Showing posts with label Mark Steyn. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mark Steyn. Show all posts

Friday, June 27, 2008

'Free at Last:' Canadian Human Rights Commission Dismisses Complaints Against Mark Steyn, Macleans Magazine

This Globe and Mail report will come as no surprise:

The Canadian Human Rights Commission has dismissed a complaint against Maclean's magazine over a controversial article on the future of Islam, magazine officials said yesterday.

Meanwhile, a decision from the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal over the same issue isn't expected for several months.

The Canadian Islamic Congress launched the dual complaints over an article by Maclean's journalist Mark Steyn. The article, The Future Belongs to Islam, came under fire by Muslim critics who claimed it spreads Islamophobia.

Earlier this month, closing arguments were made before B.C.'s Human Rights Tribunal over the article, which appeared in Maclean's in October, 2006.

In dismissing the complaint, the Commission stated:

Overall, the views expressed in the Steyn article, when considered as a whole and in context, are not of an extreme nature as defined by the Supreme Court in the Taylor decision. Considering the purpose and scope of section 13 (1), and taking into account that an interpretation of s 13(1) must be consistent with the minimal impairment of free speech, there is no reasonable basis in the evidence to warrant the appointment of a Tribunal.

For these reasons, the complaint is dismissed.

The full text of the CHRC decision is now online: Canadian Islamic Congress v. Rogers Media Inc.

For more discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in the John Ross Taylor case referenced in the CHRC ruling, see our December 17, 2007 post, Mark Steyn, Macleans and Canadian Human Rights.

We've written much previously on this complaint, and have little to add to our original commentary, also of December 17, 2007:

For the record, then, let me state the obvious:

  • These are merely complaints, and have not yet been adjudicated;
  • Allegations such as these will not necessarily be substantiated through the complaint processes or at a hearing;
  • Our press also has broad freedoms and protection in Canada - these will weigh heavily in the balance of any tribunal determination of these complaints.
  • If the complaints are weak or frivolous, they are not likely to have any success at all. The complainants nonetheless have the right to be heard. That is how our judicial processes work and that too, is a freedom worth protecting.

For additional commentary on the fallout of this dismissal, see:

For what's it's worth, Mr Steyn assures his readers that victory notwithstanding, the campaign to restore free speech to Canada will continue, unabated.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

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Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Quotable

Bernie Farber, Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Jewish Congress, on human rights commission complaints against Macleans Magazine and Mark Steyn:

Steyn's observations are not actionable under the law and the complaints against them fall outside the mandate of human rights commissions. Borovoy ignores the salient passages of the Supreme Court of Canada's 1990 decision in the John Ross Taylor case, which upheld the constitutionality of the Canadian Human Rights Act's anti-hate provisions. In so doing, the court established guidelines for hate-based complaints to the Canadian Human Rights Commission.

Most relevant, the court noted that "hatred or contempt" refers "only to unusually strong and deep-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification."

The commission's investigation of Steyn shows it has lost sight of the legislation's original purpose and the narrow fence it establishes against truly discriminatory speech. Such speech violates core Canadian values and has been upheld as a reasonable limitation of free expression precisely because of that incompatibility.
So by all means, let's tweak the law to eliminate some of its discretionary elements. Amendments could call for an ombudsperson to adjudicate objectively if the complaints meet the high threshold for action, or cost consequences for applicants who bring frivolous complaints.

But the Canadian Jewish Congress supports the act as it was originally intended: to protect minorities in Canada from speech that truly vilifies or discriminates.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

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Monday, January 14, 2008

Ezra's Law - The Levant File

It may have amused certain of his cronies to see good ol' boy Ezra Levant ambush, bully and harangue the very unfortunate woman assigned by the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship Commission to investigate the complaints advanced against him.

He did not amuse me.

It offended me as a fellow Canadian.

And as a fellow lawyer.

And as a fellow Jew.

Speaking first as a fellow Canadian, I have learned at least something from the racial enmity my own family endured nearly a century ago, upon arriving in Canada.

The host culture will always produce some whose ignorance and fear will cause them to impede and stereotype new immigrants with lofty and heated pronouncements as to all the imagined evils these newcomers bring with them. While their scripts may change over time, the characters remain the same.

I am glad Canada now provides a legal remedy against egregiously discriminatory provocation and insult.

We do, indeed, protect freedom of speech in Canada as one of our fundamental rights.

By Canadian law, however, as opposed to Ezra's Law, we also enshrine the right to be free from religious discrimination and racial harassment - spoken, written, drawn or carved in rocks.

It is quite unfortunate that Mr. Levant has graduated from being the grandson of immigrants who no doubt struggled through such wrongs to someone who now unrepentantly delivers his own bad-tasting medicine to a modern generation of newcomers.

Why would he do so?

As he put it, he did it because he wanted to. Because he can. To make a point. And because he accepts no law to the contrary.

We published those cartoons for the intention and purpose of exercising our inalienable right as freeborn Albertans to publish whatever the hell we want, no matter what the hell you say... the only thing I have to say to the government is that it's my bloody right to do so. It is my right to do so for reasonable purposes or for unreasonable purposes.

I reserve the right to publish the cartoons to do every offensive thing that [the complainants] claim was in my heart... I have the full right to do everything in here that they accuse me of.

That, apparently is Ezra's Law.

Ezra Levant, one nation unto himself. Under Ezra.

There is nothing new about the hard time that has been afforded Muslim immigrants to Canada by these self-appointed "protectors of the nation." Virtually every immigrant group to this nation has been subjected to some variation of it in its early history.

At long last, in this generation we have decided as a matter of law and public policy it is better to just say "welcome," establish legal boundaries against hatred, and see what we can learn from each other.

It is not necessarily a smooth path. But it is the right path.

........

As a fellow lawyer, I must say that Mr. Levant's conduct before a representative of a statutory legal commission was nothing short of embarrassing.

I understand he was of course, not in the role of counsel in his movie debut.

It is also unclear to me whether he continues to practice law at all.

Nonetheless, after noting Mr. Levant:

I felt it would be useful to review The Law Society of Alberta Code of Professional Conduct.

The Rules below were of interest to me:

Rule 3 A lawyer must not act in a manner that might weaken public respect for the law or justice system or interfere with its fair administration.

Commentary - Rule 3 Society expects that the legal profession will play a leading role in protecting the integrity of the justice system and ensuring that it functions properly. A lawyer's behaviour is incompatible with this role if it encourages
public disdain or disregard for the administration of justice. Examples are deliberate flouting of the law or other flagrant disrespect for an aspect of the justice system; irresponsible or unjustified allegations of corruption or partiality; criticism that is ill-considered or malicious; disrupting judicial or administrative proceedings; and suggesting to a client or other person that evasion of the law is acceptable.

