Showing posts with label punitive damages. Show all posts
Showing posts with label punitive damages. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 15, 2014

Punitive Damages in Ontario Employment Law - Pate Estate v. Galway-Cavendish and Harvey (Township)

American courtroom dramas and John Grisham novels tend to skew Canadian views on what punitive damages are and how they are awarded.

The Ontario Court of Appeal’s November 2013 decision in
Pate Estate v. Galway-Cavendish and Harvey (Township) provides some clarity on the awarding of punitive damages in the employment law context. 

What are Punitive Damages?

In Whitten v. Pilot Insurance, the Supreme Court of Canada articulated the purpose, appropriateness and range of punitive damage awards in Canada. An award for punitive damages is only appropriate if conduct is “high-handed, malicious, arbitrary or highly reprehensible ... that departs to a marked degree from ordinary standards of decent behaviour.” 

Punitive damages awards are not appropriate to compensate the plaintiff, but rather to provide retribution, deterrence and denunciation as a result of the defendant’s conduct. Factors a court considers on awarding such damages, including:
  • Blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct;
  • Degree of vulnerability of the plaintiff;
  • Need for deterrence;
  • Other penalties paid by the defendant; and
  • Any advantage wrongfully gained by the defendant. 
Confusion often arises with respect to the difference between “punitive” and “aggravated” damages, terms which are often conflated and used interchangeably. As per Vorvis v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, the general rule for awarding aggravated damages is to compensate the injured rather than punish the wrongdoer. 

Punitive damages, however are an exception to this rule, since they are designed to punish the conduct of the defendant. Unlike punitive damages, aggravated damages are aimed at compensating the plaintiff, while taking into account one's intangible injuries, such as distress and humiliation, that may have been caused by the defendant's insulting behaviour.

Pate Estate v. Galway-Cavendish and Harvey (Township)

After nearly ten years of employment at the Corporation of the Township of Galway-Cavendish and Harvey (the “Township”), Jordan Gordon Pate’s employment was terminated on the basis that the employer had uncovered financial discrepancies. No further particulars were provided to Mr. Pate and he was told that if he resigned the police would not be contacted. Mr. Pate refused to resign. 

Upon his dismissal, the employer turned over information to the Ontario Provincial Police which resulted in criminal charges being laid against Mr. Pate. After a four-day criminal trial, Mr. Pate was ultimately acquitted of the charges. 

Mr. Pate successfully sued his former employer for damages for wrongful dismissal and malicious prosecution. At the Ontario Court of Appeal, the Township appealed the Superior Court's award of $550,000.00 as punitive damages awarded to Mr. Pate.

Double Compensation and Double Punishment

In Whiten, the Supreme Court of Canada held that Canadian courts must refrain from awarding plaintiffs double recovery, "once under the heading of compensation and secondly under the heading of punishment (Whiten, para 116)." 

At the Court of Appeal, the Township contended that the award for compensatory damages related to many of the same factors as the award for punitive damages, resulting in "double compensation" to Mr. Pate and "double punishment" to the Township. 

These factors included:
  • Damage to Mr. Pate's reputation;
  • The Township's unfounded allegations of misconduct;
  • The Township's failure to provide Mr. Pate with particulars of the allegations or an opportunity to respond; and
  • The ultimatum provided to Mr. Pate that police would not be contacted if he resigned from his employment.
The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed in part with the Township and reduced the punitive damages award to $450,000.00

The majority opinion held that punitive damages award in this case failed to take into account the overall set of damages awarded to Mr. Pate, which also included compensatory damages in the amount of $34,100.00, general and aggravated damages in the amount of $75,000.00 and substantial indemnity costs. This, the Court concluded, was contrary to "the requirement that an award of punitive damages, 'when added to compensatory damages, must produce a total sum which is rationally required to punish the defendant (Pate Estate, para 202)."

Where the Law Stands

As stated at the outset of this blog post, Canadian courts rarely order punitive damages, and certainly steer clear of the exorbitant penalties frequently imposed south of the border. 

This ruling reiterates that "compensatory damages also punish. In many cases they will be all the 'punishment' required (Whiten, para 123)."


Nonetheless, the $450,000 award in Pate stands as an important, but rare illustration of Ontario courts' willingness to impose significant punitive damages in the employment law context.


