Showing posts with label BC Courts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BC Courts. Show all posts

Monday, July 02, 2012

B.C. Judge Calls Vintage Auto “Frankenstein’s Monster of Automobile World”

In 1987 John Gabriel acquired 1961 Studebaker Hawk. In 2002, he agreed to sell it to Robert Watterworth. Neither of them realized that the vintage automobile was an amalgam of two Studebakers with different Vehicle Identification and Serial numbers, one made in the US and the other in Canada, and of parts from other cars, rendering it a virtual Frankenstein.

In the British Columbia Supreme Court case of Gabriel v. Watterworth, decided in April, 2012, Mr. Gabriel sued to force compliance with the terms of the contract, while Mr. Watterworth sought to get out of the deal. Both parties agreed when they struck the deal that the car was worth about $20,000. So was Mr. Watterworth’s 3.5 acres of land that he agreed to sign over in exchange for the Studebaker. The problem was that while the vehicle was probably worth no more than $20,000 at the time of trial, the land value had increased to about $95,000.

Mr. Watterworth was driving in the country with his lover at the time, Ms. Flynn. They spotted the Studebaker on Mr. Gabriel’s property and stopped to find out more about it. Ms. Flynn liked how it looked. Most of the interior and chrome trim was missing, but Mr. Gabriel indicated he had all the necessary pieces to make the car whole. He told them it was a 1961 Hawk although the supercharger was not the right one for a 1961 Studebaker; but that nevertheless it was a very rare car. The parties decided to swap land for car. Mr. Watterworth wanted to fix up the car to give to Ms. Flynn as a gift.

A few days later Mr. Watterworth received the car, and purportedly the missing pieces. He took it to a collision shop to find out the cost of making it roadworthy. He was informed that some parts were missing and others were broken. He also learned that one of the two front hoods that came with the car and the trunk lid were from a 1958 Studebaker Golden Hawk, and the other front hood was of 1961 vintage, but had been modified. Mr. Watterworth elected to do nothing about these problems. In March, 2003, Mr. Gabriel contacted Mr. Watterworth since he wanted the land transferred to his name in compliance with the deal. They met and signed a contract that had been prepared when they had met previously, stating that Mr. Watterworth agreed to trade his described property for a 1961 Studebaker Hawk, indicating the serial number.

Mr. Watterworth’s evidence was that his signed the contract after he knew of the problems with the car and was unsatisfied with it, because he hoped that Mr. Gabriel would follow through and supply all the parts needed to complete the car.

Between 2002 and 2009 Mr. Gabriel paid all the taxes on the property. Mr. Watterworth had been sending him the bills. In 2008 Mr. Gabriel demanded that Mr. Watterworth transfer the land. At first Mr. Watterworth used an excuse that there was a title issue with the land. Then he simply refused to transfer it. He finally shipped the car back to Mr. Gabriel.

Some time after the contract was signed but before the car was returned to Mr. Gabriel, Mr. Watterworth learned that the car had two different VINs (for a US and a Canadian manufactured Studebaker), and a second serial number, this one from a 1958 Golden Hawk. Mr. Watterworth also learned that in 1961 Studebaker did not produce a car with a supercharged engine. It appeared clear that the vehicle was made from at least the two Studebakers, one 1958 and another 1961.

Mr. Gabriel sued Mr. Watterworth, demanding that the contract be completed with the land transfered to him. According to Mr. Gabriel, he could not be held liable for any promises outside of the terms of the 2003 contract. He delivered a 1961 Studebaker Hawk to Mr. Watterworth, with all available parts.

Mr. Watterworth claimed rescission of the contract. He was promised a complete 1961 Studebaker Hawk but instead received an amalgam of two cars, so Mr. Gabriel fundamentally breached the contract, and Mr. Watterworth entered the deal under a mistake. He believed that Mr. Gabriel had or could source the parts to make a whole 1961 vehicle.

Justice Rogers stated that the contract was part written and part oral, since there was nothing in the written document stating that there could be no other terms, representations or warrantees. Most written contracts have clauses stating that the written terms are all of the terms unless there is something else in writing changing them. This contract did not have such wording so the judge was able to determine the full extent of the deal through evidence of conversations and not just the written document. He found that the contract was to deliver a complete 1961 Studebaker Hawk, albeit one with a 1958 supercharged engine from another car.

