Monday, January 20, 2014

140 Law - Legal Headlines for Monday, January 20, 2014

Here are the leading legal headlines from Wise Law on Twitter for Monday, January 20, 2014:
- Rachel Spence, Law Clerk

Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Friday, January 17, 2014

140 Law - Wise Law's Legal Headlines for Friday, January 17, 2014

Here are the leading legal headlines from Wise Law on Twitter for Friday, January 17, 2014:
- Elysia Cherry, legal Assistant 
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Thursday, January 16, 2014

Intentional Under-Employment - Judges Tell Payors "Get a Real Job!"

When will Ontario's courts impute income to a parent for the purpose of calculating his or her child support obligations?

Section 19(1)(a) of the Child Support Guidelines grants the court the right to impute income to a parent if deemed appropriate to do so under the circumstances.  For example, the court may impute income to a payor parent above and beyond his or her reported earnings if the evidence indicates that the parent is intentionally under-employed or unemployed.  The decision of whether to impute income is guided by the consideration of the following factors: the age, education, experience, and skills of the parent as well as the parent’s past earning history and the projected quantum of income the parent could potentially earn if he worked to his capacity. 

A three-step test for imputing income was enunciated in the case of Drygala v. Pauli, 2002 Carswell Ont 3228 (C.A.):  
  1. The first step is to ascertain whether the father is intentionally under-employed.  The onus to establish this is on the parent seeking to impute income.  
  2. If the answer to this question is answered affirmatively, the second step is to ask whether the intentional under-employment is by virtue of the reasonable needs of the child or the reasonable educational or medical needs of the payor parent.  The onus to establish this second part of the test falls on the payor.  
  3. If the answer to this second question is no, the third and final step is to determine the amount of income that should be imputed.
The case of Rodrigues v. de Sousa, 2008 ONCJ 807 highlights the fact that the determination of what quantum to impute is highly discretionary and each case turns on its own individual and unique set of facts.  

For example, in Rodrigues, the court unequivocally found that the payor father was under-employed. 

Background:  

The parties lived together from 1992 until September 19, 2005 and had one child together.  At the time when the mother made a motion for interim child support against the payor father, he was sixty years old.  The mother took that position that the court should attribute income of $100,000 to him in light of his notable work history and credentials.

The father was an experienced life insurance salesperson and financial advisor and was employed in those fields since 1973.  From 1990 to 1998, he worked for Standard Life as a branch manager.  At the time that he left this company, he earned over $150,000 per annum.  He subsequently began working for Edward Jones as a financial advisor.  In 2002, he incorporated his own business, called Previdente Financial Corporation, which sold life insurance policies and RRSPs.  He worked nowhere else but this business since 2002.

The father also held the following certifications: Certified Financial Planner, Chartered Life Underwriter and Chartered Financial Consultant. For the past three or free years, he earned less than $2,500 in self-employment income according to his income tax returns.   Prior to the motion, he was paying child support pursuant to an interim order based on an income of $15,828.  At the motion, the mother entered into evidence a transcript from a discovery that was conducted.  The transcript revealed that during the past six years, the father had applied for only one job. 

Judge’s Findings:

The motion judge was clearly unimpressed with the father’s efforts to gain reasonable employment:“It makes no sense to me that someone with the father’s skills and experience would, for six years, choose to continue a self-employed venture that provides him with an income that would make him eligible for social assistance.  The one job application he referred to was only made in April of 2008.  His failure to seek employment in these circumstances is unreasonable.  The first part of the test in Drygala v. Pauli is met.  I find that the father is intentionally under-employed.”  The court found that the second part of the test was not met as the father provided no evidence to support a claim that he was unable to work due to medical reasons.

When it came to the third part of the test and determining the appropriate income to attribute to the father, the judge found that the mother’s position was overreaching in light of his circumstances.  The mother filed into evidence reports published by provincial and federal governments demonstrating that the average annual income in the father’s line of work ranged from $70,000 to $110,000.  She argued that these figures were representative of the income that should be attributed to him.  The judge, however, was reluctant to impute this income to the father for a number of reasons.  First, it was found that this evidence should be treated with “considerable caution” in that it was unsworn hearsay evidence untested by cross-examination.  

