Tuesday, April 05, 2011

Ontario Employment Law: Long-Term Disability Coverage During the Period of Reasonable Notice

In Brito et al v. Canac Kitchens, decided on February 18, 2011, Mr. Justice Randall Echlin of the Ontario Superior Court addressed the consequences of an employer's failure to provide adequate benefit coverages and reasonable pay in lieu of notice to its terminated employees.

In Brito, the defendant employer, Canac Kitchens (a division of Kohler Kitchens), had decided to restructure. It provide its employees who were terminated with only the bare statutory minimums in severance and benefit coverages.

Several employees commenced civil actions for damages for wrongful dismissal. One of the Plaintiffs, Mr. Olguin, was a a 22-year employee. While he was able to secure replacement employment within a month of his dismissal, it was at a substantially lesser rate of pay. Worse yet, fourteen months into his new job, he underwent surgery for laryngeal cancer, requiring him to take a disability leave. Canac Kitchens had not provided Mr. Olguin with long term disability coverage as part of his severance package. His new employer did not offer comparable coverage.

And so, Mr. Olguin was essentially left without any medical coverages or benefits during the applicable notice period.

Justice Echlin summarized the general applicable law, as follows:
. . . It may now be fairly and generally asserted that today, in the absence of voluntary resignation, or serious misconduct on the part of the employee, Canadian employers must dismiss their employees with proper notice or pay in lieu thereof. If the latter, they must "make the employee whole" for the common law period of reasonable notice.
In awarding Mr. Olguin's compensation for loss of disability insurance coverages for the entirety of the notice period, Justice Echlin rejected the employer's bald assertion that Mr. Olguin had failed to mitigate his potential damages by purchasing a replacement disability policy:

[12] How should the law deal with the events of the period of November 6, 2004 [the disability date] to May 15, 2005 [the end of the 22 month noticeperiod]? If it is to place Mr. Luis Romero Olguin into the position he would have been in had Canac provided him with working notice, he would have received his regular cash employment compensation, plus all benefit coverages for the entirety of his 22 month notice period at law.

[13] Canac consciously chose not to make alternative arrangements to provide its loyal, long-service employee with replacement disability coverage. Rather, it chose to go the “bare minimum” route. It provided only the statutory minimums in pay and benefits and then gambled that he would get another job and stay well. When it lost that gamble, it chose to litigate this matter for over five years. When confronted with its potential significant exposure, it raised the argument that Mr. Luis Romero Olguin failed to mitigate his potential damages by purchasing a replacement disability policy.

[14] I reject that argument. The onus is upon Canac to establish the Plaintiff’s failure to mitigate. Canac has failed to do so in this instance. Insufficient evidence was led to show that comparable coverage would have been available and would have provided Mr. Luis Romero Olguin with comparable coverage. While Mr. McKechnie conceded that in this setting, the law transforms the employee into a “notional employee”, he argued that Mr. Luis Romero Olguin failed to satisfy the “actively at work” requirement contained in the policy wording. I reject this argument and find it to be circular logic to argue that, if the Plaintiff was to be deemed a “notional employee”, then how can it be asserted that he was “not actively at work”?

Mr. Olguin was awarded 22 months pay in lieu of notice along with over $200,000.00 in further damages, representing the value of the lost long-term disability benefits to his age of retirement.

The Court further admonished the employer with a punitive damages award for its "cavalier" attitude upon termination:

[18] Having regard for Canac’s cavalier, harsh, malicious, reckless, outrageous and high-handed treatment of Mr. Luis Romero Olguin, I award a further $15,000.00 in damages relating to its “hardball approach”.

[19] Pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays 2008 SCC 39 (CanLII), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 362, I might have considered awarding “moral damages”. However, as indicated in Natalie C. MacDonald, Extraordinary Damages In Canadian Employment Law, Toronto: Carswell, 2010 at pp. 33-168 and 812-815, the relatively new common law head of damages, in this post-Wallace world, requires considerable specificity in pleading and further evidence which was not presented at this trial.

In so doing, this ruling indeed did "make the Plaintiff whole."

For a less favourable assessment of this ruling, see Howard Levitt's Canada.com commentary: Be generous during life crises — the courts will: Employer to pay $1M for doing 'bare minimum'

If you have been wrongfully dismissed, contact a lawyer who can advise as to your rights and entitlements both at common law and under the Ontario Employment Standards Act.