Rule 8. Except under extraordinary circumstances, a lawyer must not record a conversation with anyone, nor enable a third party to hear the conversation, without first obtaining the consent of the person to whom the lawyer is speaking.

Rule 9. A lawyer must not harass any person or discriminate against any person on the basis of race, language, creed, colour, national or ethnic origin, gender, religion, marital status, sexual orientation, age, mental disability or physical disability or otherwise or on the basis of any similar personal attribute.

Commentary: ... Harassment may encompass conduct which:

(a) undermines another person’s dignity by causing embarrassment, discomfort or humiliation;
(b) creates an intimidating or hostile environment for the recipient of the harassment...

...Personal harassment is disrespectful and degrading conduct generally that is not specifically focused within the prohibited grounds. It includes conduct that is rude, insulting, belittling or vindictive (see also Rules #2, #6 and #7 in this chapter and related commentaries). The key in determining whether conduct is harassment is the impact the conduct has had on the complainant, not the intent with which it was done. Harassment is different from offending a person; it involves undermining
another person's personal integrity.

The rule against harassment is a pervasive rule. It applies to lawyers' relations with clients, other lawyers, others who work in the justice system (judges, court officials and staff, the police and prison guards, etc.) and members of the general public.

........

I was perhaps most offended as a fellow Jew whose community was invoked by Mr. Levant in a bizarre, rambling effort to rationalize his own questionable behaviour as harmless by reference to criminal vandalism against the Edmonton synagogue he claims as his own.

There are people out there who do awful things to our synagogues, Mr. Levant. Do I really need to say that this unfortunate reality does not grant us license or in any way immunize us from the consequences of our own hateful acts?

I do not know any Jewish-Canadians (except the one governed by Ezra's Law), who would even consider proposing such an offensive argument.

A synagogue attack by one Muslim does not justify hatred of all Muslims. It justifies criminal proceedings against the perpetrators.

Do what you must Mr. Levant, but do not purport to drag Canada's Jewish community with you into this.

We are a tolerant people, living in a tolerant country. And want to keep it that way.

....

Which brings me to back to a remark I left dangling last week.

..let us not confuse who the "good guys" are here

"Who are the good guys, then Mr. Wise?" one commenter asked.

The good guys, of course, are the thousands of hard-working and determined Islamic immigrants who have come to Canada and America to make a better lives for themselves and their children, as did my forebears.

They have come to escape war or oppression or limited opportunity at home. As did my grandparents.

They are the ones who lived quiet, normal, and largely apolitical lives in their neighbourhoods, did their jobs, prayed in their mosques, and communed with their families and friends.

Until September 11, 2001.

The day our world went crazy. The day some among us decided they were all suspects. The day law enforcement was let loose on them.

Some theorists have gone so far as to suggest Islamic immigrants have arrived, armed with a master plan to convert Canada and America into Islamic outposts under Sharia law, without even noting that most Islamic-Canadian immigrants left their host nations precisely to get away from that form of excess.

So who are the good guys?

They are the ordinary people, the Islamic-Canadian citizens who contend daily with the discrimination and harassment that comes with the pervasive, but false notion that they are somehow, by definition, all aligned with the worst of the worst who happen to share their religion.

To put it more bluntly, they are the victims of guilt by association. One will easily note from a review of the video that in Ezra's World, any wrong committed by any individual Muslim quite naturally must lead to unchecked national hatred of all Muslims. It is all their fault, according to Ezra.

In my view, they need legal protection against discrimination and harassment.

I am relieved to be in a Canada that provides it as a matter of law.

......

Fortunately, the news is not all bad:

Celebrating Canada's multiculturalism

... It is often overlooked that Canada has the highest immigration rate on the planet. However, it was only in the 1960s that Canada abandoned its racist immigration policies and began admitting newcomers according to their skills and qualifications rather than their nations of origin.

...Much has been achieved over time. Once it seemed likely that Canada could never aspire to genuine equality for newcomers, let alone achieve it. How things have changed.

It is noteworthy that 80 per cent of recent immigrants after four years in the country say that if they had to do it again they would make the same decision and come to Canada.

What about Muslims as immigrants? Today they are about 2.5 per cent of the total population, numbering about 850,000. It is the fastest growing religion in the country. The median age of Canadian Muslims is about a decade lower than the median age of the population at large.

Among foreign-born Muslims, about half have come to Canada in the last 10 years. Thirty per cent have been in Canada from 11 to 19 years, and 17 per cent have been in this country for two decades or longer. About 60 per cent of them live in Ontario, 20 per cent in Quebec.

Despite widespread unfavourable comment and some irresponsible alarm, it is clear, says the author, according to his research, that they tend to share important traits with other newcomers to Canada: optimism, enthusiasm for their adopted country, a desire to improve their lives and the wish to be treated fairly.

....


A tidbit from Toronto history will be illuminating as to how Canadian governments have typically responded to racial provocation.

An elderly uncle of mine still speaks with pride of his role in defending the Jews of Toronto in 1933 by being part of the fabled Christie Pits riots. The event is documented online by the Plaque Project as follow:

In 1933, shortly after Adolph Hitler was elected to power in Germany, newspaper articles reached Toronto bringing with them news of the atrocities the Nazis were carrying out against Jews there. Toronto’s anti-Semites became inspired by what they read, and began adopting the swastika symbol. In July of that year a group of residents from the Beaches neighbourhood formed the Balmy Beach Swastika Club. They complained about the crowding, litter and ‘vulgarity’ at the beach, which they attributed to the large number of ‘obnoxious visitors’ who were riding the street cars out to the beach that summer. Many of these visitors were Jewish, and anti-Semitism seemed to be a cornerstone of the Swastika Club; they wore and posted swastikas and they attempted to have Jews and other ‘foreiners’ banned them from the beach. Even though the beach was a public park Beaches residents including the Swastika Club saw it as very much their own, and private. All of this outraged the Jewish community.

...On August 14th huge crowds gathered at Christie Pits for a baseball game, the first game of a tournament between the St. Peters’ team and the predominately Jewish Harbord Playground team. The game took place in a neighbourhood that Jews had just started moving into, and racial animosities were running high. The Harbord Playground team won the game despite the taunting from the crowd and the flying of a swastika banner. The next morning there was a giant swastika and large lettering that read Heil Hitler painted on the top of the Christie Pits clubhouse. This increased tensions and brought even more people out to the next game on August 16th. During that game a group of St. Peters’ supporters raised a white bed sheet with a swastika painted on it. A group of Jews went to tear it down. This ignited a fight, and soon the thousands of spectators had joined the brawl. The two sides violently clashed, battling each other and fighting for the bed sheet. Many residents in the area who were not involved in the baseball game “ came out of their houses with bats and sticks because they were after the Jews”. One Jewish boy was hit on the head and needed to be rushed to hospital, but rumour spread that he had been killed. As news of the riot hit the Jewish areas many more Jews (along with their Italian allies) headed north to join the massive brawl. Metal pipes and baseball bats were wielded as weapons. Pitch battles continued late into the night and spread to neighbouring streets and alleys as police closed down the park.