There were practical considerations that militated against imputing income of a managerial level to a payor who had not worked in that post for many years and who, at his age, was unlikely to be hired by anyone at such a high starting wage.  Ultimately, the judge rejected the published figures and found that while the payor was indeed under-employed, he was reasonably capable of earning $45,000, either through his own employment venture or by procuring employment.   He deferred to the trial judge to adjust the temporary support order after all of the evidence had been heard and tested at trial.

Rodrigues demonstrates that the courts will not countenance parents shirking their ongoing obligation to support their children and, to that end, will ensure that child support orders reflect what the parent is reasonably capable of earning.  

- Ana Kraljevic, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Lawyers: To Blog or Not To Blog (Today @SlawTips)

In my post today at SlawTips, I answer a reader's question about blogging for lawyers:
Hello Mr. Wise, 
…I am considering blogging this year. I was wondering if you have some insight on whether it has advanced your practice, and if so, in what way? Thank you for your input.
My response:

Blogging is an extremely effective way to build your firm’s reputation for expertise. It is also quite an effective tool for establishing an online footprint that appeals to users and Google alike.

It works best if posting is done on a consistent basis with regular updates. You will not likely see results right away, but over time, the cumulative impact will likely be quite significant.
 Read more at SlawTips: Lawyers: To Blog or Not to Blog

Feel free to ask your own practice-related questions by email or via Twitter.
- Garry J. Wise, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

140 Law - Legal Headlines for Thursday, January 16, 2014

Here are the leading legal headlines from Wise Law on Twitter for Thursday, January 16, 2014:
- Elysia Cherry, Legal Assistant
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Wednesday, January 15, 2014

Punitive Damages in Ontario Employment Law - Pate Estate v. Galway-Cavendish and Harvey (Township)

American courtroom dramas and John Grisham novels tend to skew Canadian views on what punitive damages are and how they are awarded.

The Ontario Court of Appeal’s November 2013 decision in
Pate Estate v. Galway-Cavendish and Harvey (Township) provides some clarity on the awarding of punitive damages in the employment law context. 

What are Punitive Damages?

In Whitten v. Pilot Insurance, the Supreme Court of Canada articulated the purpose, appropriateness and range of punitive damage awards in Canada. An award for punitive damages is only appropriate if conduct is “high-handed, malicious, arbitrary or highly reprehensible ... that departs to a marked degree from ordinary standards of decent behaviour.” 

Punitive damages awards are not appropriate to compensate the plaintiff, but rather to provide retribution, deterrence and denunciation as a result of the defendant’s conduct. Factors a court considers on awarding such damages, including:
  • Blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct;
  • Degree of vulnerability of the plaintiff;
  • Need for deterrence;
  • Other penalties paid by the defendant; and
  • Any advantage wrongfully gained by the defendant. 
Confusion often arises with respect to the difference between “punitive” and “aggravated” damages, terms which are often conflated and used interchangeably. As per Vorvis v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, the general rule for awarding aggravated damages is to compensate the injured rather than punish the wrongdoer. 

Punitive damages, however are an exception to this rule, since they are designed to punish the conduct of the defendant. Unlike punitive damages, aggravated damages are aimed at compensating the plaintiff, while taking into account one's intangible injuries, such as distress and humiliation, that may have been caused by the defendant's insulting behaviour.

Pate Estate v. Galway-Cavendish and Harvey (Township)

After nearly ten years of employment at the Corporation of the Township of Galway-Cavendish and Harvey (the “Township”), Jordan Gordon Pate’s employment was terminated on the basis that the employer had uncovered financial discrepancies. No further particulars were provided to Mr. Pate and he was told that if he resigned the police would not be contacted. Mr. Pate refused to resign. 

Upon his dismissal, the employer turned over information to the Ontario Provincial Police which resulted in criminal charges being laid against Mr. Pate. After a four-day criminal trial, Mr. Pate was ultimately acquitted of the charges. 