- Robert Tanha and Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Update - April 9, 2011

Also see a more generous analysis of the ruling by Sun Media op-ed writer Alan Shanoff: Playing hardball with a fired employee an expensive error
- GJW

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Ontario Employment Law: Can A Wrongfully Dismissed Employee Plead Systemic Misbehaviour By The Employer?

Unlike trial rulings, decisions on motions in the area of employment law rarely grab the attention of legal commentators, let alone employers and employees. A March 23, 2011 decision by Ontario Superior Court Master M.J. Sproat in Covelli v. Sears Canada Inc., however, is a definite exception to the rule.

The motions to strike brought by the Defendant employer, Sears Canada Inc., against a former employee, Mr. Covelli, raised the following two interrelated issues of fundamental importance to the parties:
1. Can a bald allegation of systemic misbehaviour by a Plaintiff employee in a wrongful dismissal action be struck for lack of particularity?

2. Whether a plaintiff employee can claim moral and punitive damages for alleged mistreatment of the plaintiff and other employees pursuant to this policy or practice?
In the case, Sears sought to strike the following allegations in their former employee's claim:
"11. Mr. Covelli pleads that Sears has adopted a corporate policy or practice of terminating employees for just cause, notwithstanding that it knows or ought to know that no just cause at law exists, as a means of unlawfully evading its statutory and common law obligation to provide employees with notice of termination or compensation in lieu of notice. Pursuant to this policy, Sears has engaged in similar conduct with other (now former) employees, which is also the subject matter of litigation. Mr. Covelli further pleads that Sears' cavalier and reprehensible conduct in this regard will invariably exacerbate his ability to secure alternate, comparable employment."
The Defendant emphasized the lack of particularity in the Plaintiff's allegation of systematic misconduct against it. It further took the position that circumstances leading to the termination of other employees is irrelevant and further, would lead to discovery of "monstrous proportions".

With respect to whether an allegation of a systemic wrong is relevant to an analysis of bad faith or punitive damages, Master Sproat cited and ultimately agreed with the following passage from Craig-Smith v. John Doe, [2009] OJ No. 4041, per CW Hourigan J.:
I reject the the submission that an allegation of systemic wrong is not relevant to an analysis of bad faith or punitive damages. There are many cases where such allegations are considered in the context of punitive damages or bad faith analysis (see, for example, Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co.).
In other words, punishing a defendant appropriately for its systemic misconduct, which can be said to to be so "reprehensible" as to be deserving of a court's censure, in relation to a single plaintiff may call for consideration of other similarly placed individuals even where, as here, the plaintiff is the first to make such a claim against its employer for punitive damages for this alleged misconduct.

With respect to the lack of particularity in the allegation of a systemic wrong, Master Sproat stated:
. . . the case largely turns on whether there is a risk of "limitless" discovery or discovery of "monstrous proportions". I agree with the plaintiffs' counsel's submission that the discovery plan process can be used to place parameters on the information that can be obtained. . . The Rules also provide for the principle of proportionality to address discovery issues . . .
Master Sproat, also, stressed that "discovery" might not be monstrous in this case in any event:
If the impugned pleadings are permitted to stand, there will be fewer than 200 file reviews and likely far less than that number once it is conclusively determined how many of these cases are actually relevant . . . these are matters that can be explored in the discovery plan process and on discovery
If this decision is correct, the answer to the question posed in the title to this post, is a resounding "yes."

- Robert Tanha, Toronto
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Emigrating Same-Sex Civil Partnerships: Should They Be Considered Marriages?

Recently, a website devoted to advocacy for same-sex relationships and rights published a post about a gay couple attempting to divorce in Canada. The couple became civil partners in the United Kingdom, then emigrated to Canada. Their relationship broke down and spousal abuse has been alleged:
Will is a Canadian citizen who decided to move to the UK. He enjoyed his life and, by chance, while living there, met Chris, another Canadian, who had come to the UK as well. They fell in love and had a Civil Partnership Ceremony in the UK. They later decided to return to Canada and settle down. They purchased a home, furnished it together, and lived the married life. Unfortunately, their relationship took a turn for the worse when Will became the victim of spousal abuse and his partner, Chris, was arrested. Upon release, Chris returned home, changed the locks, and threw Will out onto the street with only the clothes on his back. All Will's possessions were in the home, but he was not allowed to get them. Fortunately for Will, he had family a short distance away, who took him in while he tried to sort this mess out.
Will decided that the only way to get back his possessions was to try to file for a divorce here, in Canada. Upon filing, he received a letter from his partner's lawyer, stating that their Civil Union was not recognized in Canada, and that Will had no rights to any of the possessions in the home. Will was devastated but thought that he could find something that would say he had the rights of a spouse. He wrote to officials in the UK and to government officials in Canada. Unfortunately, everywhere he turned, he came upon a brick wall. No one had an answer for him. He found documentation that a Canadian Gay marriage is recognized in the UK, but he found nothing stating that Canada recognized a Civil Union from the UK.
The article goes on to state that "Will" (a pseudonym) will be going to court this month in order to assert his right to a divorce.

