equalization payment to the respondent. Referencing s. 4(2) Family Law Act, the Court was satisfied that the shares were transferred by way of gift and thus should not form part of the appellant's NFP and be subject to an equalization payment.

Disposition:

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the trial judge requiring the appellant to pay the respondent the amount of $209,100 in addition to prejudgment interest on that amount.

- Alim Ramji, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Friday, December 03, 2010

This Week At The Ontario Court of Appeal: 10-12-03

Each week at Wise Law Blog, we review recent decisions from the Ontario Court of Appeal.

Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General). Not, sadly, this not the Court of Appeal's final decision on the landmark trial case that struck down Criminal Code provisions on prostitution.

Rather, it is the the Court of Appeal's preliminary ruling, allowing the Attorney General's request for a stay to prevent those provisions from being struck down until the appeal has been determined.

The Court followed the test set forth in RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General, where the Supreme Court stated that the requirements for granting a stay pending appeal are that a serious issue is to be tried, that the party seeking the stay would suffer irreparable harm should the stay not be granted, and that the balance of convenience and public interest considerations favour a stay. The first requirement (seriousness) was rapidly resolved as not in contention, leaving the court to decide whether to grant the stay on the second and third requirements.

The Court granted the stay, accepting that street prostitutes are at increased risk of harm as a result of the laws being allowed to stay on the books, but pointing out that the use of the laws allows police methods to investigate more important investigations into sex-worker crimes - including particularly exploitative conduct, such as child prostitution or sex slavery. At the same time, however, the judge also notes that the laws put street prostitutes at increased risk. The arguments the judge uses are in many ways a sneak preview of what the Court of Appeal must consider when it hears the case, so the Read-the-whole-case rating for this stay grant is 5.

R. v. Luu. An appeal on a manslaughter charge where a man was convicted for unlawfully shooting and killing his friend while the two of them were playing with a handgun. The Court of Appeal accepted the appellant's argument that the conviction was unreasonable. At the original trial, the theory of manslaughter - which the jury accepted - was that since the firearms examiner had concluded that the gun had been fired 1.4 meters away from the deceased, the possibility that the deceased had accidentally shot himself was nonexistent.

However, the Court of Appeal noted that the firearms examiner's evidence was based on an examination of the deceased's shirt, which had not been carefully maintained as evidence prior to the examiner's inspection of it, and which could have allowed for error in her analysis. Furthermore, the doctor performing the autopsy originally concluded that the gunshot wound was a "contact wound" (IE, the muzzle of the gun was in contact with the body when the gun fired), but changed her opinion to coincide with the firearms examiner's opinion despite conflicting evidence. On these grounds, the Court of Appeal decided the jury's verdict was unreasonable since the evidence did not satisfy the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Read-the-whole-case rating: 3 for a very readable analysis of the available evidence.

R. v. Singh. A murder conviction was appealed by the defendant. Mr. Singh was accused of murdering his ex-girlfriend in a fit of jealousy. The defense appealed on three grounds: that a phone conversation admitted as evidence was inadmissible, that the Crown's cross-examination of two witnesses providing the bulk of Mr. Singh's defense was improper, and that the trial judge erred when he failed to give a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the lead police investigator's testimony.

The phone conversation - at a time just before the death, between the deceased and her friend, in which the deceased informed the friend that she was with the accused - was deemed admissible by the Court of Appeal. The defense had argued that the evidence was inadmissible because there was no proof that the deceased was telling her friend the truth. Interestingly, the Court of Appeal makes its decision here by comparing the situation to R. v. Khelawon, a leading case on principled exemptions to the hearsay rule: they suggest that the evidence is admissible because there was no plausible motive for the deceased to lie.

The witnesses were a simpler matter. Although the Crown's cross-examination of each of the two witnesses - the defendant's brother, who claimed he was with the defendant at the time of the murder, and a girl who claimed that she had overheard the deceased's boss threatening to kill the deceased - was vigorous, the Court of Appeal found that the Crown's occasional improper behaviour (sarcasm directed at the witnesses and editorial comment during cross-examination) was at least somewhat understandable due to the witnesses' combative behaviour on the stand. The Court also noted that the witnesses' testimony was far from exculpatory and that both witnesses had a track record of inconsistency in their statements.