The judge found that Mr. Gabriel fundamentally breached the contract and that Mr. Watterworth was entitled to rescission. Mr. Watterworth was ordered to pay Mr. Gabriel the money he had paid for the land taxes plus interest on the payments, and Mr. Gabriel was ordered to pay costs of the proceeding to Mr. Watterworth.

Counsel for Mr. Gabriel indicated that his client did not instruct him to appeal, a costly process. But the decision is problematic:
  • Both parties stated the car was worth $20,000, and so was the land, so wasn’t Mr. Watterworth getting what he bargained for?
  • The judges stated that if the car would have been in Mr. Watterworth’s possession at the time of trial, he would have ordered the car valued and ordered Mr. Watterworth to pay Mr. Gabriel for it, on the theory that Mr. Watterworth wanted it. Should the fact of returning the car before trial change the whole outcome?
  • When the deal was struck, Mr. Watterworth knew that it was not a complete 1961 Studebaker, since he knew that Studebaker did not use a supercharged engine that year. He had the car in his possession, with parts, when he signed the contract. Would a reasonable person sign a contract without all the parts, knowing that the car was not a complete 1961 model, unless he wanted it, as is?
  • Why did Mr. Watterworth do nothing for eight months, until Mr. Gabriel demanded the land, and why did he keep sending Mr. Gabriel the tax bills if he had concerns? 
  • At the time of trial Ms. Flynn was no longer Mr. Watterworth’s lover and thus Mr. Watterworth no longer had any use for the car, an intended gift for Ms. Flynn. 
  • At the time of trial there was another important change; the value of the land had increased substantially.
It appears that Mr. Watterworth wanted to get out of the deal because his land had substantially increased in value, but the car had not, and more importantly he would no longer have use for it because he had broken up with Ms. Flynn.
- Alvin Starkman, Oaxaca, Mexico
Alvin Starkman received his Masters in Social Anthropology in 1978. After teaching for a few years he attended Osgoode Hall Law School, thereafter embarking upon a successful career as a litigator until 2004. Alvin, a good-standing member of the Law Society of Upper Canada, now resides with his wife Arlene in Oaxaca, Mexico, where he writes, leads small group tours to the villages, markets, ruins and other sights, is a consultant to documentary film production companies, and operates Casa Machaya Oaxaca Bed & Breakfast.
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Tuesday, November 23, 2010

"...A Place Where Both Prostitution and Polygamy are Legal"

Today's snark from Law.com: What Happens in Canada Stays in Canada:
If you are not into the whole "monogamy" thing, Canada may soon be the place for you. If two cases now going through the court system go the right way wrong way the same way, Canada may soon be a place where both prostitution and polygamy are legal.
The Ontario Court of Appeal will rule Saturday on whether to continue a stay of a September 28 Ontario Superior Court decision that struck down Canada's anti-prostitution laws.

And in British Columbia, Canadian Press reports that Supreme Court Justice Robert Bauman has denied an Application by CBC to televise hearings, commenced today, which are considering whether Canada's anti-polygamy laws should be upheld.
- Garry J. Wise, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Saturday, November 20, 2010

B.C. Ex-Spouse Awarded $40,000 For Defamatory Facebook, Internet Posts

Vancouver Sun reports on a British Columbia Supreme Court damages award against a former "life partner" over defamatory online postings during a bitter family law dispute:

"The reality is that Dr. [Patrick Michael] Nesbitt has taken his battle with [Wendy] Neufeld over custody and access far outside the ordinary confines of the Family Court litigation," B.C. Supreme Court Justice R. Crawford said in a recent ruling.

...Neufeld sued for defamation and breach of privacy after Nesbitt waged an online battle against her, making vicious comments about her and some friends through such avenues as Facebook and YouTube.

One online site referred to Neufeld as "mean," "weird" and "sneaky," in addition to more mean-spirited postings.

The court awarded Neufeld $40,000 in damages, finding that "Dr. Nesbitt engaged in reprehensible conduct."

The B.C. Supreme Court's ruling, which includes a good survey on the Canadian law of defamation, is here: Nesbitt v. Neufeld, 2010 BCSC 1605 (CanLII).