This is new legal ground in Canada and there appears to be no caselaw stating what the proper procedure would be in this scenario, making it novel.

The Same-Sex Marriage Reference produced by the Supreme Court in 2004 explicitly divides marriage and civil unions by calling them "distinct ways in which couples can express their commitment and structure their legal obligations," and that civil unions are a "relationship short of marriage." This reading would seem to indicate that it is therefore incumbent upon couples such as Will and his partner, when emigrating to Canada, to marry once they are within the country, as civil unions and marriages are two distinct types of relationships, each with its own set of special privileges.

However, that argument sacrifices human truths for technical correctness. If a same-sex couple in a country that does not allow for same-sex marriage elects to be joined in a civil union, for all practical intents and purposes they are likely doing so because they cannot be married and seek the closest possible alternative, rather than because they want the specific set of legal obligations that come with civil partnership (as opposed to the marriage they cannot obtain).

Many gay couples who elect to enter into civil unions where they cannot be married (and, one could argue, the overwhelming majority thereof) still consider themselves to be married in spirit if not in law.

This is particularly true with respect to civil unions in the United Kingdom, where the Civil Partnership Act of 2004 granted civil unions rights and responsibilities largely equivalent to those of marriages: civil partnerships in England and Wales mirror marriages in England and Wales, and civil partnerships in Scotland mirror marriages in Scotland. (Civil partnerships in England and Wales differ somewhat as compared to as in Scotland, but that has more to do with differences in their respective family law regimes.)

However, not all same-sex civil partnership regimes are like the United Kingdom's. Switzerland's, for example, forbids same-sex civil partners from adopting children or sharing a surname, as does Hungary's; the Czech Republic, in addition to forbidding civil partners adoption rights, does not recognize their right to a widow's pension or as having joint property rights. On the other hand, civil partnership regimes in Germany and Finland are fundamentally equivalent to marriage, as in the UK.

(Special note must be taken of the United States, where civil unions are left to individual states - as the federal government does not recognize marriage - and thus there are a large number of widely differing regimes, from Massachusetts' full recognition of gay marriage to domestic partnerships in Wisconsin which enumerate only some rights.)

The idea, then, that gay couples in civil unions emigrating to Canada should be treated as not being married seems obtuse to the realities of the situation. Depending on the regime under which they were joined, same-sex partners will have either previously had all of the rights equivalent to traditionally married couples, in which case the distinction between civil partnership and marriage is essentially a fiction to placate those not comfortable with the concept of extending marriage rights to same-sex couples, or they will never have had the opportunities to those rights in the first place.

Requiring gay partners to marry a second time while in Canada seems an unnecessary burden for those couples to undertake, particularly considering that at present there is no legal requirement to have a foreign marriage registered in Canada for it to be recognized. Regardless of the fact that the Canadian government did not itself force foreign same-sex couples to enter into civil unions rather than marriages, it seems strikingly unfair that we should require emigrating gay couples to jump through additional hoops when the likelihood of their preference for marriage over a limited domestic contract with few enumerated rights is likely.

Consider that when the state of Massachusetts overturned prohibitions against same-sex marriage in 2004, over six thousand same-sex couples married within the first year and that over half of them had been common-law partners for a decade prior. Forty percent had children. The choice of marriage for these couples despite the availability of civil partnerships in the New England area makes a strong case that, like straight couples, committed gay couples will overwhelmingly choose marriage to certify their commitment when it is available.

(Additionally, Quebec's experiment with both marriage and civil partnership regimes for same-sex couples would seem to bear this out: once same-sex marriage became available to gay couples in Quebec in 2004 as a result of the Civil Marriage Act's passing, the use of civil unions by gay couples cratered in comparison to entry into marriages.)

This writer would urge whatever judge is hearing "Will's" case to recognize same-sex civil unions entered into within other countries as marriages. Given that civil unions are essentially obsolete within most of Canada, having been largely superceded by marriage where they were previously in use, the spirit of fairness demands that we recognize that emigrating civil partnerships are almost certainly only those things because they could not get properly married.