- Nitin Pardal, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Wednesday, May 04, 2011

Altman v. Steve's Music: Moral and Punitive Damages Awarded in Ontario Wrongful Dismissal Action

A leading Canadian musical instrument retailer, Steve’s Music, has been ordered by the Ontario Superior Court to to pay more than $200,000.00 in damages, including $55,000 in moral and punitive damages, to a wrongfully terminated 59 year-old store manager with more than thirty years of service.

In Altman v. Steve's Music, a March 8, 2011 ruling by Madame Justice Katherine J. Corrick, Steve's was held liable for the wrongful dismissal of a long-term employee who had been diagnosed with lung cancer. In addition to the moral and punitive damages granted, the Plaintiff was awarded twenty-two months' salary in lieu of notice and all amounts that were outstanding under the Employment Standards Act.

After being diagnosed with lung cancer, the Plaintiff, Ms. Altman, was required to reduce her hours and to take two significant medical leaves, totalling approximately six months. Ms. Altman was terminated without reasonable notice, some 16 months following her diagnosis.

The Plaintiff was devastated by the termination and suffered a major depressive episode. The employer contended that Ms. Altman's employment had been frustrated by her illness and that she accordingly had no legal entitlement to compensation upon the termination.

The manner of the termination.

The Court took considerable exception to the manner in which the termination was conducted.

The employer did not directly communicate with Ms. Altman - rather, it outsourced the termination to its lawyers, whose handling of the matter was anything but delicate. Justice Corrick referenced pertinent passages from two letters sent by the employer's law firm to the Plaintiff for this purpose:
First Letter
We are the attorneys representing the interests of your employer Steve's Music....According to the information provided by our client, it appears that you have been remiss in your duties and obligations towards Steve's Music in failing to work minimum number of hours required by your employer from Monday to Friday . ... In view of the foregoing, we have as instructions to advise you that unless you fulfill your obligations toward your employer in full by working regular work days [sic] as stipulated by your employer's directives, Steve's Music will have no alternative but to advise you that your employment will be terminated, without further notice or delay.
Second Letter
We have as instructions from our client to advise you that in light of our correspondence addressed to both you and your attorney since October 2008 to date, as well as your application for long term disability and the fact that your position with Steve's Music, has since been abolished, Steve's Music has no obligation to reinstate you. . . . Steve's Music was full entitled to offset and deduct from your renumeration or for that matter any other sums due and owing to you, for your absenteeism, late arrivals and departures.
The first letter had caused the medically frail Ms. Altman to return to work the day immediately following receipt, for fear that if she did otherwise she would be terminated.

That would be the last day Ms. Altman worked at Steve's. Her medical needs would require her to begin a three-month medical leave immediately thereafter, which was followed by a further three-month medical leave. These leaves, apparently, were the last straws for Steve's Music.

Madame Justice Corrick's ruling addresses five issues:
  1. Does Steve's owe Ms. Altman any outstanding compensation for severance, wages, vacation, commission, bonus and deferred profit sharing plan?

  2. Was Ms. Altman's employment contract frustrated?

  3. If Ms. Altman's employment contract was not frustrated, what is the appropriate period of notice?

  4. Are moral damages for mental distress appropriate, and if so, what is the quantum?

  5. Are punitive damages appropriate, and if so, what is the quantum?
Outstanding Compensation

The Defendant took the position that it was entitled to withhold outstanding salary and substantial accumulated vacation pay from the Plaintiff, claiming set-off for overpayment. It had continued to pay Ms. Altman's full salary while she was receiving treatment for cancer and absent. It claimed a credit for these "gratuitous" payments.

Corrick J. flatly rejected the employer's position in this regard. She noted that the situations in which an employer can withhold outstanding salary and vacation pay are very narrow, indeed, and held that if Steve's genuinely believed that Ms. Altman was in arrears on account of salary, it should have cross-claimed or brought an action to recover these amounts.

Moreover, Corrick J. noted that Steve's had voluntarily made the decision to continue to pay salary to the Plaintiff while she was working at less than full-capacity; such arrangement was not contingent on Ms. Altman surrendering her other employee entitlements.

