Monday, May 16, 2011

Articling, Access to Justice, And Lakehead University's New Law School

Two recent related news items - the Law Society of Upper Canada's approval of a potential new law school at Lakehead University and Michael Johnston's remarks upon becoming chairman of the Ontario County and District Law Presidents' Association - made me think about the larger articling process, especially given Mr. Johnston's comments on the matter:
There is a "glut" of students graduating from law schools in Ontario and elsewhere looking for places to article in Ontario, but there are not enough spaces, he noted.

Another critical issue is what Johnston calls the "greying of the bar," the aging of the legal profession's membership, causing concerns over succession.

That's a particular problem in smaller communities, which could soon face a lawyer shortage much as they are now facing doctor shortages.
So what we seem to have here is the legal community recognizing the abundance of graduating law students who cannot find articles, and rushing to create more graduating law students to exacerbate the problem.

Of course, that's a glib summary, but the articling shortfall is very real and getting steadily worse - and it is directly related to Mr. Johnston's other concern. Simply put, articling positions in smaller communities are a relatively scarce resource. For the articling job seeker, this is admittedly partly a case of confirmation bias: articling opportunities in smaller communities are scarce because lawyers operating in those communities don't advertise their articling opportunities widely (if at all).

If you want to put on an economists' hat, this makes sense. There are less opportunities for lawyers in smaller communities by simple virtue of numbers, and articling students are more likely to initially practice in areas where they have articled than otherwise: small-town lawyers are, on some level, thus theoretically disincentivized to hire articling students because of their potential to become competition.

One can argue instead that the problem exists because students are less interested in articling opportunities outside of large cities, and this probably has some merit to it as well - articling jobs in Toronto and Montreal typically pay much better than articling jobs in Medicine Hat or Saint John - but if jobs in smaller communities are advertised, then they will get applicants.

Speaking from personal anecdote alone, one hotly discussed position among third-year students, when I was in school and looking for articling jobs, was a reasonably well-compensated position with a sole practitioner in Kenora who was looking for an articling student to transition into an eventual junior lawyer position. (Given that the advertisement was taken down after a month, I assume he found his candidate.) Given the necessity of articling to join the bar, students will eventually accept any articling position they can realistically afford, or see their upwards-of-$40,000 investment in law school (and usually much more than that) go to waste.

If the articling process is going to remain a valuable part of legal education - rather than be tossed aside as it has been in practically every other jurisdiction in the world - then it has to be readily available to law school graduates. In his comments, Mr. Johnston addresses two major problems facing the legal community: lack of access to legal service by the general public and a shortage of lawyers in smaller communities.

Both of these are issues easily solved in one sentence: increase the supply of lawyers. However, if the articling process is hindering that goal - which increasingly appears to be the case - then it must either be fixed (perhaps by making articling commitments less optional for practicing lawyers than they currently are) or done away with so that some other form of practical legal education for new lawyers can be instituted. Otherwise, the ongoing legal access crisis in Ontario will only grow worse.

(And an aside: the term of chairman of the Association lasts only eighteen months? Does that seem particularly short to anyone else? Crafting policy changes is a task usually costed in years, not months...)

- Christopher Bird, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Friday, May 13, 2011

140 Law - Legal Headlines for May 13, 2011

Today is Friday the 13th and it just so happens that blogger was down this morning, we expect that there are some spooky forces to blame. However, we are up and running now to provide you with today's leading legal headlines from Wise Law on Twitter:

To all of our readers, have a wonderful weekend!
- Rachel Spence, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Thursday, May 12, 2011

140 Law - Legal Headlines for May 12, 2011

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Thank you to all of our readers, we hope you have a great day!
- Rachel Spence, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Wednesday, May 11, 2011

140 Law - Legal Headlines for May 11, 2011

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Tuesday, May 10, 2011

This Week At The Ontario Court of Appeal: 11-05-06

Each week Wise Law Blog reviews recent decisions from the Ontario Court of Appeal.

Mason v. Chem-Trend Limited Partnership. A separate application related to a wrongful dismissal suit, where the plaintiff (the dismissed employee) sought to challenge a restrictive covenant in his employment contract as unenforceable.

Mr. Mason, upon being hired by Chem-Trend as a technical sales representative, signed an employment contract containing a restrictive covenant preventing him from engaging in "any business or activity in competition with the Company by providing services or products to, or soliciting business from, any business entity which was a customer of the Company during the period in which I was an employee of the Company" for one year following his termination for any reason.

The application judge stated that the covenant was not ambiguous, and that Mr. Mason understood its meaning when he signed it. The judge also stated that given Chem-Trend's worldwide scope, the worldwide scope of the restrictive covenant was therefore reasonable, as was restricting any activity by the appellant in conjunctin with Chem-Trend's competition for the same reason. The application judge also noted that the one-year restriction period was relatively short.