Mr. Pate successfully sued his former employer for damages for wrongful dismissal and malicious prosecution. At the Ontario Court of Appeal, the Township appealed the Superior Court's award of $550,000.00 as punitive damages awarded to Mr. Pate.

Double Compensation and Double Punishment

In Whiten, the Supreme Court of Canada held that Canadian courts must refrain from awarding plaintiffs double recovery, "once under the heading of compensation and secondly under the heading of punishment (Whiten, para 116)." 

At the Court of Appeal, the Township contended that the award for compensatory damages related to many of the same factors as the award for punitive damages, resulting in "double compensation" to Mr. Pate and "double punishment" to the Township. 

These factors included:
  • Damage to Mr. Pate's reputation;
  • The Township's unfounded allegations of misconduct;
  • The Township's failure to provide Mr. Pate with particulars of the allegations or an opportunity to respond; and
  • The ultimatum provided to Mr. Pate that police would not be contacted if he resigned from his employment.
The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed in part with the Township and reduced the punitive damages award to $450,000.00. 

The majority opinion held that punitive damages award in this case failed to take into account the overall set of damages awarded to Mr. Pate, which also included compensatory damages in the amount of $34,100.00, general and aggravated damages in the amount of $75,000.00 and substantial indemnity costs. This, the Court concluded, was contrary to "the requirement that an award of punitive damages, 'when added to compensatory damages, must produce a total sum which is rationally required to punish the defendant (Pate Estate, para 202)."

Where the Law Stands

As stated at the outset of this blog post, Canadian courts rarely order punitive damages, and certainly steer clear of the exorbitant penalties frequently imposed south of the border. 

This ruling reiterates that "compensatory damages also punish. In many cases they will be all the 'punishment' required (Whiten, para 123)."


Nonetheless, the $450,000 award in Pate stands as an important, but rare illustration of Ontario courts' willingness to impose significant punitive damages in the employment law context.


- Nitin Pardal, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

140 Law - Legal Headline for Wednesday, January 15, 2014

Here are the leading legal headlines from Wise Law on Twitter for Wednesday, January 15, 2014:
- Elysia Cherry, Legal Assistant
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Tuesday, January 14, 2014

140 Law - Legal Headlines for Tuesday, January 14, 2014

Here are the leading legal headlines from Wise Law on Twitter for Tuesday, January 14, 2014:
- Rachel Spence, Law Clerk

Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Monday, January 13, 2014

140 Law - Wise Law's Legal Headlines for Monday, January 13, 2014

Here are the leading legal headlines from Wise Law on Twitter for Monday, January 13, 2014:

- Elysia Cherry, Legal Assistant
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Friday, January 10, 2014

Family Law Agreements: When Independent Legal Advice is Not Enough

In the spirit of encouraging parties to settle their own affairs, courts are generally loathe to overturn domestic contracts. That being said, if a domestic contract is manifestly unfair to the point of unconscionability, the court reserves the right to set aside an agreement that has been executed and purports to settle all the issues between spouses. 

Why would a domestic contract be deemed unconscionable? 

Contrary to popular belief, independent legal advice is not a condition precedent to the legal enforceability of a domestic contract. Ofcourse, obtaining independent legal advice is the best way to ensure that the domestic agreement will be upheld and fairly reflects the interests of both parties so as to protect it from being challenged later on. 

The only requirements for a valid domestic contract are that it must be in writing, signed, and witnessed. Section 56 of the Family Law Act sets out the most common reasons as to why a domestic contract may be set aside, in whole or in part. They include the following: 

  1. A party to the contract failed to disclose a significant asset or debt in existence when the contract was executed.
  2. A party failed to understand the nature and consequences of the agreement (therefore raising issues of capacity). 
  3. Any other ground upon which an agreement may be attacked pursuant to the ordinary principles of contract law. 
This last reason encompasses fraud, duress, or undue influence. 