Employer's Defence of Frustration

In considering the defence of frustration put forward by Steve's Music, Corrick J. made a number of important points, each of which is worthy of specific note:
  1. Since the employer lacked medical evidence that Ms. Altman's condition was a "permanent disability" as at the date of termination (the relevant time at which the Plaintiff's disability is to be assessed) such that she would no longer be able to perform her duties at work, it could not rely on the doctrine of frustration to relieve it from its legal obligation on termination. The medical reports the Defendant sought to rely on were written more than a year after Steve's terminated Ms. Altman's employment, after Ms. Altman's cancer had spread to her brain and bones.

  2. Ms. Altman's application for long term disability benefits was not an admission by her that she had a "permanent disability" at law for the purposes of applying the doctrine of frustration of contract, even if she had met the definition of "permanent disability" as provided for in the Defendant company's Group Insurance Policy.

  3. Ms. Altman's job involved considerable paperwork. It was not a physical job entailing heavy lifting. Thus, the standard that had to be met by Steve's Music to show that Ms. Altman was physically incapable of performing her job was a high one, which it simply could not meet on the facts of the case.

  4. Despite the Defendant employer's bald assertion to the contrary, there was no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Altman had been remiss in her duties at work or that anyone was dissatisfied with her work. The fact that her cancer medically required her to work reduced hours clearly did not constitute neglect of duty.
The Period of Reasonable Notice

To determine the period of reasonable notice owed to Ms. Altman, Corrick J. turned to the oft-cited Bardal factors finding that Ms. Altman was entitled to 22 months of notice. The Court underscored that Ms. Altman's vulnerable medical state and age meant that her chances for reemployment into a comparable position were very low, and justified an extended period of notice.

Further, the long-term disability payments received by Ms. Altman during the notice period were not deductible because she, not Steve's Music, had paid the premiums, and the insurance company, not her employer, had paid the benefits.

Mitigation

Corrick J. found that Ms. Altman's modest job search efforts were enough to meet her duty at common law, and that Steve's has not discharged its onus of proving a failure to mitigate.

Moral Damages

In deciding whether Ms. Altman should be awarded moral damages, Corrick J. focused on the manner of termination and the actual damage that had been caused to the Plaintiff by the Defendant's misconduct in this regard.

She accepted medical evidence which demonstrated that Ms. Altman had suffered psychological distress consisting of a major depressive episode of moderate severity. The extent of the trauma suffered by Ms. Altman is revealed in Justice Corrick's reviews of the expert medical evidence adduced by the Plaintiff:
Dr. Li met Ms. Alman after she had undergone surgery, chemotherapy and radiation therapy. Dr. Brade referred Ms. Altman to Dr. Li as Ms. Altman was suffering from psychological distress. Dr. Li diagnosed her as suffering from a major depressive episode of moderate severity. In Dr. Li's opinion, this illness was precipitated by Ms. Altman's receipt by bailiff of October 7, 2008 letter from Kaufman Laramee informing her that she will be terminated if she does not work full-time hours. Dr. Li testified that this letter was more traumatic for Ms. Altman than being diagnosed with cancer or being told that her cancer could not be cured.
Dr. Li testified that Ms. Altman's depression required treatment because the presence of depression in cancer patients is very strongly co-related with poor survival, poor response to treatment, and higher mortality. . . .
Although Ms. Altman's depression remitted, her psychological distress has not abated, according to Dr. Li. Ms. Alman continues to be distressed over the conflicts she has had with her employer, which is activating her hormonal stress system and putting her health at further risk.
In deciding whether moral damages were warranted in Ms. Altman's case, Corrick J. emphasized that the employer's actions had to be viewed in the context of the employee's age, length of service, state of health and relationship with Steve's Music. The Court noted the following, justifying a significant award of moral damages:
  1. The letters, in particular the second letter, were highly insensitive and inappropriate, and did not accord with the way the law requires employers to treat employees

  2. If the correspondence was issued in error, why hadn't anyone from Steve's music contacted the Plaintiff to rectify the error?

  3. The Defendant employer could not have issued two aberrant letters in error; this defied coincidence.

  4. Given the Plaintiff's length of service and dedication to her job, which she had performed without incident, management of Steve's Music should have spoken with the Plaintiff about her termination personally, not pawned this off on their lawyers to deal with in a cavalier manner.