Only two days after the riot fears of further violence forced city council to ban the Swastika symbol from Toronto’s streets.

Even in 1933, Canadian sensibilities favoured legislation prohibiting the public display of incendiary symbols, as a measure to avoid the foment of racial discord and violence.

Apparently, it worked then.

I do not note any slippery slope toward totalitarianism that has followed.

......

The notion that human rights commissions are somehow "liberal" is worthy of passing comment. Alberta has had Progressive Conseratives in power continuously since 1971. Alberta's first human rights legislation was enacted in 1972. Do the math.

......

America has Skokie. We have Human Rights Commissions.

Either approach works. But I'll stick with ours, thanks.

.....

Finally, I do not see the complaints against Mr. Levant as anywhere near as frivolous as those against Mark Steyn. Mark Steyn may offend some with his theories, but that is clearly not his objective, nor is offense the inevitable result of his work.

Mr. Levant chose, knowingly, to publish and republish deeply offensive cartoons that he was well aware had led to serious upset, outrage and violence after prior publications overseas.

Let us not conflate Mark Steyn and Ezra Levant. These are very different cases.

Mark Steyn is a serious, talented writer. We do not have to agree with his views to at least recognize his highly researched, if controversial, efforts to analyze and address the key issues of our times. I have repeatedly stated my view that the complaints against Mr. Steyn are dubious and unlikely to succeed. His conclusions may be debatable, but his freedom to express them should never be.

By contrast, in the impugned publication, Mr. Levant has created nothing. His "big stand" involved copying and pasting. He published a series of inflammatory comic drawings that most of the Western media wisely saw fit to avoid, after observing the great offense taken to them by the Islamic world.

Mr. Levant knew exactly what he was doing. He cries foul, but his is the cry of one who makes the fatal mistake of pretending to be above the law.

Did Mr. Levant cross a legal line by publishing the offending cartoons, or by republishing them earlier this week? Did any of his comments before the Commission, now published on YouTube for the world to see, cross any lines?

Maybe. Maybe not.

That, as a matter of law, is now up to the Commission, and perhaps, appellate courts to decide.

As always, the Commission will fulfil its legislated mandate. That is its statutory role. Some readers get angry with me for noting that reality, but I will note it again, nonetheless.

Let's be clear - the Commission is not on trial here.

What is on trial is Ezra's Law.

........................

UPDATE: January 17, 2008

I appreciate the many comments to this post, many of which are quite thoughtful. I entirely agree with the many persuasive arguments raised in favour of treading very carefully, indeed, with respect to anything that purports to limit freedom of expression in Canada.

Many of the commenter' arguments raised are largely in line with the Supreme Court of Canada's 1990 decision in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, which, to some extent, defined the balancing of interests necessary in the consideration of these kinds of cases. I will again excerpt from the slim majority's ruling:

58 I find it helpful to address the question of whether s. 13(1) minimally impairs the freedom of expression by examining in turn the arguments marshalled by the appellants and the CCLA in support of striking down the section. One of the strongest of these arguments is the complaint that the phrase "hatred or contempt" used in s. 13(1) is overbroad and excessively vague. Specifically, it is said that the wide range of meanings available for both "hatred" and "contempt" extend the scope of the section to cover expression not causing the harm which Parliament seeks to prevent. Additionally, the appellants contend that the process of determining whether a particular communication is likely to expose persons to "hatred or contempt" is necessarily subjective, leaving open the possibility that in deciding whether a complaint is well-founded the Tribunal will fall into the error of censuring expression simply because it is felt to be offensive.

59 When considering the scope of the phrase "hatred or contempt", it is worthwhile mentioning that the nature of human rights legislation militates against an unduly narrow reading of s. 13(1). As was stated by Lamer J. in Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 158, a human rights code "is not to be treated as another ordinary law of general application. It should be recognized for what it is, a fundamental law". I therefore do not wish to transgress the well-established principle that the rights enumerated in such a code should be given their full recognition and effect through a fair, large and liberal interpretation. At the same time, however, the purposive definition to be given a human rights code cannot extend so far as to permit the limitation of a Charter right or freedom not otherwise justified under s. 1.
60 In my view, there is no conflict between providing a meaningful interpretation of s. 13(1) and protecting the s. 2(b) freedom of expression so long as the interpretation of the words "hatred" and "contempt" is fully informed by an awareness that Parliament's objective is to protect the equality and dignity of all individuals by reducing the incidence of harm-causing expression. Such a perspective was employed by the Human Rights Tribunal in Nealy v. Johnston (1989), 10 C.H.R.R. D/6450, the most recent decision regarding s. 13(1), where it was noted, at p. D/6469, that: In defining "hatred" the Tribunal [in Taylor] applied the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary (1971 ed.) which reads (at p. 28):
active dislike, detestation, enmity, ill-will, malevolence.

The Tribunal drew on the same source for their definition of "contempt". It was characterized as the condition of being condemned or despised; dishonour or disgrace. As there is no definition of "hatred" or "contempt" within the [Canadian Human Rights Act] it is necessary to rely on what might be described as common understandings of the meaning of these terms. Clearly these are terms which have a potentially emotive content and how they are related to particular factual contexts by different individuals will vary. There is nevertheless an important core of meaning in both, which the dictionary definitions capture. With "hatred" the focus is a set of emotions and feelings which involve extreme ill will towards another person or group of persons. To say that one "hates" another means in effect that one finds no redeeming qualities in the latter. It is a term, however, which does not necessarily involve the mental process of "looking down" on another or others. It is quite possible to "hate" someone who one feels is superior to one in intelligence, wealth or power. None of the synonyms used in the dictionary definition for "hatred" give any clues to the motivation for the ill will. "Contempt" is by contrast a term which suggests a mental process of "looking down" upon or treating as inferior the object of one's feelings. This is captured by the dictionary definition relied on in Taylor ... in the use of the terms "despised", "dishonour" or "disgrace". Although the person can be "hated" (i.e. actively disliked) and treated with "contempt" (i.e. looked down upon), the terms are not fully coextensive, because "hatred" is in some instances the product of envy of superior qualities, which "contempt" by definition cannot be. [Emphasis added.]