True, there may be the occasional instance of a couple choosing a civil union rather than a marriage, but this writer firmly believes they will be extremely occasional given the wide berth between marriage and civil partnership in most countries in terms of rights and privileges, and their potential existence does not present enough reason to complicate the lives of emigrating gay couples who believe - and understandably so - that Canada will validate and recognize their desire to be married.
- Christopher Bird, Toronto

Addendum:

To some extent, I differ on this point.

I am not sure it is accurate to assume in all cases that partners have specific marriage-like intentions when opting for civil union.

The leap to full marital property rights may be more than either party bargained for.

Certainly, it would be a mistake to extend entitlements - and obligations - to partners that they would not enjoy even in the jurisdictions of their civil unions - and which would exceed the entitlements of common law spouses, same sex or otherwise, in Canada.

If a blanket rule of recognition of civil unions as marriage is employed, as Chris suggests, how would one distinguish between jurisdictions such as Massachusetts, where civil union and formal marriage are both available same-sex options - yielding wholly different property regimes - and other states where gay marriage is not yet legalized and civil union is the only option?

It would be prudent, however, for our courts to enquire as to the nature of property rights acquired in the actual jurisdiction of the parties’ civil union and to consider whether those entitlements and obligations ought to be applicable in Canada – perhaps on an implied contract basis.

Beyond that, it is unclear why "Will" need to assert these broader "marital rights" to secure his own belongings (and one-half of the joint assets) along with his interest in the family home – Ontario's common law spouses regularly secure such relief via civil actions and family law applications, alleging constructive or resulting trusts or entitlement to replevin.

Frankly, I think Will needs to speak with a lawyer, not a journalist.

The determination of a mechanism in Canada for dissolving marriage-like unions entered into elsewhere does indeed pose an interesting challenge, however. Our courts and legislators will need to address this current legal status vacuum. It does not follow, however, that the extension of property rights to civil union partners must necessarily be part of such a law reform package.

Worthy of additional note, perhaps, is that the trust entitlements of common law spouses were recently clarified and extended by the Supreme Court of Canada in its February 18, 2011 decision in Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10.
- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

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Rebecca Black's "Friday": Both Aurally and Legally Challenging

Many readers will probably be familiar with Rebecca Black at this point. If you are one of the lucky few who have not seen or heard "Friday", you are in the distinct minority: 82 million hits on Youtube and counting makes Ms. Black's video the most viral in history, and that is before one considers the dubstep remix, the death metal cover version, and all of the other variations on the existing theme. "Friday" has gone from being an internet joke to a valued intellectual property in the space of about a month.

Which, of course, means that its copyright has become a source of legal conflict. It appears that Ark Music Factory, which produced the song for Ms. Black, and Ms. Black herself (represented through her mother) don't agree as to who actually owns the copyright in the song. Ms. Black claims that her agreement with Ark gives her 100% ownership of the song; Ark claims that the agreement gives her ownership of the master recording only, but not the song or composition, and that copyright for the song should reside with them as they wrote the lyrics and arranged the music for Ms. Black.

The Black situation contrasts with work-for-hire copyright squabbles, such as the current legal battle being fought between Marvel Comics and the estate of Jack Kirby, who co-created many of Marvel's top properties (such as the Fantastic Four, Thor and the Silver Surfer, among many others). In that situation, the Kirby estate is characterizing Kirby's work for Marvel as work-for-hire on the basis that he had worked on the characters prior to pitching them to Marvel, which would make it not a work-for-hire since a work-for-hire must be created specifically as a result of being ordered or commissioned by the employer.

However, Kirby's work for Marvel is also one of the enumerated categories where work-for-hire is possible in American copyright law (specifically "a contribution to a collective work") and his contract with Marvel was expressly stated to be a work-for-hire contract. Whether Ms. Black's song can be considered a "collective work" is debatable: traditionally musical compositions are not considered to be collective works, but certainly an argument can be made that a modern pop production is collective. But no party seems to be taking the attitude that Ms. Black's contract with Ark Music Factory was work-for-hire (whether Ms. Black would have been working for hire or whether Ark would have been), so the lack of a work-for-hire agreement makes the "Friday" battle one of authorship.

Determining authorship is more difficult than determining the existence of work-for-hire, particularly in this instance. Is Ms. Black the primary author for singing and performing the song? Or is Ark the primary author for having written and arranged it? The legal ground here is, at best, unsteady.