  5. The letters were replete with mistruths from the Defendant employer's lawyers and signified that the Defendant employer was engaged in a campaign of deceit, which campaign attempted to conceal the true reasons for the Plaintiff's termination: the fact that her health problems had made her too much of burden and liability for Steve's to bear. Her job performance and competence were beyond reproach.
Corrick J. awarded $35,000.00 under this head of damages, holding as follows:

[117] The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays,[37] confirmed its earlier ruling in Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd.[38] that damages resulting from the manner of dismissal will be available if the employer engages in conduct during the course of dismissal that is “unfair or is in bad faith by being, for example, untruthful, misleading or unduly insensitive.”[39] The normal distress and hurt feelings resulting from dismissal from employment are not compensable.[40] The award of damages for mental distress caused by the manner of termination must reflect the actual damage caused and is meant to be compensatory in nature.

[118] In my view, Ms. Altman is entitled to moral damages...

[129] The manner of communicating termination has been held to justify damages for mental distress. In Bohemier v. Storwal International Inc. the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld an award of damages for mental distress in circumstances where an employee of 35 years was terminated by means of a cold and perfunctory letter delivered to his house by taxi on a Friday evening.

[130] Similarly, an employer’s harsh treatment of an employee known to be in difficult circumstances has been held to be the proper subject of damages for mental distress. In Rae v. Attrell Hyundai Subaru the employer sent notice of dismissal to an employee of four years by courier two weeks prior to the birth of her child. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding that this inexcusable conduct on the part of the employer merited a two-month increase in notice.

[131] Steve’s treatment of Ms. Altman was callous and insensitive. She was a 30-year employee who had been treated like family, and who worked for Steve’s as if she were a member of the family. She deserved to be treated better than twice having a bailiff deliver her a letter replete with mistruths from Steve’s lawyers – especially when Steve’s knew she was recovering from cancer treatment. No one in the management of Steve’s had the decency or courtesy to speak to her personally to express their dissatisfaction with the work arrangement to which they had previously agreed. I conclude that once Steve’s decided that Ms. Altman had become more of a liability than an asset to the organization because of her cancer, they abandoned her to be dealt with by their lawyers. These letters devastated Ms. Altman and caused her significant mental distress to the point of clinical depression. Ms. Altman’s mental distress has been long lasting and is ongoing.

[132] I award Ms. Altman damages in the amount of $35,000.00 as compensatory damages as a result of Steve’s breach of its duty to deal with Ms. Altman in good faith and with fairness in the manner in which they terminated her employment.

Punitive Damages

In finding that the Defendant's misconduct also called for punitive damages, Corrick J. noted the following:
  1. The employer had committed multiple violations of the Ontario Employment Standards Act, including withholding salary improperly and refusing to pay Ms. Altman's statutory minimum termination pay as set out in the Act. This constituted an independent, actionable wrong, a prerequisite for an award of punitive damages;

  2. The Defendant had roadblocked the Plaintiff's attempts to obtain long-term disability benefits long after her wrongful termination by failing to complete the Policyholder's Statement in the claim form, despite numerous attempts by Ms. Altman and others to get it to do so;

  3. The Plaintiff had to retain counsel to obtain her Record of Employment which would permit her to apply for and receive Employment Insurance Benefits; and

  4. The Defendant employer had chosen to fire Ms. Altman when her illness made her more of a liability to the business than an asset.
Corrick J. awarded $20,000.00 under this head of damages, citing the employer's "reprehensible and high-handed conduct:"
[139] Steve’s conduct must be viewed in the totality of Ms. Altman’s circumstances. In October 2008, Ms. Altman had just completed very intensive cancer treatment. Steve’s did not pay her during her medical leave, which began on October 17, 2008. In fact, Steve’s did not pay her for the hours she had worked that week. Ms. Altman had no source of income. Steve’s failure to honour its statutory obligations to pay her termination pay, to provide her with a Record of Employment to allow her to obtain Employment Insurance benefits, to comply with an order made by Conway J. to provide Ms. Altman with an accounting of her share of the deferred profit sharing plan, together with the other misconduct listed in paragraph 136 is reprehensible and high handed conduct that is deserving of this court’s denunciation.
Moral Damages: The New Wallace Damages?

This ruling follows closely on the heels of Brito v. Canac Kitchens, another recent Ontario wrongful termination decision in which punitive damages were awarded against an employer for its callous treatment of an employee. In the February 2011 Brito ruling, Mr. Justice Echlin similarly admonished an employer for its conduct upon termination:

[18] Having regard for Canac’s cavalier, harsh, malicious, reckless, outrageous and high-handed treatment of Mr. Luis Romero Olguin, I award a further $15,000.00 in damages relating to its “hardball approach”.