The Court of Appeal disagreed. The Court noted that the caselaw in this regard suggests that an unreasonable restrictive covenant can be found invalid if the overall limits of the clauses in the convenant are overly broad and prevent competition generally (as opposed to specifically competing against the employer by soliciting its customers).

In terms of Mr. Mason's employment contract, the Court observed that the restrictive convenant clause prevented Mr. Mason from working with any business entity which was a customer of Chem-Trend for the entirety of Mr. Mason's tenure with the company - over seventeen years. The Court held that a prohibition from working with all companies that had been customers of the business for nearly two decades was excessive; they also reasoned that this prohibition was at odds with the one-year time period of the covenant, since if the covenant expired after a year the assumption then was that Mr. Mason's information on the company and its clients would no longer be current at that time, and therefore the seventeen-year restriction was even more excessive as it was therefore unreasonable. The Court also pointed out that since the restrictive convenant contained a clause protecting trade secrets that the clause on employment restrictions was even less defensible given that other elements of the covenant protected the company in that regard. The Court therefore declared that the restrictive covenant was unenforceable. Read-the-whole-case rating: 2.

United Stated of America v. Khadr. Abdullah Khadr was abducted by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directory (the "ISI"), who were in turn paid by the United States for that purpose. Mr. Khadr was secretly held in detention for fourteen months, then for another nine months before Mr. Khadr was repatriated to Canada. The United States requested extradition, which failed when the judge of the Superior Court who considered the case deemed the violations of Mr. Khadr's human rights to be "shocking and injustifiable," and ordered a stay of proceeding based on abuse of process. The Attorney General of Canada (acting for the USA) appealed the stay on the basis that the extradition judge's stay was outside of his jurisdiction, and alternatively that his case did not qualify for a stay.

The Court dismissed the appeal. Firstly, the Court stated that the residual power of a Superior Court Judge to order a stay to remedy an abuse of process was not limited strictly to procedural abuse, and that the law clearly allowed the court to order a stay where allowing a case to continue would endanger public confidence in the judicial system.

The appellant, however, proposed that s. 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act, where the Minister of Justice is granted authority to refuse to make a surrender order at the end of the immigration process, deprived a superior court of the power to order a stay since that power created a remedy for instances of abuse of process. Some extradition cases suggests that where Charter of Rights and Freedoms issues arise and refusal to surrender is a potential remedy, that then the remedy is exclusively that of the Minister of Justice.

However, the Court of Appeal cited United States of America v. Cobb, where issues that fall within the committal stage - including the use of the stay power - are the jurisdiction of the courts. The appellant suggested that Cobb was distinguishable on the grounds that this case dealt with conduct which did not directly implicate the extradition hearing, whereas Cobb was a case where the potential extraditees were intimidated from exercising their rights to a hearing.

The Court disagreed with this analysis, pointing out that the entire basis for the stay in the first place was that the United States had perpetrated a serious misconduct in garnering its information which caused it to request extradition, which meant that the abuse of process was the root cause for the extradition hearing to happen in the first place. The Court also stated that the Attorney General's reading of Cobb was overly narrow and that common law suggested that the power for an extradition judge to stay proceedings for abuse of process was much broader than simply relating to the fairness of the hearing itself, and finally state that recognizing this power coincided with the idea that the courts should not surrender their own authority to protect their integrity to the executive.

The Court then considered whether this case qualified for a stay, given that they had clearly decided that the stay power was usable in this instance. They noted that the Attorney General had not appealed the findings of the extradition judge that Mr. Khadr's human rights violations were "shocking and unjustifiable," and then stated that the judge's findings were sufficient to trigger discretionary use of a stay in this instance. The Attorney General also submitted that the extradition judge had no jurisdiction to find that Mr. Khadr's detention had been illegal under Pakistani law, but the Court pointed out that the judge had relied upon an expert affidavit from a law professor to establish that fact.

Finally, the Court rejected the appellant's argument that the stay should be rejected on the basis that the extradition judge had not appropriately balanced the effect of the stay against the public's interest in seeing an alleged terrorist committed for extradition. The Court first stated that balancing the merits of a stay should only occur in borderline cases of abuse, rather than in clear cases, then pointed out that the Attorney General itself had conceded that Mr. Khadr was liable under the Criminal Code of Canada for terrorist acts committed in another country and that therefore, even if balancing were necessary, the fact that other means existed to address the public's interest in this case would tip that balance in favour of the stay. Read-the-whole-case rating:4.
- Christopher Bird, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

140 Law - Legal Headlines for May 10, 2011

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Have a wonderful Tuesday!
- Rachel Spence, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Monday, May 09, 2011

140 Law - Legal Headlines for May 9, 2011

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Have a fantastic Monday!
- Rachel Spence, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Friday, May 06, 2011

140 Law - Legal Headlines for May 06, 2011

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To all of our readers, have a wonderful weekend!
- Rachel Spence, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net