An interesting precedent exists, however, in Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau. In 2009, an Indiana doo-wop group named Stormy Weather performed a song called "Lake County, Indiana" which was used by a local tourism agency for promotional purposes. One of the members of the group, Cheryl Janky, who wrote the song, sued them for using the song without her permission. The agency's defense was that another member of the band, who had contributed to the writing of the song, had issued them a nonexclusive license for its use. The U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal found that this second bandmember was a "joint author" and therefore had the right to issue the license.

Janky is relevant to the Black situation because many of the Black family's complaints lie with the profit Ark Music has been making from the work - ringtones, for example - which the Black family has apparently not received a share thereof. If Black and Ark were found to be co-authors of the song, they would co-own it. This is likely why Ark's representatives have been stating that Black "didn't even write a lyric."
- Christopher Bird, Toronto
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140 Law - Legal Headlines for April 05, 2011

Here are today's leading legal headlines from Wise Law on Twitter:

Monday, April 04, 2011

140 Law - Legal Headlines for April 04, 2011

Here are today's leading legal headlines from Wise Law on Twitter:

Have a great day!
- Rachel Spence, Toronto

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Sunday, April 03, 2011

Removing Antiques upon Sale of a Home: Chattels v. Fixtures

When Richard Foltz and Wendy Loper sold their house in Pointe – Claire, Quebec, they unhinged and took with them an antique door that they had received as a gift. But the door was not stipulated as an exclusion in the agreement of purchase and sale. So when the purchasers, Kimberly Kyle and Jacqueline Jensen took possession of the home and found the door missing, they sued. They had other reasons to take Mr. Foltz and Ms. Loper to court, but in the proceeding they included a claim for the antique door that they believed was part of the sale and included in the purchase price.

The 2010 Court of Quebec case of Kyle c. Foltz raises the issue of what you can remove from your house upon its sale, in the way of antiques and collectibles, and what must legally remain on the premises. While it’s up to your real estate agent to prepare the agreement to protect you, sometimes realtors are simply not sensitive to this important issue. Unless otherwise specified in an agreement of purchase and sale, a vendor can remove all chattels from the property or home, but fixtures must remain.

For antique collectors there are important ramifications, particularly when, for example, your garden landscaping includes an old iron plough, or when you’ve installed a vintage stained glass window with pine frame, hung a Victorian crystal chandelier, or yes, affixed a nice old oak door.

Curiously, this past year there were a number of Canadian real estate law cases which dealt with the issue of the difference between chattels and fixtures. The leading case cited by courts across the country is a 1902 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal. In the 2010 Supreme Court of British Columbia case of CMIC Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Rodriguez, Mr. Justice Rogers summarized the law from the Ontario case, and other more recent cases, as follows:

From these authorities I take the law to be that a thing affixed to the real estate will be presumed to be a fixture unless the evidence shows it is affixed for the purpose of making better use of it as a chattel as opposed to being an integrated part of the property as a whole; and that a thing that is not fixed to real estate will be presumed to be a chattel unless the evidence shows that its presence on the property is intended to make it an integral part or an enhancement of the property as a whole.

We can break down this somewhat convoluted legal principle by reference to our Quebec case and another recent B.C. case, Manarin v. Stelmaschuk, Doucettle Realty Ltd. and Leckie. In the Quebec case, the hinged antique door was clearly “an integrated part of the property” and not attached “for the purpose of making better use of it.”

In the Manarin case, Mr. Manarin purchased a home from Mr. Stelmaschuk. He sued Mr. Stelmaschuk and the realty company and agent who represented Mr. Stelmaschuk. Mr. Manarin claimed that the defendants misrepresented the square footage of the property, and that Mr. Stelmaschuk removed a number of “fixtures” from the home between when Mr. Manarin saw the home, and when he took possession after the sale. Mr. Stelmaschuk allegedly exchanged some of the items with others of lesser value. The list included a greenhouse and utility shed, wall mounted sconces and mirrors, and numerous other items; some the judge wasn’t convinced had been removed, others he couldn’t value for lack of evidence, and others he decided upon and valued.

Recall that the judge in the CIMC Mortgage case used the words “will be presumed.” This means that a party can still argue one way or the other, by rebutting the presumption. In the Manarin Judge M.J. Brecknell wrote that determining whether an item is a chattel or fixture “is not always as clear as may initially be thought.”

The judge found that the greenhouse and utility shed were chattels, stating that they were not annexed to the land, and citing evidence of how easily portable they were. However, other cases have looked at the weight of an item, so that an outer building could be intended to be a fixture, yet not attached to the ground simply because its weight makes it unnecessary.