[19] Pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays 2008 SCC 39 (CanLII), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 362, I might have considered awarding “moral damages”. However, as indicated in Natalie C. MacDonald, Extraordinary Damages In Canadian Employment Law, Toronto: Carswell, 2010 at pp. 33-168 and 812-815, the relatively new common law head of damages, in this post-Wallace world, requires considerable specificity in pleading and further evidence which was not presented at this trial.

While it may be premature to assert that these heads of damages will be awarded with increasing regularity by Ontario Courts, employers should take note that in genuine cases of misconduct in the course of termination, Ontario courts are not averse to awarding substantial damages, including significant amounts for moral and punitive damages.

Employers should proceed with caution, accordingly. Plaintiffs will certainly rely on these recent rulings to hold employers accountable for the consequences arising from bad faith in the conduct of termination.

Monday, December 20, 2010

Ontario Employment Law: Aggravated Damages in Wrongful Dismissal Cases

Aggravated damages may be awarded in wrongful dismissal actions on rare occasions to compensate an employee whose damages have been worsened or exacerbated by the employer's misconduct or bad faith upon termination.

Aggravated damages are compensatory in nature, and must reflect actual harm. They should not be confused with punitive damages, which are intended to punish or or admonish a defendant for a particularly reprehensible act that justifies public censure.

Both aggravated damages and punitive damages, however, have largely fallen out of favour in the nation's courts in employment law actions.

In a June, 2010 Ontario ruling, Branch v. CIBC, the court, referring to the seminal case in this area Honda v. Keays, stated as follows:
In order to be entitled to aggravated damages, Ms. Branch [the employee] must prove that the Bank’s [the employer] conduct during the course of dismissal constituted a display of unfair dealing or bad faith: Honda v. Keays, 2008 SCC 39 (CanLII), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 362 at paras. 56-58; Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., 1997 CanLII 332 (S.C.C.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701 at para. 98. Since aggravated damages are compensatory in nature, the employee must also prove the actual damages suffered: Honda v. Keays at para. 59.
In other words, an employee must prove actual, quantifiable injury. The Plaintiff employee in Branch was unable to do so.

While the employer might have lacked candour in the manner in which it terminated her, and terminated her for objectionable reasons, that was not enough to justify an aggravated damages award where actual damages could not be shown by the employee.

What kind of "actual damages" must a plaintiff employee prove to justify an award of aggravated damages?

While an exhaustive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article, if an employee can prove that he or she has suffered documented psychological injury beyond the typical emotional upheaval of a termination, for example, then an award of aggravated damages might be warranted if the injury was rooted in an employer's exceptional misconduct.

It must underlined that the court in Branch stressed that even where "aggravated damages" are warranted, the Plaintiff will be not be entitled to an extension of the period of reasonable notice. This was the approach previously taken with Wallace damages, prior to the Honda ruling.

Instead an employee is entitled to a monetary award that reflects actual damages suffered.

For an example of a post-Honda ruling where aggravated damages were in fact awarded, see our November 2009 article on the Ontario Court of Appeal's ruling in Slepenkova v. Ivanov: The Future of Wallace Damages in Ontario Employment Law

If you have been wrongfully dismissed, contact a lawyer for advice as to your rights and entitlements.
- Robert Tanha and Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Tuesday, July 07, 2009

Canada: Employment Law Update

I'll note two good articles on recent Canadian employment law rulings that are of considerable importance:
  • In Judicial Interpretation Of Restrictive Covenants, Ottawa Business Journal provides a good summary by Jordan Plener on the January, 2009 ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in Shafron v. KRG Insurance Brokers (Western) Inc., 2009 SCC 6 (CanLII). In Shafron, the Supreme Court of Canada overturned a ruling of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that had liberally interpreted and enforced a non-competition covenant that purported to restrict a former employee's ability to work in the Greater Vancouver area. The Supreme Court of Canada held the employer to the strict wording of the covenant, which referred to the non-existent entity of the "Metropolitan City of Vancouver" and refused to enforce the covenant. As Mr. Plener succinctly put it, "In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court held that an ambiguous restrictive covenant is prima facie unreasonable and unenforceable."

Friday, June 27, 2008

Honda and Keays: Supreme Court of Canada Rules for Honda, Punitive Damages Awards Set Aside

The Supreme Court of Canada has today released its long-awaited decision in Honda and Keays.