In regard to the trial judge's failure to give a limiting instruction, the Court first noted that even the defense admitted that this ground alone was not enough to accept an appeal. However, the Court addressed it nonetheless, pointing out that the impugned evidence that defense argued should have merited a limiting instruction was actually elicited by the defense on cross-examination. Further, the Court noted that the defense, in their closing argument, made wide use of the hearsay evidence that they were now challenging due to the lack of limitation, and dismissed the argument. Read-the-whole-case rating: 2.5, but the portion devoted to analysis of the phone conversation hearsay evidence merits a 4.
- Christopher Bird, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Sunday, October 24, 2010

Ontario Employment Law: "Wilful Misconduct" under the Employment Standards Act

Section 54 of the Ontario Employment Standards Act requires that an employer who terminates the employment of a non-probationary employee without cause must give the employee written notice of termination or, alternatively, pay specified wages in lieu of such notice.

Section 55 permits certain exceptions to that obligation, exceptions which are fully enumerated in Regulation 288/01 of the Employment Standards Act.

We will consider one: where an employee who is guilty of "wilful misconduct" that has not been condoned by the employer.

In Walmart Canada Corporation v. Glenford Gray and Ministry of Labour, the Ontario Labour Relations Board stated that in order for misconduct to rise to the level of "wilful misconduct" as defined in the Employment Standards Act the employee's conduct must be deliberate and completely egregious as opposed to careless, thoughless, or heedless, a high standard indeed.

In so holding, the Board relied on and agreed with the decision in VME Equipment of Canada Ltd. [1992] OESAD No. 230, where the following is stated:
Much has been written on the meaning of the words ‘wilful misconduct’. It seems to me, however, that that authority can be summarized briefly. In the first place, serious misconduct has to be proven. That is conduct that seriously interferes with either the performance of the employee’s job duties or that of his or her co-workers. Normally the Employer would have to demonstrate that harm has been done to its operation and that the misconduct amounted to a repudiation by the employee of the employment contract. There are two general categories of serious misconduct. There will be single acts: insubordination, theft and dishonesty, and physical violence against other employees, for instance, which may, standing on their own, meet that standard of seriousness. As well, there will be less serious repetitive forms of misconduct, which if handled properly by the employer, will also meet this standard of seriousness. The employer, in this scenario, must have explained to the employee after each occurrence that the conduct in question was not acceptable and that if continued would result in termination and there must be, subsequent to these warnings, a culminating incident.
In Walmart Canada Corporation, the second category of "serious misconduct", described in the passage above, was at issue, that is, a "repetitive form of misconduct". A Walmart employee, Mr. Gray, had failed to attend at work on three occasions and had given no or inadequate notice on certain occasions. This conduct must be viewed in light of the fact that Mr. Gray had had the importance of attendance and the consequences for failing to report to work brought home to him on more than one occasion.

Still, the board went on to find that the required standard was not met and therefore Walmart obliged to pay Mr. Gray two-weeks termination pay in accordance with the Employment Standards Act:

In this case, Mr. Gray’s conduct has been indeed careless, thoughtless or heedless. I have found that he made no, or insufficient, attempts to notify his supervisor of certain absences. The fact that he may have had difficulty in communicating with a supervisor in the past may have led to perfunctory attempts to call in late 1999 and 2000. I cannot conclude, on the basis of the three occasions on which Mr. Gray was unable, due to illness or family emergencies, to attend at work, where he failed to notify his employer or to make sufficient attempts to call in to give notice of his absence, that Mr. Gray was guilty of the kind of wilful misconduct identified in section 57(10). Wal-Mart decided to discharge him on that basis. The Act does not prevent Wal-Mart from doing so. Was Mr. Gray’s behaviour so egregious that Wal-Mart could not be expected to permit him to work another two weeks before his termination? I find it was not. After all, it was not Mr. Gray’s behaviour while at work which caused Wal-Mart to discharge him.