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto
Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Thursday, August 12, 2010

B.C. Court: Loss of "Promising" Law Career Assessed at $5.1 Million

In a decision released August 9, 2010, a Britsh Columbia Supreme Court Judge has assessed the value of a young lawyer's loss of income capacity, after injuries arising from an unfortunate dance hall accident essentially ended her budding legal career.

In assessing these economic damages at $5.1 million, The Honourable Mr. Justice Kelleher noted the Plaintiff's potential value as a "rainmaker" to prospective, large-firm employers:
[325] Mr. Mallett also noted that the plaintiff was very effective at bringing new clients into the firm. She brought in work that was above her level of expertise, which is unexpected for a junior lawyer.
[326] Mr. Pakrul stated that the plaintiff had “above average ability, perhaps extraordinary ability to successfully market in cold-call situations where she didn’t know anybody and in situations where she was simply working with existing contacts or clients.”
[327] Peter Snell was also a lawyer at Alexander Holburn, becoming a partner in 2003. He agreed that the plaintiff had very good business development skills.
[328] I accept that the plaintiff had the skill to become a successful rainmaker, and would likely bring a substantial volume of business to whatever firm she worked for. However, as counsel for Lombard points out, it is important to keep in mind that the plaintiff was only a junior associate with limited experience at the time she left Alexander Holburn. Accordingly, some caution must be exercised in basing a pattern of future success or “rainmaking” on this relatively short period of employment.
[329] The four considerations listed in Brown v. Golaiy are all present here: Ms. Danicek has been rendered less capable overall from earning income from all types of employment; the plaintiff is less marketable or attractive; she has lost the opportunity of taking advantage of all job opportunities which might otherwise have been available to her; and is less valuable to herself as a person capable of earning income.
[330] It is highly likely that she would have stayed in the workforce and achieved a substantial income as a successful commercial solicitor.
[331] Ms. Danicek has a residual earning capacity which I have described above.
[332] In all the circumstances, a fair and reasonable assessment of the plaintiff’s loss of capacity, net of her residual earning ability, is $5.1 million. It is so awarded.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

B.C. Polygamy Charges Quashed

City News reports that polygamy charges against Winston Blackmore and James Oler have been quashed by the British Columbia Supreme Court:

The men had petitioned the court to stay the charges, arguing that the B.C. attorney general had gone "special prosecutor shopping" until he found someone who would go ahead with charges.

In a decision released Wednesday, B.C. Supreme Court Judge Sunni Stromberg-Stein agreed.

The judge said the province's attorney general did not have the jurisdiction to appoint a second special prosecutor to consider charges against Blackmore and Oler after the first special prosecutor recommended against charging the two men.

She found that the appointment of the second special prosecutor - and therefore the decision to charge the men - was "unlawful."

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

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Saturday, August 15, 2009

The Tale of the Art of Norval Morrisseau, and the Artifacts of Grand Forks

Canadian art and Canadian artifacts; their worlds are often distinct. However last year they merged in two courts, illustrating how egos, principles, and perhaps greed, can motivate individuals and groups which are purportedly acting solely in the interest of a greater public good.

The Ontario case of Mcleod (Maslak Mcleod Gallery) v. Sinclair, 2008 CanLII 67901 (ON S.C.), deals with the art of the late great prolific First Nation artist, Norval Morrisseau, and alleges “forgeries” or “counterfeits” of his work. The British Columbia proceeding, Boundary Museum Society v. City of Grand Forks, 2008 BCSC 898 (CanLII), involves a plaintiff and a defendant with the same basic interests, arguing over the protection and housing of between 12,000 and 14,000 artifacts from the communities of Grand Forks and the Kootenay Boundary Regional District.

In the Morrisseau action, four galleries and one distributor, all engaged in identifying, purchasing, holding and selling the works of Norval Morrisseau, are suing Ritchie (“Stardreamer”) Sinclair, alleging that through his website (www.Morrisseau.com) Sinclair is defaming the plaintiffs by falsely and without justification stating that works of art attributed to Morrisseau, owned or held by them, are not genuine. Sinclair responds that his motivation is to perform a public service and to assist in protecting Morrisseau’s legacy.