By a 7-2 majority, the court ruled in favour of the employer, Honda. The trial court's award of punitive damages against Honda in the sum of $500,000, subsequently reduced to $100,000.00 by the Ontario Court of Appeal, has been set aside.

We'll have more on this decision later. In the meanwhile, this excerpt from the Court's headnote summary sets out the Court's conclusions quite succinctly:

Aggravated damages should not have been awarded in this case. The employer’s conduct in dismissing K was in no way an egregious display of bad faith justifying an award of damages for conduct in dismissal. On this issue, the trial judge made overriding and palpable errors of fact. The employer’s March 28 letter to K did not misrepresent the positions of its doctors and it should not have been faulted for relying on the advice of its medical experts. There is no evidence that B took a “hard‑ball” attitude towards workplace absences or that K was being set up when asked to meet B. The employer’s request for a meeting between K and B was normal in the circumstances. The employer’s decision to stop accepting doctor’s notes was not reprisal for K’s decision to retain legal counsel. Rather, the employer was simply seeking to confirm K’s disability. Lastly, there is no evidence that K’s disability subsequent to termination was caused by the manner of termination. [34‑35] [38] [40] [43] [46‑48]

Similarly, punitive damages should not have been awarded. Punitive damages are restricted to advertent wrongful acts that are so malicious and outrageous that they are deserving of punishment on their own. The facts of this case demonstrate no such conduct. Courts should only resort to punitive damages in exceptional cases and the employer’s conduct here was not sufficiently egregious or outrageous to warrant such damages. Even if the facts had justified an award of punitive damages, both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal should have been alert to the fact that the compensatory damages already awarded carried, under the old test, an element of deterrence and they should have questioned whether punitive damages were necessary. This failure resulted in considerable and unnecessary duplication in the award of damages. [61‑62] [70]

Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal also erred in concluding that the employer’s “discriminatory conduct” amounted to an independent actionable wrong for the purposes of allocating punitive damages. The Ontario Human Rights Code provides a comprehensive scheme for the treatment of claims of discrimination. A breach of the Code cannot constitute an actionable wrong; therefore the legal requirement for the common law remedy of punitive damages is not met. Since there is no evidence of discrimination to support a claim of discrimination under the Code and no breach of human rights legislation serves as an actionable wrong, there is no need to deal with K’s request for recognition of a distinct tort of discrimination. [55] [57] [60]

The full text of the Court's decision: Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays, 2008 SCC 39 (CanLII)

For additional background, our previous articles on this important case are compiled here.

More reading:

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

EMPLOYMENT LAWCIVIL LITIGATIONWILLS AND ESTATESFAMILY LAW & DIVORCE

Thursday, June 26, 2008

SCC: Honda and Keays Update

The Supreme Court of Canada will be handing down its ruling in Honda and Keays tomorrow, according to an online report.


- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

EMPLOYMENT LAWCIVIL LITIGATIONWILLS AND ESTATESFAMILY LAW & DIVORCE

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Saturday, May 17, 2008

$8 Million Court Victory for Eccentric Collector of Antiques and Fine Art

Editors' note: We are pleased to have Alvin Starkman join us as a guest contributor to Wise Law Blog. We've previously written about Mr. Starkman, and shall thus assume he requires no further introduction. Suffice to say, we're looking forward to his continued commentaries.

This week, Alvin revisits Chubb and Sagl, a September 2007 Ontario Superior Court decison in which an Oakville, Ontario antique collector was awarded $500,000 in punitive damages after her insurer, alleging arson, refused to pay a legitimate fire-damage claim.

NOTE: The ruling discussed in this post was overturned by the Ontario Court of Appeal in a May 2009 ruling. A new trial has been ordered.

......

Bridgette Sagl was obsessed with and unusually attached to her collections … furniture, paintings, other fine art, china, glassware, clothes, jewellery, and yes antiques. Her home was like a museum according to her companion, with every square inch of wall covered with paintings, and still more packed and stored in every nook and cranny of her Mississauga home.

Between 1971 and 1994, she’d spent, sometimes with her then husband, over $300,000, in one store alone, The World of Antiques Art and Antiques Gallery, according to former owner Frank Frankfurter. So when on the night of December 16, 1997, Mrs. Sagl’s home was destroyed by fire, and Chubb Insurance Company of Canada refused to pay for her losses, the stage had been set for an ugly battle.