The board reasoned that if its finding in this regard made Mr. Gray's continued presence for two more weeks untenable in workplace, the employer had the option of paying him two weeks' wages in lieu of notice:

If an employer finds that its action of discharging the employee renders the continued presence of the employee in the workplace inappropriate, it has the option of paying two weeks’ salary in lieu of notice. However, section 57(10) deals only with the employee’s conduct, not the situation which results from the employer’s reaction to it. Here there was nothing in Mr. Gray’s conduct to make his presence in the workplace for another two week’s untenable.

This decision makes it plain that an employer will not be able to easily shirk its responsibility of giving notice or pay in lieu thereof in accordance with section 54 of the Employment Standards Act by alleging that the employee is guilty of "wilful misconduct" unless the conduct at issue seriously interferes with either the performance of the employee's job duties or that of his or her co-workers.

- Robert Tanha, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Interns and Employment Standards

Professor David Doorey tackles a thorny question: Are Unpaid Interns Illegal in Canada?

And on a related note, see this post from a leading U.S. law blog: Above the Law Seeks Student Interns.

(The crucial caveat appears to be that the internships are available only to students in New York City who are eligible to receive academic credit for interning).

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Monday, September 27, 2010

How Do Ontario’s Six Law Schools Compare?

Ontario’s six law schools are:
1. Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
2. University of Toronto, Faculty of Law
3. University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law
4. University of Windsor, Faculty of Law
5. University of Western Ontario, Faculty of Law
6. Queen’s University, Faculty of Law
Let’s briefly consider what each school offers in terms of programming.

Osgoode Hall Law School

The breadth of Osgoode Hall Law School's upper-year J.D. courses is undeniable: it offers more than 125 seminars and courses annually. It also has strong clinical programs.

Further, it has a number of joint programs, including a new joint J.D./LL.M. program with New York University.

For the J.D. program, the curriculum streams offered are: taxation law; international law; and dispute resolution law.

Osgoode now also offers a professional LL.M. program for the busy practitioner. In addition to the J.D. and LL.M., Osgoode also offers the Ph.D. in law for those seeking an academic career.

For more information, visit Osgoode’s website

University of Toronto, Faculty of Law

The University of Toronto also offers a rich and diverse legal education. It has a wide-ranging curriculum, though its upper-year course offerings are probably slightly less than Osgoode’s in any given year.

It does not offer formal curriculum streams though a student can take a disproportionate number of courses in certain areas of interest.

That said, it offers more joint programs than Osgoode, including a J.D./Ph.d. (political science) program.

Also of note, the school offers many – perhaps the most – community legal clinics and clinical education programs to its J.D. students, an enticing feature for those looking for a practical legal education.

Like Osgoode, the University of Toronto offers graduate programs in law, though they are smaller programs than Osgoode’s.

University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law

Ottawa’s J.D. program offers four different concentrations: social justice law; environmental law; international law; law and technology.

In terms of clinical programs, among other programs, the law school now offers the uOttawa-Ecojustice Environmental Law Clinic for those interested in the study and practice of environmental law. Of the all the Ontario schools, Ottawa is the only one which offers such a program.

Further, Ottawa offers a national program in which a student may graduate with both common law and civil law degrees. This is definitively a very attractive program for those considering careers in the civil service or for those Ontario students who are seriously contemplating practicing law in Quebec at some point in their career.

Ottawa also has graduate programs, the LL.M. and LL.D. programs, though their graduate department is smaller than either Osgoode's or the University of Toronto's, meaning, among other things, it does not have nearly the same breadth of graduate courses.

For more information, visit: The University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law’s website

University of Windsor, Faculty of Law

Windsor’s flagship program is the Canadian & American Dual J.D. program it has with University of Detroit Mercy Law School.

Its J.D. course offerings, while more than adequate, are not nearly as extensive as some of the other schools, such as Osgoode Hall. That said its social justice programming is second to none.