61 The approach taken in Nealy gives full force and recognition to the purpose of the Canadian Human Rights Act while remaining consistent with the Charter. The reference to "hatred" in the above quotation speaks of "extreme" ill-will and an emotion which allows for "no redeeming qualities" in the person at whom it is directed. "Contempt" appears to be viewed as similarly extreme, though is felt by the Tribunal to describe more appropriately circumstances where the object of one's feelings is looked down upon. According to the reading of the Tribunal, s. 13(1) thus refers to unusually strong and deep-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification, and I do not find this interpretation to be particularly expansive. To the extent that the section may impose a slightly broader limit upon freedom of expression than does s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code, however, I [page929] am of the view that the conciliatory bent of a human rights statute renders such a limit more acceptable than would be the case with a criminal provision. 62 In sum, the language employed in s. 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act extends only to that expression giving rise to the evil sought to be eradicated and provides a standard of conduct sufficiently precise to prevent the unacceptable chilling of expressive activity. Moreover, as long as the Human Rights Tribunal continues to be well aware of the purpose of s. 13(1) and pays heed to the ardent and extreme nature of feeling described in the phrase "hatred or contempt", there is little danger that subjective opinion as to offensiveness will supplant the proper meaning of the section. (emphasis added)

As I noted in my conclusion to this post, I do not know whether Mr. Levant has crossed any legal line. That will be for the tribunal to decide, if the case proceeds beyond this stage. If nothing else, Mr. Levant wishes to test or challenge this very area of law, and he now has his opportunity.

I also will reiterate my thought that Canada will benefit from further definition from the appellate Courts on how the Supreme Court of Canada's comments are to be interpreted in a modern, internet environment. I have said as much in prior posts:

Having reviewed much of what has been written, including Ezra Levant's summary of recent tribunal decisions in the National Post, my impression, however, is that our human rights tribunals have at times been inconsistent and unduly restrictive in deciding freedom of expression cases.

That is probably as much due to the absence of any genuine guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada since 1990's Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, as any other factor.

There is a proper, but narrow role for human rights tribunals in dealing with the strongest and most noxious instances of hate speech, as originally intended. That is the law in Canada, as resolved by Taylor, and as a matter of public policy, I believe it to be a justifiable limit, to be employed in extreme, rare cases.

The human rights commissions' terms of reference badly require clarification by the courts to redefine their functions in a modern, internet-based communications universe. The primacy of the Charter of Rights in freedom of expression cases that come before the tribunals would benefit from judicial restatement.

While much of the ongoing discussion of human rights commissions has been devisive and polarized, I continue to view our Human Rights tribunals and Courts as well able to handle the challenge of striking the appropriate balance.

Finally, it has come to my attention that a few writers have inaccurately characterized my comments in the above post as somehow "calling" for specific professional sanction againt Mr. Levant. My post did not take that position.

My comments did, however, underline my sincere view that there is nothing appropriate about calling a Human Rights Commission investigator a "thug" in the midst of an investigation.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

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Thursday, January 10, 2008

Free Speech, Mark Steyn and U.S. Anti-Online "Annoyance" Law

A January 15, 2006 UPI article discusses a newly-enacted American law that reportedly goes much farther in controlling "offending" online speech than does any human rights statute in Canada.

This federal U.S. legislation apparently prohibits Internet use that is merely intended to be "annoying:"

Last Thursday President Bush signed into law the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005. Included in the law is a clause that outlaws anonymously using the Internet "with the intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass."

"The law is different from the final versions of the bill in the House and Senate," Opsahl said. "It was a bill addressing a lot of other things, and this part was slipped in."

The chief problem with the law, Opsahl said, was the word 'annoy.' "The word covers a much wider range of speech than threats," Opsahl said. "It goes beyond the cyber-stalking that proponents were worried about."

...First Amendment rights are precisely the reason the law may not stand up, Opsahl said.

"The courts historically have been very protective of the right to speak anonymously," he said. Curtis concurred. "The first time it gets taken out for a spin, it will get shut down legally," he said. Opsahl said that even if the law is not enforced, it may have a chilling effect on speech.

These laws, of course, are extremely well-intentioned. For an example of how online abuse laws may legitimately be applied to halt internet harassment, even in the case of a woman whose public vilification might be seen as justified, by some, see this story regarding ongoing web harassment of a Missouri woman involved in an internet hoax that led to a tragic teen suicide.

As the UPI article notes, however, the federal law could be open to considerably broader interpretation. Concern is stated, in fact, that the law could potentially have a chilling effect on speech.

The opponents of the U.S. legislation utilize arguments quite similar to those now being raised regarding Canadian human rights law.

Canada has been repeatedly assailed in recent weeks by U.S. commentators as lacking adequate protection for freedom of expression as compared to America. These comments have typically emerged in response to pending human rights complaints brought by members of the Canadian Islamic Congress against conservative writer and commentator Mark Steyn and Macleans magazine.

I will restate my genuine belief that each of our nations has much to proud of in the constitutional protections that are afforded to freedom of expression.

Each nation guards free speech jealously, but each also places reasonable limits at the outer fringes of communication, as defined in each country.

When challenges are launched that purport to either extend or limit the envelope of our respective Constitutional protections for free expression, our Courts must ultimately be the arbiters of where lines are to be drawn, and where they are not.

In each of our nations, such judicial deliberations are never taken lightly. Our Courts are worthy of great respect, whether we agree with their decisions or not, for the intelligence, deference to legal precedent and vigourous analysis applied.

The recent, uncritical derision of Canada and our human rights legislation places very little faith in the integrity of Canada's judiciary, and is the refuge of the uninformed and the intellectually lazy.

This concerted protest against human rights commisions is largely a Canadianized version of the US neocon cry against "activist judges."

It should be seen for what it is - a talking point by those who defend Mark Steyn instead of defending Canada and tolerance.

The complaints against Steyn way well be dubious as a matter of law, but let us not confuse who the "good guys" are here.

On a related note, if you're in the mood for a fascinating and fun read, check out the U.S. Supreme Court's June 2007 ruling in Morse v. Frederick, the so-called "Bong Hits for Jesus" case, which is one of the Court's more recent rulings on how and where at least one line is to be drawn in the vigourous debate as to permissible speech in America.

The cross-talk among the Justices is at least as interesting as the outcome of the appeal.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

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Saturday, January 05, 2008

Mark Steyn, Unplugged

Mark Steyn on CAIR: "Dialogue up to a Point"

(CAIR is the US-based Council on American-Islamic Relations)

.....

Mark Steyn on al-Husainy: Democrats Wrong to Invite Imam's Prayer


(Imam Husham Al-Husainy is director of the Karbalaa Islamic Education Center in Dearborn, Michigan)

.........

Judge for yourselves.

Is Mark Steyn truly an advocate of unfettered free speech?