In the 2007 Ontario Superior Court of Justice case of Sagl v. Cosburn, Griffiths & Brandham Insurance Brokers Limited et. al., The Honourable Mr. Justice Blenus Wright was charged with determining, amongst other issues, whether or not the fire was deliberately set on behalf of the plaintiff, the amount of insurance, if Mrs. Sagl intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material facts relating to the coverage, if the insurer acted in bad faith sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages, and of course the value of the contents of the home.

The court ruling was lengthy, detailed, and filled with facts one usually encounters when watching a Hollywood movie or TV program.

Mr. and Mrs. Sagl initially lead a blessed existence, beginning their cohabitation in 1979, then in 1980 moving into a 113- acre property north of Milton called The Rockwood Estate, with a 16,000 square foot home filled with furniture, artwork and sculptures. In the 1980’s they developed Belltronics, a company which manufactured electronic components. In 1984 they married. They had children. In 1985 they purchased a large home in Jamestown, Barbados. Their company had facilities in Mississauga, Buffalo, France, Germany, Holland and Georgia. The Sagl’s had a 10,000 square foot Georgia mansion, a penthouse in Germany and an apartment in Italy.

Money was available to fund a lavish lifestyle where Mrs. Sagl was able to satisfy her penchant for collecting. However two events burst the bubble: Mr. Sagl’s affair with Mrs. Sagl’s sister, and the recession of the late 80’s and early 90’s which took a toll on Belltronics’ fortunes. The matrimonial proceedings were acrimonious.

After her marriage broke up, Mrs. Sagl did not manage her finances very well, perhaps due to her earlier standard of living with an abundance of money around, and her husband handling the bills. She never came to realize that she was responsible for paying the expenses, nor that she had to budget. At the time of the fire her mortgages, utilities and taxes were in default and she owed an additional $800,000. But there were considerable funds due and payable to her from her husband as a result of the separation and the order of a family court judge, and she had significant equity in her home (and a second home next door). And of course there were the antiques and collectibles.

But Chubb maintained that she deliberately set the fire, or rather had someone do it, so she could get out of debt by getting the insurance proceeds. It contended that the house had been “staged” in preparation for the fire to occur that evening by reason of the maid having the night off, the Sagl’s son staying at a friend’s home, the dog being left outside, and Mrs. Sagl being out for dinner with her companion. And it pointed to notes and reports of the Office of the Fire Marshall (OFM), which both suggested an outright alleged arson, based on the foregoing facts, as well as the functioning of the alarm system, several probable points of origin of the fire, windows being left ajar, and more.

Justice Wright, however, opined that the OFM used tunnel vision, and did a rush to judgment. Chubb relied on the OFM’s reports and “findings,” which the judge found to be seriously flawed, without Chubb doing its own thorough and even-handed investigation. And when it came to Mrs. Sagl, her lawyers, and her experts setting out their version of the facts, it became clear to the judge that the plaintiff’s story was much more probable. Their answers to the suspicions and allegations of Chubb and the OFM were logical and credible: it seemed more likely that the fire had ignited from one place of origin in the basement, with cause “undetermined” (although there was a more logical and innocent source); the “staging” was unlikely, based upon several additional facts and circumstances including that Mrs. Sagl would have been putting her daughter, son-in-law and grandchild who were living in the home next door at great risk; and, Mrs. Sagl’s financial circumstances were not so dire as to lead someone to have their home torched to get out from under debt … her net equity including what was likely owing to her from Mr. Sagl, was significant.

One of the most troubling aspects of the case for Justice Wright, however, casting doubt on the theory of the case and version of the facts proffered by Chubb, related to something with which we all, as collectors of antiques, jewellery and fine art, can identify. Would someone like Mrs. Sagl, clearly obsessed with her collections more than most of us, go so far as to destroy them, under any circumstances, no matter how dire her financial situation? Would you or I? The judge reasoned that Mrs. Sagl was simply not capable of having her home, with all her possessions, torched, just to obtain insurance proceeds. He wrote:

“Who is it who continues to purchase … when there is no more display space?”

“Who stores numerous paintings … on top of each other throughout the house?”

“Who is it who has multiple sets of china and glassware
The answer: someone who has an unusually strong passion for collecting and who just loves to surround herself with “objets d’art.”