At present, the University of Windsor does not have any graduate programs in law though this is scheduled to change in September 2011 when the school launches its first LL.M. program.

For more information, visit: The University of Windsor, Faculty of Law’s website

University of Western Ontario, Faculty of Law

Western’s business law offerings are very impressive. The school offers concentrations in business law, criminal law, intellectual property, and taxation. It also has very strong advocacy programs.

Besides Queen’s University, Western is the only other school that offers a concentration in criminal law.

In terms of graduate programs, Western has an LL.M. program but no Ph.d.

For more information, visit: The University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law website

Queen’s University, Faculty of Law

The school offers combined J.D. programs, as well as a business law clinic. LikeOttawa, Queen’s has a combined civil law/common law degree program.

Queen’s law school is perhaps best known for its criminal law course offerings. It is the only school in Canada that offers a "correctional law project", a program that, among other things, deals with inmate appeals against conviction.

While Queen’s LL.M. program is well-established, it’s doctorate in law is a fairly new program.

For more information, visit: Queen’s University, Faculty of Law’s website

Concluding remarks:

Depending on the law applicant’s personal preferences and ultimate career aspirations, obviously each of the above schools may have varying levels of appeal. Nonetheless, regardless of which school you get into, you can be assured that you will be receiving a top-notch legal education.

The fact that you do not obtain an LL.B. or J.D. in a certain concentration (e.g., business law) from a particular law school is not a bar to practicing law in that area.

For more information on the Ontario Law Schools generally, see the Ontario Law School Application Service’s 2011 Instruction Booklet.

- Robert Tanha, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Thursday, September 16, 2010

Ontario Employment Law: Reasonable Notice and 'Character of Employment'

Ontario employers are legally required to provide reasonable notice of termination when terminating employment without cause.

Often, employers fail to do so.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that an overwhelming majority of employment law cases deal with the issue of reasonable notice.

The legal remedy for an employer's failure to provide reasonable notice is an award of damages, based on the compensation that would have been paid to the employee during the period of notice which should have been provided.

How is this period of reasonable notice determined?

In the leading Ontario case of Bardal v. Globe and Mail Ltd., decided in 1960, it was noted that what constitutes reasonable notice will differ depending on the circumstances of any particular case.

There, the court identified a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to the assessment of reasonable notice: the character of employment (are you a manager or a non-manager?); the age of the employee and the availability of similar employment; and the length of service of the employee.

McRuer, C.J.H.C. articulated what have come to be known as the Bardal factors, as follows:

There can be no catalogue laid down as to what was reasonable notice in particular classes of cases. The reasonableness of the notice must be decided with reference to each particular case, having regard to the character of the employment, the length of service of the servant, the age of the servant and the availability of similar employment, having regard to the experience, training and qualifications of the servant.
Without question, of these factors, the duration of service of the employee is typically the most significant.

Nevertheless, the character of employment has also been an important consideration with respect to assessments of notice periods, with most courts in the past essentially giving management employees (those with higher levels of responsibility) a lengthier notice period than non-management employees.

This has traditionally been rationalized on the basis that it takes a longer period of time for managers to secure alternate employment than non-management employees.

Courts have reached this conclusion by presuming that there are fewer employment opportunities available for management employees seeking comparable positions as compared with non-management employees because their skills are more specialized and hence relevant to a narrower range of employers, often without undertaking an analysis into whether this is in fact the case.

In Panimondo v. Shorewood Packaging Corporation, a 2009 decision of the Ontario Superior Court, Mr. Justice Strathy notes at at paragraph 33:
With respect to the factor of character of employment, there appears to be a presumption that employees with more senior positions in an organization, such as those with management responsibilities, require a longer notice period than those with lower levels of responsibility. It is presumed that there are fewer employment opportunities available for those whose specialized knowledge and skills demand higher managerial positions with comparable salaries and benefits:Minott v. O’Shanter Development Company Ltd. 1999 CanLII 3686 (ON C.A.), (1999), 42 O.R. (3d) 321, 40 C.C.E.L. (2d) 1 (C.A.); Cronk v. Canadian General Insurance Company 1995 CanLII 814 (ON C.A.), (1995), 25 O.R. (3d) 505, 14 C.C.E.L. (2d) 1 (C.A.).
In a 1995 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, Cronk v. Canada General Insurance Corp., Weiler J., in dissent, essentially rejected this presumption, arguing that there may be more compelling reasons to reach the opposite conclusion - that clerical workers as opposed to senior managers probably experience more difficulty in securing employment.