The judge decided that the wall mounted sconces were chattels. It appeared that some had been hanging on screws and could be easily taken down without removing the screws (as apparently had been the case). The mirrors were determined to be fixtures “because their attachment to the wall was for the better use of room as a room, and not the better use of the mirror as a mirror.”

How would a judge make a decision regarding our vintage stained glass window with pine frame? Let’s assume that an ordinary window has been removed from a living room, and the stained glass unit inserted in its place, with silicone, and that the stained glass is what the purchaser saw before agreeing to buy the house. The window would be presumed to be a fixture. What evidence would have to be adduced to convince the judge that it was “affixed for the purpose of making better use of it as a chattel as opposed to being an integrated part of the property as a whole?” Would it be enough to tell the judge that it was installed where the old window had been, purely to make the best use of it, with the daylight and sunshine accentuating its beauty?

In the Manarin case, the buyer and seller did use a standard real estate association contract with pre-printed provisions and space for hand-written insertions, including an area for specific inclusions and exclusions. It was not completed with sufficient particularity.

Vendors should go through their home with their real estate agent, compiling a list of everything they want to take with them, that could possibly be construed as a fixture, and ensure that each item is enumerated as excluded. Purchasers should do the same thing for any item that could possibly be deemed a chattel, and have each listed as an inclusion. Real estate agents don’t always know what’s important to their vendors and purchasers. If they don’t ask, tell them.

- Alvin Starkman, Oaxaca, Mexico

When Alvin Starkman sold his Toronto home, the purchaser insisted he remove the big old iron plough which had been incorporated into the front garden shrubbery. Alvin refused, and won that battle. Alvin and his wife Arlene now live in Oaxaca, Mexico, and own Casa Machaya Oaxaca Bed & Breakfast (http://www.oaxacadream.com). Alvin is also a partner in Oaxaca Culinary Tours (http://www.oaxacaculinarytours.com), providing custom designed small group gastronomic tours of Oaxaca.

....
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Saturday, April 02, 2011

Reimer Time in T.O.

After much April Foolery, it's time for a weekend diversion. And while our beloved Leafs do not appear destined for the immediate post-season, much excitement abounds nonetheless in this little hockey town, just north of Hamilton.

Here's a taste of what has Toronto all abuzz - Houses Of The Hockey & Bloge Salming Present: Reimer, the Video:


And, finally, a note in response to she who protesteth that something called "baseball season" has now arrived.

For some of us, there's only 1) the hockey season, and 2) the hockey off-season. That way, the fun never ends...
- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

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Friday, April 01, 2011

This Week At The Court of Appeal: 11-04-01

Each week, Wise Law Blog reviews recent decisions from the Ontario Court of Appeal.

Cleveland v. Whelan. A negligence tort case where a minor, represented by his parents as litigation guardians, sued a doctor for medical malpractice. Tyler Cleveland was born in 1996 and under blood tests, conducted as part of the Ontario Newborn Screening Program, was found on two occasions to have elevated levels of phenylalanine, an amino acid which in excess quantities can indicate potential for developing phenylketonuria ("PKU"), a congenital disorder which can interfere with normal brain development.

Tyler's doctor, Dr. Whelan, ordered a third screening test, which indicated a non-elevated level of phenylalanine, and no further clinical or laboratory followup was ordered at that time. However, these screening tests - the routine tests performed for the Newborn Screening Program - were only semi-quantitative and could not provide entirely accurate results.

Tyler was diagnosed in 1999 with severe PKU: his original screening samples were retested under a more rigorous and accurate test for phenylalanine, and it was found that all three samples had higher levels of phenylalanine than the semi-quantitative nature of the screening tests would have been able to determine. Tyler, through his parents, brought an action in negligence against various parties, including Dr. Whelan.

At trial, Dr. Whelan was found liable for negligence, and appealed.

His appeal was based on the argument that the trial judge had incorrectly failed to apply the principle in ter Nezuen v. Korn, where a medical practitioner will not be found liable for negligence if, despite choosing a treatment not endorsed by the majority of medical practitioners, said treatment was still generally recognized by medical science as a reasonable alternative adhered to by a respectable minority of competent practitioners.

At trial, Dr. Whelan called one expert witness to the plaintiff's three: Dr. Whelan's witness affirmed that his management of the case met the standard of care of a metabolic specialist at the time, while the plaintiff's witnesses obviously disagreed. Dr. Whelan also noted, in his appeal, that one of the plaintiff's expert witnesses admitted that they would respect and rely upon his opinion where it was given.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Dr. Whelan's appeal. Dr. Whelan's expert witness had stated that in 1996, it was common practice to repeat the standard screening test until it was determined whether a high level of phenylalanine was treatable, and that Tyler's results had been "suspicious" but insufficient to require diagnostic investigation, as the levels he had seemed to have were untreatable despite their elevation.