If so, can his position as a self-syled champion of civil liberties be reconciled with the call he makes in these videos for the silencing of certain, allegedly "non-moderate" Islamic-American voices in the public square?

It appears that the issue boils down to this.

Mr. Steyn has regularly called for the muzzling of Islamic-American leaders whom he deems as inadequately moderate. Certain Islamic-Canadians leaders, in turn, now seek to muzzle Mr. Steyn.

I think we should be hearing from all of them.

Why? In spite of all the dubious positioning and hot air by both sides, the issues at stake go to the very root of crucial policy deliberations throughout the Western world.

Not only is the dialogue essential - it is the only way to move forward.

Canadian law does not, and must not, preclude this critical discussion on a central issue of our time.

Finally, one last point. The videos make it plain that Mr. Steyn invites political dialogue with moderate Islamic-Americans. As hyperbolic as his views may be, he does not suggest in any fashion that all Islamic-Americans are extremists. Significantly, many Islamic-Canadian leaders do not endorse the human rights complaints against Mr. Steyn.

......

Comments invited and welcome. Having said that (and based on recent experience), I'm reminding readers on all sides of the aisle that I will remove any comment containing profanity, racism, vulgarity or gratuitous personal attack.

And for readers who are new to this issue, there is more here.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

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Thursday, January 03, 2008

Hello, Mark

I agree with much of what writer Mark Steyn says in his article Wise and the ways of the world, which is his response to my last post.

Where I part ways with Mr. Steyn is in my primary characterizations of this affair.

I view the Steyn-CIC matter as an example of the broader problem of politically-driven lawsuit abuse, rather than as a specific indictment of Canada's human rights legislation.

The "real world" that I observe frequently includes litigants who cleverly exploit any legislation or legal avenue open to them in pursuit of their often-transparent advocacy agendas. Sometimes they succeed with this type of litigation. Sometimes they do not.

My faith that the judicial system will sort it all out does not imply that I welcome these claims against Mr. Steyn. It simply explains why, contrary to some, I have concluded that the future of the free world is not likely riding on their outcome.

What strikes me as noteworthy, however, is how serious Mr. Steyn has become over these complaints. From what I can gather, he used to think that politically-motivated litigation by partisan hacks with axes to grind was fodder for humour:

... Even for Bill Clinton, this is unworthy. Internwise, America divides into those who think he's Benny Hill with subpoenas and those who believe it was Richard Mellon Scaife under the Oval Office desk and he later pinned it on Monica. But either way we're interned out.

The Wrong Way to Mount Rushmore, Mark Steyn - Opinion Journal, June 27, 2004

(Ah, those good old days of Larry Klayman, when "only" the U.S. Presidency was at stake in those dubious legal attacks by what Mr. Steyn refers to as "serial plaintiffs")

Finally, on a personal note before I move on, as gifted as Mr. Steyn undoubtedly is when it comes to crafting amusing prose, I am nonetheless not pleased that immediately upon reading Mr. Steyn's post, my 'significant other' adopted his "Mr. Moderate" moniker as her new "pet name" for me - with at least as much friendly mischief in mind as that intended by Mr. Steyn.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

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Wednesday, January 02, 2008

More on Steyn, Free Speech and Human Rights Commissions

Reader Bruce K. was good enough to let me know that writer Mark Steyn has fired off yet another "rebuttal" regarding the human rights complaints against him by the Canadian Islamic Congress. See today's Calgary Herald: In rebuttal: Squashing debate like mosquitoes.

It is puzzling to me, even granted the cobwebbed modishness of these misbegotten creations of the Trudeaupian Seventies, why the Canadian and British Columbia "Human Rights" Commissions regard it as within their jurisdiction to regulate the editorial decisions of privately owned magazines. But any Canadian interested in freedom of expression should be deeply concerned by the commissions' willingness to hear this "case."

I disagree with Mr. Steyn's conclusions, although my impression remains that the complaints against him are dubious, politically-motivated and extremely unlikely to succeed.

Nonethless, the law does not provide for advance quashing of these cases on constitutional grounds, before the constitutional issues have even been considered.

It is the job of the human rights commissions to investigate and adjudicate. The Charter of Rights must be applied in those adjudications, and all human rights tribunal decisions are subject to appeal.

This is our judicial process, and for the benefit of those south of the border who cite the Steyn case as evidence that Canada "lacks a First Amendment-strength guarantee of free speech and stands in very great need of one," I will note this judicial process is in no way peculiar to Canada.

In a 1986 decision, Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Schools, the United States Supreme Court rejected the constitutionally-framed application of the privately-owned Dayton Christian Schools to permanently halt a pending investigation of its employment practices by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. In rejecting the school's claim for an injunction, the Supreme Court ruled that the Commission was entitled to pursue the investigation, and noted that First Amendment principles would be applied by the Commission in its deliberations regarding discriminatory practices alleged against the school:

From Justice Rehnquist's ruling in the Ohio case:

... Dayton filed this action against the Commission in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking a permanent injunction against the state proceedings on the ground that any investigation of Dayton's hiring process or any imposition of sanctions for Dayton's nonrenewal or termination decisions would violate [477 U.S. 619, 625] the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. App. 118-120. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the District Court should refrain from enjoining the administrative proceedings based on federal abstention doctrines. Record, Doc. No. 9, pp. 7-8. It also filed various documents defending its action on the merits.

...We have no doubt that the elimination of prohibited sex discrimination is a sufficiently important state interest to bring the present case within the ambit of the cited authorities. We also have no reason to doubt that Dayton will receive an adequate opportunity to raise its constitutional claims. Dayton contends that the mere exercise of jurisdiction over it by the state administrative body violates its First Amendment rights.

... We therefore think that however Dayton's constitutional claim should be decided on the merits, the Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating the circumstances of Hoskinson's discharge in this case, if only to ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for the discharge. [477 U.S. 619, 629]

What is uniquely Canadian (as opposed to the U.S., as I understand it) is that this country does in fact have hate speech laws. These laws are limited in application, however, to the very outer fringes - the rare and most extreme forms of vilifying and contemptable expression.

That is not Mark Steyn.

.......

The Canadian Catholic League also weighs in today on Steyn and the human rights commissions debate: Canada Catholic League Calls for Halt to Use of Human Rights' Commissions in Free Speech Cases.

I note an interesting passage in its article, however, which makes my point that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms draws a hard line between hate speech and merely offensive commentary - Human Rights Commissions may not cross that line:

In 2002, the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission ordered the Saskatoon Star Phoenix and Hugh Owens to each pay $1,500 to three complainants because of the publication of an advertisement that quoted Bible verses on homosexuality. Four years later, this was overturned by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal after the court ruled that the message, though offensive, didn't reach the level of inciting hatred. The League was part of an intervention to protest the labeling of Scriptural passages as hate speech.