She cites a number of reasons for this, not least of which is that while there may be fewer job vacancies for senior managers, they are often in a much better position to secure re-employment because of their education, training, and contacts.

The majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal differed, however, and continued the traditional approach, holding that the clerical nature of Mrs. Cronk's work did not entitle her to any extended period of notice.

Currently, Ontario law holds that managers typically remain entitled to longer periods of notice than non-managers. The character of the employee's work is still an important factor to be considered.

This may continue to be a topic of ongoing debate, however.

What is more, this traditional analysis may see increasing challenge in our current economy, where many employees cannot be neatly classified as managers or non-managers, and where online employment recruitment continues to revolutionize the job search process.

- Robert Tanha, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Wednesday, June 16, 2010

Ontario Reports Online (Revisited)

Precedent now has an article online regarding the arrival in April of the digital Ontario Reports. I have a few, brief comments quoted in this article.

See: News: Ontario Reports go online

My expanded take on the new OR's is found in our April 8, 2010 post, The Digital Ontario Reports (Fail).

To my surprise, not much has changed since then. The weekly Ontario Reports email notices now find their way to my delete bin rather quickly.

The digital O.R.'s remain a great opportunity lost, I'm aftraid.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

EMPLOYMENT LAW • CIVIL LITIGATION • WILLS AND ESTATES • FAMILY LAW & DIVORCE

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Friday, April 23, 2010

Flushing Out the System

Toilet reform comes to Ontario this summer - Ontario to ban toilets that waste water:

In fact, the province is home to a leader in high-tech toilet engineering, Gauley said, pointing to Ontario firm Hennessy & Hinchcliffe, which developed the three-litre Proficiency toilet. “The three-litre toilet, an Ontario development, is the most efficient toilet in North America,” he said.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

EMPLOYMENT LAW • CIVIL LITIGATION • WILLS AND ESTATES • FAMILY LAW & DIVORCE

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Thursday, April 15, 2010

The HST Tax is Coming July 1, 2010

The Law Society of Upper Canada's FAQ's address the transition:
Effective July 1, 2010, the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) will be implemented. The HST combines the GST and the Provincial Sales Tax (PST) into a single federally administered tax and work completed by lawyers and paralegals after July 1, 2010, will be subject to the full HST. Lawyers and paralegals should contact the CRA directly ....to confirm how the HST applies to specific legal services and disbursements, and should consider consulting with an accounting or tax professional to discuss how the implementation of the HST will affect their internal accounting and invoicing systems.

We've previously expressed concern at the significant, inflationary impact of this new tax on fees for legal services - see our November 2009 post, The HST Tax on Access to Justice.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

EMPLOYMENT LAW • CIVIL LITIGATION • WILLS AND ESTATES • FAMILY LAW & DIVORCE

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"Nearly Half" of Toronto Court Interpreters Fail A.G.'s Competency Test

A very serious indictment of court interpreters' services in the Toronto area from the Attorney General's offices:

The results of a controversial test for court interpreters in the Toronto area could lead to widespread delays in trials and new grounds of appeal for defendants convicted of serious crimes.

Nearly half of all court interpreters in the Greater Toronto Area, some with more than two decades of experience, were informed this week they had failed a new test administered last year.

Of the 225 people tested, 108 did not receive a passing grade, according to the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney-General. Many more received a conditional pass. The province declined to reveal exactly how many interpreters met the standard for full accreditation.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

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Thursday, March 18, 2010

Ontario To Announce New Taser Guidelies March 30

Canadian Press reports that the Ontario's government is about to announce new guidelines on the use of Taser stun guns by the Province's police forces:

TORONTO — Ontario is poised to revamp its guidelines on the use of stun guns by police, The Canadian Press has learned.