Justice Wright continued that Mrs. Sagl had been betrayed by her husband and her sister, her marriage was destroyed, her lavish lifestyle funded by Belltronics was gone, and son Ryan had his own life to live. All she had left was her collections which she had spent years accumulating along with the memories of collecting all of it. When we as collectors look at various antiques in our homes, as much as admiring a piece we often recount the hunt or happenstance resulting in the acquisition.

Justice Wright continued:

"What would the plaintiff gain by torching her possessions? Insurance money could never replace her collections. If she was interested in money she could have sold her collections.”
In fact he noted that Mrs. Sagl had heard of a hot stock tip, borrowed $350,000 at 24% interest to invest and lost it all. “Why not sell some possessions instead of running up a debt which costs interest at 24%,” he asked, answering that obsessed with her collections, she wasn’t about to relinquish any of her lifetime endeavours. Not then, and not to bring a defaulting mortgage into good-standing.

In dealing with the issue of insurance coverage, a Binder of Insurance had been issued 11 weeks before the fire, but no policy had been provided. There were disputes regarding the amount of coverage, exclusions, special riders, and so on. Justice Wright concluded that the Binder was the contract of insurance, and that Chubb was sloppy, unprofessional and utilized poor business practices, in particular in not using written confirmation regarding changes to coverage it contemplated or apparently believed to govern, and not obtaining Mrs. Sagl’s written consent. The onus was on Chubb, and it came nowhere close to discharging it, in its effort to try to restrict coverage.

Regarding allegations of misrepresentation and fraudulent filing of the claim, once again the judge was very critical of Chubb, citing Chubb’s own shortcomings in its investigation, and in its presentation of its case at trial in attempting to discredit Mrs. Sagl.

The stage had been set for the trial judge to pass judgment on the issue of punitive damages, ordered only when a defendant’s conduct is malicious, oppressive and high-handed. In this case, Justice Wright found that Chubb had breached its duty to act in good faith to Mrs. Sagl by:

  • utilizing poor underwriting procedures to determine and restrict coverage, and
    then alleging wrongdoing against an innocent insured;
  • failing to consider the evidence in an impartial and common sense way, in circumstances where there was no direct evidence to implicate the plaintiff;
  • pre-judging the cause of the fire as arson the day after the fire, and thereafter denying the plaintiff coverage for her additional and ongoing living expenses (recoverable under the terms of the insurance contract);
  • conducting itself in a reprehensible fashion by alleging commission of a criminal offense without putting forth any supporting evidence, and
  • knowing the high standard of proof in order prove fraud in a court of law, continuing this pattern of conduct for 10 years, from the day after the fire occurred, through the conclusion of trial.
In the end, Justice Wright ordered Chubb to pay $500,000 in punitive damages, in addition to the further sums of $802,308.45 on account of dwelling losses, $600,000 for contents, $1,000,000 for jewellery, $2,000,000 for fine art and $132,046.02 for warehousing, for a total of $5,034,354.47, plus interest and costs … bringing the total award to over $8,000,000.

Particularly surprising is that while in this case Justice Wright described Chubb’s conduct against Bridgette Sagl as malicious, oppressive and high-handed, in the same court in the year 2000, another judge in a different case involving the same Bridgette Sagl, described her conduct against someone else, in the same vein.

In that case Mrs. Sagl agreed to promote and sell the works of artist Ruth von Bismark, and simply kept the art for herself…some of the same pieces of art destroyed in the 1997 Sagl house fire. Mrs. Sagl was ordered to pay Ms. Bismark, amongst other amounts, $50,000 in punitive damages, an award upheld on appeal.

In the Chubb case, it should come as no surprise given the size of the award and the issues, that insurer is appealing the decision. Counsel for the insurance company has advised me that the hearing of the appeal likely will not take place until near the end of this year.


- Alvin Starkman, M.A., LL.B, Oaxaca

Alvin Starkman received his Masters in Social Anthropology in 1978. After teaching for a few years he attended Osgoode Hall Law School, thereafter embarking upon a successful career as a litigator until 2004. Alvin, a good-standing member of the Law Society of Upper Canada, now resides with his wife Arlene in Oaxaca, Mexico, where he writes, leads small group tours to the villages, markets, ruins and other sights, is a consultant to documentary film production companies, and operates Casa Machaya Oaxaca Bed & Breakfast.

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