At an early stage in the court case the plaintiffs brought a motion requesting a temporary injunction to have Sinclair’s website shut down pending trial. The main proceeding, framed as a defamation action, seeks a permanent injunction, monetary damages and other relief.

In his decision, Justice Lederer acknowledges that it’s generally known that there is a concern that there are a number of paintings on the market which are identified as Morrisseau’s work, when they are not.

The motion was heard December 8, 2008, prior to cross-examinations on the affidavits filed by the parties. So the veracity of the allegations had not been tested, and in fact a lengthy affidavit of Sinclair, sworn January 5, 2009, had not yet been filed with the court. In that affidavit Sinclair explains in detail why he believes that many of the works offered for sale by the plaintiffs are fakes, and enumerates in detail the rationale for his belief that galleries, auction houses and ebay are offering paintings for sale that are not Morrisseau’s. He goes to great lengths to explain his expertise in terms of the Morrisseau art, based on his investigation, and importantly his lengthy master-protégé relationship with Morrisseau.

Each of the plaintiffs, the judge stated, asserts that the claims made attacking the pictures are in error and the paintings are genuine. Yet Sinclair’s website identifies works which have been offered for sale by one or more of the plaintiffs, alleged to be “fakes,” “counterfeits,” “imitations,” “stolen,” “inauthentic,” and so on. He names names, so to speak, of particular plaintiffs and specific works of art.

The judge noted that Sinclair has made it his personal concern to identify, uncover, make known and even publicize works said to be those of Morrisseau which he believes are false. The contents of the website alone clearly support the judge’s statement.

At issue is the right of freedom of expression, and the appropriateness of a court to stifle it before trial and before the allegations have been tested through cross-examination.

The judge found that: on their face, the comments and observations of Sinclair are defamatory; Sinclair had not yet had an opportunity to fully respond to the allegations that his comments are erroneous; Sinclair’s right to freedom of expression must be borne in mind; and both sides have a right to protection under the law.

Justice Lederer struck a balance, acknowledging that the website is in the public domain, and that while the proceedings are public, court records are not easily available. He ordered that the website can remain up pending further court order, provided that Sinclair place a notice on each page of the website which refers to the lack of authenticity of Morrisseau paintings, stating the court file number and the following:

“The opinions expressed on this website and on this page are those of Ritchie ‘Stardreamer’ Sinclair and of no other person. These opinions are alleged to be defamatory and are the subject of an action in the Superior Court of Ontario.”

The motion for temporary relief was adjourned to February 18, 2009, presumably so that further affidavits and transcripts of cross-examinations would be filed with the court. Counsel for the defendant has advised me that there have not yet been cross-examinations; that the motion was subsequently adjourned to March 18, 2009; and then once again without a fixed date to re-appear in court.

The plaintiffs run businesses, at least to some extent for profit, and believe that their reputations are wrongfully being besmirched. However it is reasonable to assume that part of their motivation for commencing proceedings was to maintain the integrity of the art world at large and serve the interests of collectors of Canadiana. The defendant, on the other hand, appears to be inspired by pure altruism, and concern that the public is being misled, without profit motive. It therefore seems that at least one of the parties is being driven solely by concern for the public, and the other in an indirect fashion.

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The B.C. case is much more striking in terms of both parties having a similar, if not identical public interest. Boundary Museum Society (the “Society”) was formed in 1980 to educate the people of Grand Forks and Kootenay on historical artifacts, their cultural significance, and the effect of the artifacts on the communities, through providing a museum and archives. Its bylaws provide that the Society’s members shall include The City of Grand Forks (the defendant “City”), its Mayor, its Chief Administrative Officer, a city councilor and electoral area directors for Kootenay. Despite the striking connection between the Society and Grand Forks, the Society sued the City regarding matters relating to the artifacts.

The Society operated its museum in premises owned by the City, free of rent and utilities. The premises eventually became dilapidated, and water leakage and electrical problems put the collection at risk. In 2005 the City voted to demolish the building and the following year the Society proposed that the museum be moved to the former courthouse building once renovations had been completed. The City then pursued a redevelopment plan for the town square, including a park and premises in the courthouse for the museum, and an art gallery. In 2007 the Society refused or neglected to sign a form of lease. A number of months later the City advised the Society of the town square redevelopment plans, which included demolition of the old building with anticipation of a timely and orderly move to the former courthouse. The City alleged that the Society was not cooperating. Shortly thereafter the City locked the doors to the museum.