The changes are expected to be made public March 30, sources say, about two years after the governing Liberals launched a review of Taser use in the province.

According to the report, radical change is unlikely. Recommendations that all front line, uniformed police officers be permitted to carry the weapon are not expected to be implemented:

Currently, only tactical officers and supervisors are allowed to carry Tasers in Ontario, but the government is being urged to make them available to all front-line police officers.

It's among the recommendations made by the police standards advisory committee, a group of representatives from police groups and municipalities within the ministry tasked with providing advice to the government about the use of stun guns.

...Government officials wouldn't comment on whether they plan to follow that advice, but hinted that drastic changes are not in the works.

"We have and will continue -- notwithstanding the report -- to have a very measured use of Tasers in the province of Ontario," said Laura Blondeau, a spokeswoman for Community Safety and Corrections Minister Rick Bartolucci.

Progressive Conservative critic Garfield Dunlop said he's planning to re-introduce a resolution in the legislature demanding that all front-line officers carry Tasers.

Friday, November 20, 2009

Workplace Harassment and Bill 168 - A New Remedy for an Old Problem

Workplace bullying is a serious problem for thousands of Canadians at work. It can degrade one’s self worth and create serious health problems for workers and their families.

There has often been very little that could be done to stop the workplace bully in his or her tracks. But, in Ontario, there is now hope around the corner.

This month, Ontario’s Standing Committee on Social Policy will wrap up public hearings regarding Ontario's Bill 168, An Act to amend the Occupational Health and Safety Act with respect to violence and harassment in the workplace. The Bill, which will place heavier obligations on employers to prevent and manage workplace violence and harassment, has already been given second reading in the Legislature, and will likely become law sometime next year.

The new law defines "workplace harassment" and "workplace violence" in the following manner:

"Workplace harassment" means engaging in a course of vexatious comment or conduct against a worker in a workplace that is known or ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome.

"Workplace violence" means:

a. the exercise of physical force by a person against a worker in a workplace that causes or could cause physical injury to the worker,

b. an attempt to exercise physical force against a worker in a workplace that could cause physical injury to the worker.

This type of legislative initiative should be welcomed. Many employees live with the often horrific reality that the workplace can be a war zone from which there is no shelter.

Researchers Charlotte Rayner, Helge Hoel and Cary L. Cooper have contributed to our understanding of what may constitute workplace bullying.

In their book, Workplace Bullying: What We Know, Who is to Blame, and What We Can Do, they suggest that bullying may include:

  • Threat to professional status (e.g., damaging the person's reputation, humiliating the person in public or accusing him or her of lack of effort).
  • Threat to personal standing (e.g., calling the person names; insulting, teasing or intimidating him or her; or devaluing the person based on age).
  • Isolation (e.g., preventing access to opportunities, deliberately withholding important information or isolating the person physically or socially).
  • Overwork (e.g., imposing undue pressure to produce work, setting impossible deadlines or making consistent and unnecessary disruptions).
  • Destabilization (e.g., failing to give credit where it is due, assigning meaningless tasks, removing responsibility or setting the person up for failure).
Certainly the costs of workplace violence and harassment can be profound for victims. Bill 168 is a welcome step in the right direction.

......

Tort Remedies for Harassment

The Ontario Superior Court's December 2009 ruling in Piresferreira v. Ayotte and Bell Mobility Inc., [2008] O.J. No. 518, provides a dramatic example of the civil remedies available in Ontario in extreme cases of harassment and bullying.

In that case, an employee was abused by a manager who frequently yelled and swore at her, and berated her in front of other employees. The culminating incident occurred when the manager became frustrated with the employee and pushed her aside, and the employee (who was 60 years old) lost her balance and fell back against a filing cabinet. Soon thereafter, the employee was presented with a performance improvement plan prepared by the manager. The employee was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and left her employment permanently.