A lawyer who is retained to provide ILA should be careful that his or her client has received full financial disclosure and that the contract is consistent with the client’s objectives. There should be no doubt in the lawyer’s mind that the client is signing the contract freely and voluntarily. Merely providing this advice and having the client provide verbal assurances that no undue influence is at play may not be sufficient. 

In the 2000 case of Bradley v. Bradley, the Supreme Court of Ontario affirmed rationale previously set out in in Youngblut v. Youngblut (1979), 11 R.F.L. (2d) 249 (Ont. H.C..  
In Youngblut,  the plaintiff had received independent legal advice when signing a separation agreement. Nevertheless, Justice Carter found that due to duress, she was not bound by the agreement: 
In the case before me while it is true that the plaintiff obtained independent legal advise [sic], and while she may well have been told that on the law then existing she had a right to institute a partition action in which she might well be successful, that is small comfort to a person who wished to have food on the table and a roof over her head at the instant moment and not six months or more from then. I am of the opinion that the pressure upon her, bearing in mind the respondent’s past conduct towards her and his harassing telephone calls, would constitute undue influence and cause her to ignore her solicitor’s advice and execute the deed in return for the money owing to her.
Therefore, Youngblut v. Youngblut demonstrates that simply going through the motions and obtaining legal advice as proof that all four corners of a domestic contract are being observed is simply not enough. The lawyer must be fully apprised of the client’s situation, and that includes not only the history of the relationship and its breakdown, but the current state of the client’s relationship or marriage, the client’s health and emotional states as well as the client’s objectives in entering into the domestic contract. 

The lawyer should fully canvass the full nature of the agreement with the client, along with its attendant risks, effects, and consequences. Only by going through this comprehensive process can the client and the lawyer protect themselves from surprises later on.    
- Ana Kraljevic, Toronto

140 Law - Wise Law's Legal Headlines for Friday, January 10, 2014

Here are the leading legal headlines from Wise Law on Twitter for Friday, January 10, 2014:

- Elysia Cherry, Legal Assistant
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Thursday, January 09, 2014

140 Law - Legal Headlines for Thursday, January 9, 2014

Here are the leading legal headlines from Wise Law on Twitter for Thursday, January 9, 2014:
- Rachel Spence, Law Clerk

Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net

Paternity Testing in Ontario: Perhaps Damned If You Do, But Certainly Damned If You Don’t

Paternity testing, in most cases, is requested in applications in which child support is sought from a putative father, necessitating a declaration of parentage under sections 4 or 5 of Ontario's Children's Law Reform Act.  Biological parentage, however, is but one of the factors that create an obligation to support a child in light of policies that have long recognized that support is the right of the child, not the parent.   
The laws governing the right of the child to receive financial support contemplate a host of scenarios that preserve and safeguard this right, with the best interests of the child trumping any other competing consideration.  For example, where a male may not be the biological father of the child, and this is later proven by paternity testing, he may still be responsible for providing child support if, by his conduct, he has demonstrably stepped into the stead of a parent. 
The wording of Section 31 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, as amended, expressly imposes this legal obligation to support children who are not blood relations:  A parent has an obligation to provide support for his or her child. The child support obligation extends to a biological child, an adopted child, or a child to whom a person has demonstrated a "settled intention" to treat as a member of his family.  
Therefore, if a male has been providing financial support to a child who he mistakenly believes is his, for any number of reasons, and can be shown to have met the test of demonstrating a “settled intention” he will be liable to pay support.  His belief that he is actual biological father is often based on the same set of circumstances which create a presumption of paternity in law.    
Section 8 of the Children's Law Reform Act set out factors that establish a presumption of paternity. 