This is the headnote summary (not available without subscription online) of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal's 2006 decision in that case, Owens v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission):

The publication of the advertisement, properly considered in its full context, did not offend s. 14(1)(b) of the Code, which was to be applied using an objective approach. The overriding question was whether the advertisement was characterized by intense feelings and a strong sense of detestation, calumny, and vilification. For purposes of applying s. 14(1)(b) of the Code, it was important to consider Owens' advertisement in the context of the time and circumstances in which it was published. That environment featured an active debate and discussion about the place of sexual identity in Canadian society. The advertisement was published in connection with gay pride week, which was an event promoted by the gay community as a celebration of diversity and used in part as a platform for the advancement of gay rights. In this broader context, Owens' advertisement tended to take on the character of a position advanced in a continuing public policy debate rather than the character of a message of hatred or ill. Both the Board of Inquiry and the Chambers judge erred by failing to give any consideration to this wider context. The stickmen were not depicted in a way that suggested undesirable characteristics such as dangerousness, untrustworthiness, lack of cleanliness, dishonesty, or deceit. They were presented in a neutral and straightforward fashion. As a result, there was nothing about the stickmen themselves that might engage s. 14(1)(b) of the Code. The Board of Inquiry and the Chambers judge took the Biblical passages at face value, making no allowance for the fact they were ancient and fundamental religious text. The Board and the Chambers judge assessed the passages in the same way as one might consider a contemporary poster, notice or publication saying "homosexuals should be killed." This was an error.

A human rights tribunal or court had to exercise care in dealing with arguments to the effect that foundational religious writings violated the Code. While the courts could not be drawn into the business of attempting to authoritatively interpret sacred texts such as the Bible, those texts typically had characteristics that could not be ignored if they were to be properly assessed in relation to s. 14(1)(b) of the Code. In the context at issue, the Bible passages had to be seen in a different light than a plain assertion made in contemporary times. The Bible passages did not violate the Code. Although bluntly presented and upsetting to many people, the essential message conveyed by the advertisement was not one that involved ardent emotions and strong sense of detestation, calumny, and vilification.

From the reasons for decision of Justice Richards in the Owens matter:

In other words, the Court interpreted the prohibition against ridicule,belittlement and affronts to dignity as extending only to communications of that sort which involve extreme feelings and strong emotions of detestation,calumny and vilification.[53] No other result, of course, could be justifiable. Much speech which is self-evidently constitutionally protected involves some measure of ridicule,belittlement or an affront to dignity grounded in characteristics like race,religion and so forth. I have in mind, by way of general illustration, the editorial cartoon which satirizes people from a particular country, the magazine piece which criticizes the social policy agenda of a religious group and so forth. Freedom of speech in a healthy and robust democracy must make space for that kind of discourse and the Code should not be read as being inconsistent with that imperative. Section 14(1)(b) is concerned only with speech which is genuinely extreme in the sense contemplated by the Taylor and Bell decisions

The factum (a written position summary that is filed with the court before a hearing) of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, which intervened in the Owens case, is available online, and in my view, very thoroughly summarizes the law protecting freedom of expression in Canada.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

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Monday, December 31, 2007

Mark Steyn - Washington Times Article

I am briefly quoted in today's Washington Times by writer Barry Brown, as he takes on the Mark Steyn issue in Muslim group irked by columnist's book.

The article provides a largely balanced overview of the human rights complaints pending against Mr. Steyn and the controversy over the implications these proceedings have for freedom of expression in Canada:

TORONTO — A Muslim group is suing Canada's leading national newsweekly for the right of rebuttal because it published excerpts warning of high Muslim birthrates in the book "America Alone," by syndicated columnist Mark Steyn.

The Canadian Islamic Congress filed complaints earlier this month against Maclean's magazine with Canada's national human rights commission and provincial rights commissions in Ontario and British Columbia, charging that Mr. Steyn's writings promote hatred and contempt against Canada's estimated 750,000 Muslims.

The commission in British Columbia accepted the case and has scheduled a hearing for early June.

Mr. Steyn, whose syndicated columns appear in The Washington Times, writes that rising birthrates in Muslim countries and the declining number of babies in Christian and Westernized countries represent a long-term security threat.

Mr. Steyn, in the excerpts used by Maclean's, compared Muslims to Indians in the Old West infiltrating "the white cities" and suggested many Muslims are "hot for jihad" and favor a "bloody" war against the West.

We've written quite a bit on the complaints against Mark Steyn over recent weeks and will be following up in the short future with a more detailed look at freedom of expression in Canada and the U.S.

I have a brief elaboration on the comments attributed to me in Mr. Brown's article:

Toronto lawyer Garry Wise said Mr. Steyn's writings are not hate speech. In 1990, Canada's Supreme Court moved to prevent human rights tribunals from stepping into areas of free speech by requiring the offending material show an "extreme" amount of hatred allowing for "no redeeming qualities" in the targeted individual or group. But if one of the human rights panels does rule in favor of the Islamic council, "this case could end up in the Supreme Court."

The Supreme Court of Canada's 1990 ruling in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, establishes that by virtue of Section 2 of the Charter, Canadian courts and human rights commissions may not limit freedom of expression unless a communication exposes others to an "ardent and extreme" level of hatred or contempt.

The Court drew a hard line between the rare instances of abject hatred and contempt where restriction on expression may be permitted, and occurrences of mere, subjectively offensive speech, which is constitutionally protected and plainly may not be limited by Canada's human rights commissions, courts or legislators.

According to Taylor, human rights commissions may intervene to sanction an impugned communication only in the case of "unusually strong and deep-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification."

This is an extremely high bar. In my view, the Steyn book does not rise anywhere near that level.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

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Wednesday, December 26, 2007

Steyn, Steyn, Steyn...

I referenced Vox Day's article "Heil Canada" a few posts ago.

Canadian journalist, Mark Steyn, the protagonist in a festering soap opera featuring his "epic" clash with Canada's human rights commissions, nonetheless sees fit today to honour Mr. Day as his "Reader of the Day."

As I noted in a recent response to a reader's email, I walked somewhat unsuspectingly into the Steyn issue last weekend, after simply noting the strident, anti-Canadian tone of the American take on it, as evidenced in one conservative law blog.

As I have learned, that tone has since echoed rather loudly throughout the conservative media and blogosphere.

It has been a bit of an eye opener to see the passions this issue raises, here in Canada and south of the border.

(It has also been a bit of fun, I acknowledge, to be called all kinds of nasty names by the National Review crowd that flocked to this blog in the hundreds for several days last week, virtually all of whom apparently failed to notice I largely agree with them that human rights complaints against Mark Steyn appear weak and unsustainable.)