The Court of Appeal, however, agreed with the trial judge, who had felt that the expert witness had essentially characterized a second high-level test result as being both "suspicious" and reassuring enough to not require additional investigation. They also noted that Dr. Whelan, by his own admission, would order diagnostic testing upon three consecutive tests showing an elevated result where they were all untreatable, which belied his assertion that diagnostic testing was not necessary until treatable levels of phenylalanine could be demonstrated to exist.

Dr. Whelan also argued that since there was no protocols in place expressing the standard of care in Tyler's case at the time, that therefore the decision was up to his clinical judgement.

However, Dr. Whelan was being sued as the regional consultant and not Tyler's physician; although he was responsible for Tyler's care, he was not actively making decisions about Tyler's case. The Court characterized Dr. Whelan's actions in this incidence, then, as merely being his routine standard orders and not a conscious decision specifically relating to Tyler's well-being, which would not satisfy the "honest and intelligent exercise of judgement" to take reasonable care which would satisfy the doctor's professional obligations.

Read-the-whole-case rating: 3. The technical jargon takes a bit of plowing through, but once you get to it there's some interesting discussion of what constitutes the standard of care in medical malpractice cases.

Masters' Association of Ontario v. Ontario. This was an action brought by the Masters' Association specifically on behalf of case management masters. When the province of Ontario introduced case management masters in 1996, they were paid less than traditional masters. In 2000, the Masters' Association sued the province to obtain identical salary, benefits, and security for case management masters as existed for traditional masters.

The province settled at pre-trial, agreeing to tie case management masters' salaries to the SMG3 classification of public employees. However, since then, traditional masters' salaries have increased twice as fast as case management masters' salaries have.

The Masters' Association brought an application for a declaration that case management masters are entitled to the same salary, benefits and security as traditional masters. The application judge declared that s.53(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, which provides the Lieutenant Governor of Ontario with the power to address case management masters' renumeration, was unconstitutional as it failed to sufficiently provide judicial independence to case management masters (who might be influenced by public sector pay rate changes, either actual or potential).

The judge also found the requirement in s.86(5.2) of the Act that the Attorney General approve of any case management master's reappointment over the age of 65 to be similarly unconstitutional. However, the application judge refused to sever the provisions and read case management masters into the existing provisions applying to masters' renumeration, as the Masters' Association requested, stating that he felt the choice of remedy for the situation was best left up to the government. The Province appealed the finding on s.53(1); the Masters' Association cross-appealed seeking the severance and reading-in.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals. In regards to the Province's appeal, although it was that the current pay system for case management masters satisfied the requirements for judicial independence of being objective and effective, the requirement of independence was not satisfied since there was no independent body serving as an intermediary between the government and the judiciary.

The SMG3 classification, established and controlled by the government, could not be considered independent in this sense. The Court of Appeal, however, did note that the problem lay not in s.53(1) of the Act, but in the manner by which case management masters' renumeration was determined in Order-in-Council 458/2003.

The Court also made short work of the Assocation's cross-appeal, stating simply that, following Mackin, it was not appropriate for courts to remedy the situation, since there were multiple ways to address the issue and that the choice of method should be left up to the government if possible. Read-the-whole-case rating: 2.5 since this decision mostly just serves to endorse a prior decision at length, but it's still important for the future of jurisprudence in Ontario.

- Christopher Bird, Toronto
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Wise Law Blog: Ontario Human Rights Tribunal Digest - March 18-31, 2011

Each week, Wise Law Blog reviews important decisions from the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.

SUBSTANTIVE RULINGS


In this case, the applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of disability in employment, contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code. More specifically, the applicant alleged that she took a medically approved sick leave due to a disability, and that the respondents were aware of her medical condition. When she advised her respondent employer she was ready to return to her job, she was refused, even after offering to come back part-time or as a floater. She subsequently learned that someone new had been hired by her company to fill her role.

The respondent, in its evidence, alleged that the applicant's termination was due to a slowdown in business and had nothing whatsoever to do with her disability. What is more, it stated that the applicant was a temporary employee, not a permanent employee, and that its decision to hire a new staff member was made after the decision to terminate the applicant had already been taken. Furthermore, this new staff member was hired to work very minimal hours and the applicant in the past had indicated to the respondent that these hours would not be enough to sustain her.