8.  (1)  Unless the contrary is proven on a balance of probabilities, there is a presumption that a male person is, and he shall be recognized in law to be, the father of a child in any one of the following circumstances:
1. The person is married to the mother of the child at the time of the birth of the child.
2. The person was married to the mother of the child by a marriage that was terminated by death or judgment of nullity within 300 days before the birth of the child or by divorce where the decree nisi was granted within 300 days before the birth of the child.
3. The person marries the mother of the child after the birth of the child and acknowledges that he is the natural father.
4. The person was cohabiting with the mother of the child in a relationship of some permanence at the time of the birth of the child or the child is born within 300 days after they ceased to cohabit.
5. The person has certified the child’s birth, as the child’s father, under the Vital Statistics Act or a similar Act in another jurisdiction in Canada.
6. The person has been found or recognized in his lifetime by a court of competent jurisdiction in Canada to be the father of the child. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, s. 8 (1).
However, even if one of the circumstances set out in section 8 of the Children’s Law Reform Act can be shown to exist, it is just one factor for the court to turn its mind to.  The Court will look at the totality of evidence in exercising its discretion to recognize paternity as well as its accompanying legal implications.  Therefore, any factor establishing a presumption of paternity is rebuttable in the light of all the evidence.   
If a putative father is contesting paternity and the applicant seeking child support wishes to remove any doubt about parentage, the wisest course of action may be to apply for leave to obtain a paternity test.
Section 10(1) Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 12, as amended, provides as follows:
  • 10.(1) On the application of a party in a civil proceeding in which court is called on to determine a child's parentage, the court may give the party leave to obtain blood tests or DNA tests of the persons who are named in the order granting leave and to submit the results in evidence. 2006, c. 19, Sched. B, s. 4
Obtaining a paternity test may not only be a wise course of action for a party seeking contribution for her child, but it can also provide peace of mind to the putative father before he commences any payments and shows any conduct establishing a loco parentis role.  Since the court can presume that a putative father is the biological father if he refuses to take a paternity test, and the evidence he adduces is insufficient to rebut the presumption, the Children’s Law Reform Act effectively removes any incentive to refuse testing by reserving the right to make an adverse inference in any event. Thus, a party contesting paternity should undergo testing to provide the clearest proof that would rebut the presumption established by any of the factors listed in s. 8 of the Children's Law Reform Act. The case of R. v. S. [1988] O.J. No. 2788 is an example of what a wise investment a paternity test would have been to the Applicant, Mr. R. 
In 1982, a court order was made that compelled Mr. R. to provide support to a child born out of wedlock to Miss S.  The mother, Miss S., assigned the payments to the Ministry of Community and Social Services.  Four years after the order was originally issued, Mr. R. obtained leave to have Miss S., the child, and himself, submit to blood tests in order to ascertain parentage.  As a result of these tests, it was conclusively determined that Mr. R. could not be the father of the child, and, consequently, an uncontested declaration of non-paternity was issued in the Supreme Court of Ontario.
Mr. R. filed two motions with the court. The first was to rescind the  original support order, while the second motion was for an order to recover the monies Mr. R. paid pursuant to the 1982 order. Mr. R. sought reimbursement from COMSOC of the sum of $2,080, a figure which was not disputed.
The court granted an order rescinding the original order for support, but held that there were no legal grounds for recovery of the monies already paid out.  It was clear that there was never a proper factual basis for the support order and therefore a credible basis for retroactively discharging the original support order made.  The judge nonetheless held he had no jurisdiction to make an order directing the repayment of support paid pursuant to the original order.  “By discharging the order today, the legal embarrassment is lifted, but if I cannot order the return of the support paid, Mr. R. will find little solace in the situation.”
“Discharging an order retroactively does not include an inherent statutory power to correct inequities which may arise when the order is discharged. The Family Law Act does not confer upon me a power to order COMSOC to repay to Mr. R. the sum of $2,080 which he paid as support for a child whom we now know not to be his. I therefore deny Mr. R.'s second motion.” Moreover, as a judge of the Provincial Court (Family Division), he concluded that he lacked the jurisdiction grant equitable relief, a power then reserved to the Supreme Court, the former District Court and the Unified Family Court pursuant to Section 109(3) of the Ontario Courts of Justice Act.
Therefore, while the Court may certainly sympathize with parties who have paid support on mistaken grounds, often for lengthy periods of time, it will not necessarily be able to order repayment of support.  Early paternity testing can eliminate this risk, and provide greater certainty to parents, and ultimately the child, from the outset.
- Ana Kraljevic, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Office website: www.wiselaw.net