Two weeks later the Society advised the City that the collection could not be moved until Fall, 2008. But because of the City’s contractual obligations, it became necessary to move the collection before the end of February so that demolition could proceed in an orderly fashion pursuant to the City’s plan. The City engaged two curators to supervise and record the collection, and a mover to package, label and remove it to a secure temporary location.

The Society started a court action asking for a declaration that it owns the entire collection, and not just the artifacts which had been assigned to it by donors. It brought a motion to restrain the City from selling, disposing of or dealing with the collection. Mr. Justice Brooke dismissed the motion, stating that the Society had not made out a case for irreparable harm. He found no evidence that the City had any intention of inappropriately dealing with the collection. In fact the City invited Society representatives to be present when the artifacts were to be moved.

The judge’s commentary was more important than his decision, since it brings us to the point of this article:

“I only wish to add that it is regrettable when two parties with such a large and important community of interest are unable to agree to a reasonable resolution of what seems to me to be a very narrow issue, which, given the public’s beneficial interest, may be no issue at all. The collection is being moved from a high-risk environment to a secure one, an environment which everyone agrees is a good idea. At the end of the day, does it really matter who “owns” the collection as between the City and the Society?”

In the B.C. case, the judge’s concluding remarks will probably lead to a resolution of the entire lawsuit. The public in due course will once again have an opportunity to view and learn from a segment of Canadian pre-History. In the Morrisseau case, we can only hope that a much-needed court-ordered mediation will devise a mechanism whereby all can agree to a means by which the fakes can be differentiated from the authentic works, so as to remove a dark cloud which has been haunting the mastery of Norval Morrisseau. Only then will the public interest truly be served.
- Alvin Starkman, Oaxaca, Mexico

Alvin Starkman is a member of The Law Society of Upper Canada. However, this article is not intended to be and should not be relied upon as constituting legal advice or opinion. Alvin and Arlene Starkman, former Toronto residents and collectors of Canadiana, moved to Mexico in 2004. They operate Casa Machaya Oaxaca Bed & Breakfast.

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Update: August 17, 2009

We received a comment today, purporting to provide an update as to the Ontario litigation referenced in this article. While we have no reason to deny the authenticity of this comment, we are unable to verify the authorship or the information provided therein. Accordingly, we must regretfully decline to publish it.

- Garry J. Wise

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

Thursday, April 09, 2009

B.C. Court: Facebook Usage Logs Must Be Disclosed by Personal Injury Claimant

A March 5, 2009 British Columbia decision has greatly expanded the scope and nature of Facebook usage information that Plaintiffs in personal injury claims may be required to disclose.

In Bishop v. Minichiello,  the B.C. Supreme Court has ordered production of computer logs from a Plaintiff's hard drive that will purportedly reveal details as to the wee hours Facebook habits of the injured Plaintiff.  

B.C. personal injury lawyer, Erik Magraken, reported on the Court's ruling at ICBC Law Blog:

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court (Bishop v. Minichiello) dealing with this issue.  In today’s case the Plaintiff allegedly suffered a brain injury as a result of the negligence of the defendants.  The Defendants wished to analyze the Plaintiff’s computer hard drive to ‘determine the period of time the plaintiff spends on Facebook between eleven at night and five in the morning‘.  The Plaintiff refused to produce his computer hard-drive and this resulted in a Court motion seeking an order compelling the Plaintiff to do so.

Mr. Justice Melnick granted the motion and ordered that ‘the parties agree on an independent expert to review the hard drive …to isolate and produce to counsel…the information sought or a report saying that the information sought is not retrievable.’.