The Tribunal preferred the evidence of the respondent to that of the applicant:

I prefer the evidence of Ms. Buchanan and Ms. Nichols that they hired an individual in December 2008, on a vary casual or temporary basis, after the applicant's employment was terminated. I find that their evidence was consistent with each other. . .
The Tribunal found that market conditions, not the applicant's disability, had caused the employer to decide to terminate the applicant's employment; it just happened to coincide with the time she was suppose to return to work. As well, the Tribunal found that the applicant's employment was of a temporary nature. It stated:
I find that the decision to terminate the applicant's employment was related to market conditions and a lack of business at the Hazelton Lanes branch, and the applicant's disability was not a factor in the decision to terminate her employment. The applicant did not dispute that her workplace was not busy. In addition, the applicant agreed in cross examination that, when she went on leave, the respondents did not have any work for her beyond September 22, 2008.
Of note, the Tribunal stated that disability, as is the case with any of the prohibited grounds contained in the Code, only has to a factor in the decision to terminate; it does not have to be the sole reason.

PROCEDURAL RULINGS


In this case, the applicant alleged discrimination in services against a dentist on the basis of race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, ethnic origin, disability, creed, sex, marital status and reprisal or threat of reprisal. The dentist had refused to provide an extraction at the applicant's scheduled appointment for no apparent reason, which she alleged had been done due to her personal characteristics. Beyond this, the applicant provide no further information beyond stating that she felt this treatment was grossly unfair.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss on the basis that the applicant had failed to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code allegedly committed by the respondent, requesting information on the aforementioned. The applicant failed to reply.

In dismissing the application, the Tribunal aptly noted:
The Tribunal's jurisdiction is based on the Code, which prohibits discrimination in the areas of accommodation, services, goods and facilities, employment, contracts and membership in vocational associations, on the basis of grounds listed in the Code. Neither the Application nor the applicant's submissions suggest a connection between the applicant's allegations and any of the grounds identified in the Code. The Tribunal does not have a general power to inquire into claims of unfairness or wrongdoing outside those areas or grounds

In this case, the applicant alleged discrimination with respect to employment on the basis of record of offences and reprisal. The applicant stated that he had been mistreated by his employer, but did not connect this alleged mistreatment to a Code-protected ground or to an attempt on his part to claim and enforce his Code rights.

In its reasons, the Tribunal fleshed out the extent to which it may inquire into claims of unfairness:
The Tribunal does not have a general power to inquire into claims of unfairness outside the grounds listed in the Code. The applicant has not identified any ground of discrimination or basis upon which he alleges that the Code was violated. I find that the Application does not raise matters which the Tribunal has the power to decide.
Unfairness, in other words, may be cognizable by the Ontario Human Rights Code but only where it relates to a Code-protected ground.


In this case, the applicant alleged discrimination in employment because of sexual solicitation or advances, relying on bald assertions of such treatment at the hands of his employer. Section 7(3)(a) of the Ontario Human Rights Code provides:

(3) Every person has a right to be free from,

(a) a sexual solicitation or advance made by a person in a position to confer, grant or deny a benefit or advancement to the person where the person making the solicitation or advance knows or ought reasonably to know that it is unwelcome

Because the applicant had not responded to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss, which had been sent to the applicant requesting information about how he experienced unwelcome sexual solicitation or advance within the meaning of the Code provision, the Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

- Robert Tanha, Toronto


April Fool's: Who's Laughing Now, NY Times?

Like it wasn't bad enough that our esteemed law blogger friend, Eric Turkewitz, punked the New York Times last April Fool's with his "news" of a pending Obama administration blogging appointment, thereby earning questionable question marks from at least one State ethics overseer:
Is an April Fool’s Day joke a violation of the lawyer’s duty of candor? Of course, context is everything. We can say with some certainty that the Disciplinary Board of Pennsylvania has never been called upon to adjudicate an April Fool’s defense to a misrepresentation charge. We must note, however, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania originally adopted the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct effective April 1, 1988. We should be very clear on this point: they weren’t kidding.
Well, the Times has (allegedly) been seriously snookered again this year. Perhaps that paywall thing isn't going over so well...

The dirty details are all laid bare at Andrew Barovick's New York Medical Malpractise Blog.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto
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140 Law - Legal Headlines for April 1, 2011

To all of our loyal readers, this will be our final leading legal headline post from Wise Law on Twitter (April Fools! As if we would let you down!):

Have a great April Fool's Day!
- Rachel Spence, Toronto

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