The complainants' National Post article last Thursday, All we want is a chance to respond, did little to add substance to their contentions against Steyn.

My views, nonetheless, are not as critical of the various Canadian human rights commissions as are those of some writers. Canada's human rights tribunals do very important work in the realms of disability rights and employment law, among other areas.

This is but one case, in early stages and not yet adjudicated.

To indict Canada's human rights codes as a whole over the Steyn matter makes about as much sense at trashing the entire U.S. Constitution over any of the countless, frivolous civil rights lawsuits that regularly find their way to dismissal (and success) in America's courts.

Having reviewed much of what has been written, including Ezra Levant's summary of recent tribunal decisions in the National Post, my impression, however, is that our human rights tribunals have at times been inconsistent and unduly restrictive in deciding freedom of expression cases.

That is probably as much due to the absence of any genuine guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada since 1990's Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, as any other factor.

There is a proper, but narrow role for human rights tribunals in dealing with the strongest and most noxious instances of hate speech, as originally intended. That is the law in Canada, as resolved by Taylor, and as a matter of public policy, I believe it to be a justifiable limit, to be employed in extreme, rare cases.

The human rights commissions' terms of reference badly require clarification by the courts to redefine their functions in a modern, internet-based communications universe. The primacy of the Charter of Rights in freedom of expression cases that come before the tribunals would benefit from judicial restatement.

It may well be that the current complaints against Steyn and Macleans feature powerful enough litigants to weather the costs of tribunals and appeals, and at the end of the day generate stronger, binding legal authority from the higher courts as to when and how human rights commissions may (and may not ) assume jurisdiction.

At the conclusion of this process, I expect that protections for free speech in Canada are likely to be stronger and better defined.

I have little doubt that Mr. Steyn, however, would reject such a vision as polyannic and naive.

For Mark Steyn, it is the process itself that is illegitimate - this is nothing short of his political battle to abolish Canada's human rights commissions altogether:

I have been opposed to the HRCs in principle my entire adult life and a two-minute Lexis Nexis search will turn up any number of quotes. So if contempt for the process is likely to increase "the Tribunal"'s "sympathy" to the complainants, it's way too late.

Second, it's worth considering the logic of that lawyer's advice. He's saying that, if we make nice, we might get a fair trial and be acquitted. Sorry, that would be the worst possible outcome. It would legitimate the process, and the usual pussies at The Toronto Star et al would say: See, it proves there's no threat to freedom of speech from the HRC shtick. After all, if a notorious hatemonger like Steyn can get a fair shake, what's the problem?

Here's my bottom line: I don't accept that free-born Canadian citizens need the permission of the Canadian state to read my columns. What's offensive is not the accusations of Dr Elmasry and his pals, but the willingness of Canada's pseudo-courts to take them seriously. So I couldn't care less about the verdict - except insofar as an acquittal would be more likely to bolster the cause of those who think it's entirely reasonable for the state to serve as editor-in-chief of privately owned magazines. As David Warren put it, the punishment is not the verdict but the process. To spend gazillions of dollars to get a win on points would do nothing for the cause of freedom of speech: It would signal to newspaper editors and book publishers and store owners that it's more trouble than it's worth publishing and printing and distributing and displaying anything on this subject, and so it would contribute to the shriveling of freedom in Canada.

This is a political prosecution and it should be fought politically. The "plaintiffs" certainly understand that, ever since the day they went in to see Ken Whyte and demanded money from Maclean's. I want the constitutionality of this process overturned, so that Canadians are free to reach the same judgments about my writing as Americans and Britons and Australians and it stands or falls in the marketplace of ideas. The notion that a Norwegian imam can make a statement in Norway but if a Canadian magazine quotes that statement in Canada it's a "hate crime" should be deeply shaming to all Canadians.

This discussion will no doubt continue for quite some time.

In subsequent posts, we'll continue to take a closer look at how Canada's legislators, Courts and tribunals have addressed freedom of expression - and its limits - to date.

..........

UPDATE:

Mr. Day responds to us and others today with a new post, Canada Strikes Back. I will briefly comment.

As indicated, we do intend to discuss the limits on freedom of expression, here and in the U.S., in subsequent posts. It will be apparent by scrolling down a bit in this blog that we've already begun that process.

If that's too much trouble, consider this news report from CNN today:

Marine punished for talking to media, family says

A former Marine drill instructor convicted of abusing 23 recruits has been punished for giving a news interview from the brig, his family says.

Former Sgt. Jerrod Glass, 25, was stripped of his telephone privileges for 45 days for violating brig policy by talking to The Associated Press by phone earlier this month, according to his sister, Kim Chesnut.

Some might consider this restriction on Sgt. Glass' freedom of expression to be a reasonable limit that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic America. Others might not.

Irrespective of that debate, it is clear that this news report illustrates but one example of an apparently legitimized restriction on freedom of speech under American law.

One also want to look at this article detailing judicial misconduct proceedings pending against Massacheusetts Judge Ernest B. Murphy, over his allegedly "improper" letters to the publisher of the Boston Herald.

When discussing the Steyn matter, then, let us not buy into the fallacy that that First Amendment rights are absolute in America. They are not.

As in Canada, American freedom of expression is also subject to reasonable limits, as defined and refined from time to time.

More on that later, when we'll canvas the law around obscenity, sedition and national security, perjury, intellectual property, advertising, professional responsibility and political ethics, to name but a few areas where freedom of expression has typically been regulated or restricted, to a greater or lesser extent, in both nations, for good reason and bad.

Finally, if Mr. Day is to characterize my mention that Canada does, in fact, have constitutional protection for freedom of expression as "pulling a fast one," I am wondering how he anticipates readers might view his erroneous suggestion that Canada does not?

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

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Monday, December 24, 2007

The Nuts Have Cracked - More Hyperbole on Steyn, Free Speech and Canada's Human Rights Commissions

Just a thought...

It might be a whole lot easier to take the arguments of writers like Vox Day seriously if they didn't employ incendiary headlines like "Heil Canada."

Mr. Day's article in World Net Daily voices opposition to the human rights complaints pending against Mark Steyn and Macleans.

The debate is legitimate. The anti-Canada diatribes are not.

Regarding the article itself and a tiny point of accuracy, while Mr. Day's statement that "there is no Canadian First amendment" is technically true (as our free speech guarantees are not nested in a constitutional amendment), his readers should not be misled.

Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms affords constitutional protection to freedom of expression in Canada:

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:

(a) freedom of conscience and religion;

(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;

(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and

(d) freedom of association.

......