The court awarded the employee $45,000 in damages for assault, battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, mental suffering and psycho-traumatic disability; $450,832 for loss of past and future income; and $5,123 for special damages.

Garry has also addressed this ruling in a previous post.

- Stephen Ellis, Toronto

Stephen Ellis is a Toronto lawyer practicing in association with Wise Law Office, Toronto

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EMPLOYMENT LAW • CIVIL LITIGATION • WILLS AND ESTATES • FAMILY LAW & DIVORCE

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Monday, November 16, 2009

The Future of Wallace Damages in Ontario Employment Law

Law Times has a good analysis today on the future of Wallace damages in Ontario wrongful dismissal proceedings. These damages have typically been granted where an employer has acted in bad faith in the termination of employment.

With the Ontario Court of Appeal's June 25, 2009 ruling in Slepenkova v. Ivanov, it is now clear that the nearly-universal pronouncements by management lawyers as to the death of this head of damages after Honda and Keays may have been a bit premature.

In Slepenkova, the Ontario appellate court upheld a two-month notice extension for an employer's bad faith termination, even though no evidence was led at trial as to the specific damages the employee directly incurred as a result of the bad faith. This appeared to place the trial Judge's decision at odds with the new Wallace test set out in Honda.

One employers' counsel, quoted in the article, sums up management's employment law litigation equation as follows:
“Employers always have to ask themselves whether it’s worth going to trial in employment cases...And you can never tell what the judge is going to do because employment cases are always crapshoots where sympathetic judges have enough leeway to fit the facts around the law.
See the full Law Times article: Wallace Damages are not Dead

Prior to Honda, the Wallace damages claim had become a virtually "boilerplate" feature in employment law litigation, rearing itself in a very significant percentage of employees' wrongful dismissal claims.

In our view, Slepenkova simply demonstrates that the Honda decision merely moderated, rather than eliminated Wallace claims.

Wallace damages are now likely reserved for the out-of-the ordinary cases where an employer's excessive, inflammatory or detrimental actions at the time of termination cause observable distress or damage to an employee that is beyond the norm.

Perhaps they always were.

Wallace claims may no longer be "boilerplate," but they remain as a significant response where an employee has suffered demonstrated harm due to excessiveness or callousness at the time employment is actually being terminated.

Monday, October 26, 2009

Ontario Drivers' Cell Phone Ban Now in Effect

Hands-free cell phone use is now the law in Ontario.

As noted in our April 23, 2009 post on the new provincial law, which took effect today:
The Countering Distracted Driving and Promoting Green Transportation Act, 2009, Ontario's new law banning use of cell phones while driving... amends the Highway Traffic Act to provide:

Hand-held devices prohibited

Wireless communication devices

78.1 (1) No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a highway while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device or other prescribed device that is capable of receiving or transmitting telephone communications, electronic data, mail or text messages.

Entertainment devices

(2) No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a highway while holding or using a hand-held electronic entertainment device or other prescribed device the primary use of which is unrelated to the safe operation of the motor vehicle.

Certain exceptions to this basic rule are also established:

(3) Despite subsections (1) and (2), a person may drive a motor vehicle on a highway while using a device described in those subsections in hands-free mode.

Exceptions

(4) Subsection (1) does not apply to,

(a) the driver of an ambulance, fire department vehicle or police department vehicle;

(b) any other prescribed person or class of persons;

(c) a person holding or using a device prescribed for the purpose of this subsection; or

(d) a person engaged in a prescribed activity or in prescribed conditions or circumstances.

Same

(5) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of the use of a device to contact ambulance, police or fire department emergency services.

Same

(6) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply if all of the following conditions are met:

1. The motor vehicle is off the roadway or is lawfully parked on the roadway.

2. The motor vehicle is not in motion.

3. The motor vehicle is not impeding traffic.

All is not lost - my recently-purchased Motorola T505 Bluetooth hands-free unit adds much value by doubling as an MP3 player, sending tunes (and phone conversations) from my Blackberry to my car stereo, via FM signal.