In his reasons, Mr. Justice Melnick considered the Plaintiff's legitimate privacy interests, the fairlyly narrow scope of the disclosure requested, and the relevance of the information that would be revealed by granting the order requested:
[55]            It is true the Bishop family computer is more akin to a filing cabinet than a document; however, it is a filing cabinet from which the plaintiff is obligated to produce relevant documents.  This sentiment was approved in Chadwick.  Simply because the hard drive contains irrelevant information to the lawsuit does not alter a plaintiff’s duty to disclose that which is relevant.  If there are relevant documents in existence they should be listed and produced (or simply listed if they are privileged). 
;56]         ...The plaintiff advised Dr. Zoffman that his sleep varies with the time one of his friends goes to bed.  This is because he spends a substantial amount of time on Facebook chatting with this friend.  The plaintiff alleges that ongoing fatigue is preventing him from maintaining employment and thus his late-night computer usage is relevant to matters at issue in this lawsuit.
...[57]            The information sought by the defence in this case may have significant probative value in relation to the plaintiff’s past and future wage loss, and the value of production is not outweighed by competing interests such as confidentiality and the time and expense required for the party to produce the documents.  Additionally, privacy concerns are not at issue because the order sought is so narrow that it does not have the potential to unnecessarily delve into private aspects of the plaintiff’s life.  In saying that, I recognize the concern of the plaintiff that to isolate the information the defence does seek, its expert may well have consequent access to irrelevant information or that over which other family members may claim privilege.  For that reason, I direct that the parties agree on an independent expert to review the hard drive of the plaintiff’s family computer and isolate and produce to counsel for the defendant and counsel for the plaintiff the information sought or a report saying that the information sought is not retrievable, in whole or in part, if that is the case.  I grant liberty to apply if counsel cannot agree on such an independent expert or if other terms of this order cannot be agreed. 
The Bishop decision should be considered together with February's Ontario Superior Court ruling in Leduc v. Roman, in which disclosure of a Plaintiff's non-public Facebook content was similarly ordered.  

The Ontario Court found in Leduc that it was "reasonable to infer that his social networking site likely contains some content relevant to the issue of how Mr. Leduc has been able to lead his life since the accident.”

As we noted last month in Facebook, Disclosure, Leduc and Ontario Employment Law, online postings at social media sites may well now be fair game for disclosure in Ontario civil litigation. 

With the B.C. ruling in Bishop, it is clear that the Facebook disclosure trend in becoming a national one.

Importantly, Bishop has extended the potential scope of social media disclosure that may be required beyond mere content to include production and discovery of metadata and user logs where that information may be directly relevant to factual matters that are raised in the litigation. 

In other words, in terms of potential disclosure by Plaintiffs, it no longer is just about what their Facebook and similar pages say - now, it might also be about when and how they use these sites.

The broader question, still unconsidered, is whether this ever-increasing potential for forensic examination of  Plaintiffs' personal computers and computing histories in civil court actions may have a chilling effect on the willingness of some individuals to assert their entitlements in Canada's courts, at all?

Friday, March 27, 2009

Toronto Parental Alienation Conference

The National Post reports on a Toronto conference for lawyers, professionals and parents on parental alienation: Custody Judges Rule on Vengeance.

Also see coverage from the Globe and Mail: Gender Bias Evident in Parental Alienation Cases.

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

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Thursday, March 19, 2009

B.C. Court Decides Competing Survivor Pension Claims Between Widow, Ex-Spouse

Stan Rule has another excellent post at Rule of Law today.  He reports on MacMichael v. Strocel, a January 2009 ruling of the B.C. Supreme Court that decided between the competing entitlement claims of a widow and a deceased's former wife to payment of federal survivor benefits under the Public Service Superannuation Pension Plan.

The former spouse was entitled to the husband's monthly survivor benefit pursuant to a 1971 separation agreement.  He remarried in 1973.

Subsequently, the terms of federal employees' Superannuation Pension Plan changed - under the current pension plan, only the deceased's widow has an entitlement to the monthly $1,200.00 benefit.

The Court ruled in favour of the widow.  As Mr. Rule points out:
Fern MacMichael asked the court to declare that James MacMichael held the survivors’ benefits in trust for her. She argued that the separation agreement created a trust, or alternatively that allowing Marie MacMichael to keep the benefits would unjustly enrich her.

Madam Justice Stromberg-Stein ruled that the widow was entitled to keep the survivors’ benefits. The separation agreement did not contain wording that would create an express trust for the benefits.

The Court also rejected the argument that the widow was unjustly enriched.