UPDATE: More on Mr. Day here.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

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Monday, December 17, 2007

Mark Steyn, Macleans and Canadian Human Rights

Following up on my earlier posts today, I have briefly perused the human rights complaints filed against Mark Steyn and Macleans, and have a few top line thoughts, only.

Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifically guarantees freedom of the press. Given the paramountcy of the Charter, I cannot imagine any basis upon which any of the human rights commissions involved would ultimately rule against Steyn or Macleans on these complaints.

While the comments attributed to Steyn may indeed have offended certain sensibilities, Charter protection will clearly supersede any discrimination remedy on these facts.

I do want to note, however, taking the complaints at face value for the purpose of discussion only, that if the comments attributed to Steyn had been repetitively uttered in a workplace by an employer, rather than having been published online by a clearly legitimate journalist, there may well have a strong reason for a Commission to act on a complaint of racial toxicity and discrimination in the workplace.

It is the guarantee of press freedom, rather than any savoury quality of his expression, that will protect Steyn and Macleans.

In a different context, the comments alleged might well be actionable. I am hopeful that today's barrage of conservative readers do not take umbrage with that. (But they will!)

And frankly, given that Macleans has very clearly adopted controversy-for-controversy's-sake as a new editorial and marketing direction, I suspect the magazine will gladly embrace the publicity these complaints have generated, even as its supporters protesteth a bit too loudly.

(I have included a photo of one of the magazine's recent covers, for those who may not be aware of the publication's current tendencies)

My guess is that Macleans will be defending these proceedings with one indignant eye on the tribunals and another gloating eye on its circulation.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto
...........

Update:

Some readers have expressed an interest in further background as to the balance that must be struck between the Charter's protections of free expression and the anti-discrimination provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

I've added an excerpt, below, from the majority opinion in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, which I believe will shed a bit of light on this question.

This 1990 ruling on hate propaganda represents the sole occasion on which the Court has specifically considered the Charter's freedom of expression guarantees in the context of human rights code legislation. The Court has not to date specifically addressed the guarantees of freedom of the press in this context.

Chief Justice Dickson delivered the majority opinion in what was a closely divided 4-3 court:

58 I find it helpful to address the question of whether s. 13(1) minimally impairs the freedom of expression by examining in turn the arguments marshalled by the appellants and the CCLA in support of striking down the section. One of the strongest of these arguments is the complaint that the phrase "hatred or contempt" used in s. 13(1) is overbroad and excessively vague. Specifically, it is said that the wide range of meanings available for both "hatred" and "contempt" extend the scope of the section to cover expression not causing the harm which Parliament seeks to prevent. Additionally, the appellants contend that the process of determining whether a particular communication is likely to expose persons to "hatred or contempt" is necessarily subjective, leaving open the possibility that in deciding whether a complaint is well-founded the Tribunal will fall into the error of censuring expression simply because it is felt to be offensive.

59 When considering the scope of the phrase "hatred or contempt", it is worthwhile mentioning that the nature of human rights legislation militates against an unduly narrow reading of s. 13(1). As was stated by Lamer J. in Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 158, a human rights code "is not to be treated as another ordinary law of general application. It should be recognized for what it is, a fundamental law". I therefore do not wish to transgress the well-established principle that the rights enumerated in such a code should be given their full recognition and effect through a fair, large and liberal interpretation. At the same time, however, the purposive definition to be given a human rights code cannot extend so far as to permit the limitation of a Charter right or freedom not otherwise justified under s. 1.

60 In my view, there is no conflict between providing a meaningful interpretation of s. 13(1) and protecting the s. 2(b) freedom of expression so long as the interpretation of the words "hatred" and "contempt" is fully informed by an awareness that Parliament's objective is to protect the equality and dignity of all individuals by reducing the incidence of harm-causing expression. Such a perspective was employed by the Human Rights Tribunal in Nealy v. Johnston (1989), 10 C.H.R.R. D/6450, the most recent decision regarding s. 13(1), where it was noted, at p. D/6469, that: In defining "hatred" the Tribunal [in Taylor] applied the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary (1971 ed.) which reads (at p. 28):

active dislike, detestation, enmity, ill-will, malevolence.

The Tribunal drew on the same source for their definition of "contempt". It was characterized as the condition of being condemned or despised; dishonour or disgrace. As there is no definition of "hatred" or "contempt" within the [Canadian Human Rights Act] it is necessary to rely on what might be described as common understandings of the meaning of these terms. Clearly these are terms which have a potentially emotive content and how they are related to particular factual contexts by different individuals will vary. There is nevertheless an important core of meaning in both, which the dictionary definitions capture. With "hatred" the focus is a set of emotions and feelings which involve extreme ill will towards another person or group of persons. To say that one "hates" another means in effect that one finds no redeeming qualities in the latter. It is a term, however, which does not necessarily involve the mental process of "looking down" on another or others. It is quite possible to "hate" someone who one feels is superior to one in intelligence, wealth or power. None of the synonyms used in the dictionary definition for "hatred" give any clues to the motivation for the ill will. "Contempt" is by contrast a term which suggests a mental process of "looking down" upon or treating as inferior the object of one's feelings. This is captured by the dictionary definition relied on in Taylor ... in the use of the terms "despised", "dishonour" or "disgrace". Although the person can be "hated" (i.e. actively disliked) and treated with "contempt" (i.e. looked down upon), the terms are not fully coextensive, because "hatred" is in some instances the product of envy of superior qualities, which "contempt" by definition cannot be. [Emphasis added.]

61 The approach taken in Nealy gives full force and recognition to the purpose of the Canadian Human Rights Act while remaining consistent with the Charter. The reference to "hatred" in the above quotation speaks of "extreme" ill-will and an emotion which allows for "no redeeming qualities" in the person at whom it is directed. "Contempt" appears to be viewed as similarly extreme, though is felt by the Tribunal to describe more appropriately circumstances where the object of one's feelings is looked down upon. According to the reading of the Tribunal, s. 13(1) thus refers to unusually strong and deep-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification, and I do not find this interpretation to be particularly expansive. To the extent that the section may impose a slightly broader limit upon freedom of expression than does s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code, however, I [page929] am of the view that the conciliatory bent of a human rights statute renders such a limit more acceptable than would be the case with a criminal provision. 62 In sum, the language employed in s. 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act extends only to that expression giving rise to the evil sought to be eradicated and provides a standard of conduct sufficiently precise to prevent the unacceptable chilling of expressive activity. Moreover, as long as the Human Rights Tribunal continues to be well aware of the purpose of s. 13(1) and pays heed to the ardent and extreme nature of feeling described in the phrase "hatred or contempt", there is little danger that subjective opinion as to offensiveness will supplant the proper meaning of the section. (emphasis added)


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